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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate Saudi Arabia's policies for 
diversification. Economic diversification only became a realistic 
possibility £allowing the first major oil price rise in the early 1970's. 
Not surprisingly the immediate reaction was to follow the example of 
western industrialised countries, and consequently very ambitious plans 
were discussed. This over reaction was scxm rationalised. The Second 
Development Plan covering the 1975-1980 period, laid the £oundations £or 
diversifying the economy by providing for ~he creation of a muCh needed 
infrastructure. It was left to the Third Development Plan covering the 
1980-1985 period, to define a selective approaCh to industrialisation so 
that only the economically feasible projects remained. 
It is rather too early to assess just how successful the Third Plan 
has been. The rrost that can fairly be asked is: has the Government begun 
to implement its policies for economic diversification? The abrupt change 
in revenues alrrost £arced the Government to rely on imports £or development 
if it v.I}_shed to take imnediate action because of its limited danestic 
economy. Consequently, industrialisation in Saudi Arabia is largely 
dependent on imports, and most diversification amounts to the 
implernentation of imrort substitution fOlicies. D:p:xt diversification is 
virtually the export of any goods or services other than oil. It is thus 
essential to analyse the determinants of imports ond exports a..!ld to look at 
recent trends. 
i>: 
Foreword 
The image of Saudi Arabia is sometimes one of ranance with sheikhs 
spending millions of p::>unds an diamonds or other Whims of fancy, rather 
than the nore realistic one of econanic planners ITBking careful, rational 
decisions. The Saudi Arabian Goverrnnent has drawn up three developnent 
plans to date: the First Plan 1970-1975, the Second Plan 1975-1980 and the 
Third Plan 1980-1985. Each is based on well thought out econanic 
objectives, pushing or pulling the econcrny in a specific direction. One of 
the general aims of this thesis is simply to show that Saudi Arabia has a 
sensible development strategy. It should provide an insight into scrne of 
the decisions taken, Which have been dictated by the country's econanic 
environment. In p:trticular, this thesis attempts to evaluate Saudi 
Arabia's policies for economic diversification. 
Economic diversification only became a realistic possibility after the 
well-documented price increase of oil in 1973-1974. It was only at t.his 
time, at least in the Short term, that financial constraints were removed. 
The growing econany required careful monitoring and planning, especially as 
the Government wished to ensure that Saudi culture remained intact, p::>ints 
looked at in the first introductory chapter. 
TI1e Governm61t ~~shed the economy 2~d its people to imma4iately 
benefit fran these revenues but the lirni ted, existing danestic econany made 
it essential to JTBJ<:e use of irn_rorts. Ifil[...Orts then acted as the so-called, 
engine of grDv.'i:h for develo;menti t~he oe.-n'3nd for irnp::>l"tS increased an:J the 
economy soon became dependent on i_mp:)rts in order to sustain growth. 
X 
if they are rontributing to future development we analysed in chapter 2. 
The determinants of imports are examined using formal linear regression 
analysis as these detenninants are also likely to be crucial for imJ:ort 
substitution and hence economic diversification. Regressions have not been 
attempted before using Saudi data. Chapter 3 on imp:::>rt substitution 
presents hitherto unused material as the tables were compiled using 
unpublished industrial survey data. With this major exception it was 
mainly necessary to use secondary sources, although primary data fran the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the Ministry of Planning were also used. 
Saudi Arabia has little industrial tradition. It was thus a necessity 
-w use exp:ftriate workers to implement these inq:ort substitution p:>licies . 
As chapter 4 shows, a number of problems surround this • Without doubt the 
use of expatriate labour has a high opportunity rost politically, socially 
and econanicall y. Another problem is that the natural depletable resource, 
oil, is almost the only foreign exchange earner. In Saudi Arabia there is 
an evident need for export diversification. The country aims to exploit 
its comparative advantage. Oonsequently, export diversification is largely 
based an the use of oil or gas as major inputs. 
The evaluation of economic diversification policies in Saudi Arabia 
- -
involves the observation of the country's external relations. Without 
llnp::lrts, industrialisation cannot ta}:e place and oil revenues fund these 
imports. Import substitution polices and export diversification policies 
must go hand _in hand. Tne economic l:Bse must be deveJ oped first tn p3ve 
the v.>ay for export diversification policies. The last cl1apter thus lCDks 
at the implications of a.~nomic diversification for the Balance of 
Payment:s. 
1 
CHAPI'ER 1 
INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS AND PCJI'ENTIAL 
1 . 1 THE PROBLEM OF OVERDEPENDENCE 
Saudi Arabia is a single-commodity economy. As will become apparent, 
the daninance of oil in the country' s foreign exchange earnings, government 
revenue and as a source of growth of national incane is the rrost obvious 
characteristic of the econanic system. However, the oil sector is not an 
important source of employment. 1 
Before 1970 Saudi Arabia oil revenues were only a fraction of their 
post 1970 dimensions. Indeed at the end of the 1960 's so little had the 
focus of the Saudi Arabian economy nnved towards oil that the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) remained a significant source of government 
income and emplOjm1ei1t for the local fOpulation. The high prestige of 
employment based on the hajj and the periodic return of this work remains 
an influence on the employment p3.tterns of Saudi Arabian nationals even 
today. The natural conservatism of Saudi Arabia's leaders meant that 
modern development proceeded cautiously: there was protracted debate about 
the impact of m:x'iernity upon rroral values. This can be illustrated by t.he 
large proportion still working jn the (rat.her ill-defined) sector, 
'agriculture and nomadism'. In 1970 virtually one half of the Saudi 
Arabian e....'"'Ononically active Jnrour force, was still in this sector. At 
this time the 'agricult_ure and nanadism' sector wn.s traditional in 
2 
organisation and its technology was largely that of sUbsistence hill 
fanning. 
This was in sharp contrast to the oil industry. The low levels of 
educational attainment and limited modern sector employment experience of 
Saudi nationals meant few CJpiX>rtuni ties. for them to work in the oil sector. 
The various arms of government and pUblic administration represented the 
principal alternative to farming for nost Saudi Arabians - thus in 1970 
their employment options were very much the same as they had been for the 
past century. Terms of service and conditions in the PJlice, anny and 
civil service did improve. Yet, many Saudi Arabians of urban background 
continued to follow private trading pursuits, as this existence sui ted 
their attitude and expectations of life. Ironically, the concern of the 
time, despite the limited impact of rrcd.ernity, was that change was 
ed . 'dl 2 proce 1ng too rap1 y. 
In Saudi Arabia today, the concern is centred on the need to diversify 
the econanic base of the econany. There is a problem of overdependence on 
the oil industry, as becomes clear from the figures on the distribution of 
gross dcrnestic pro::luct ( GDP) according to economic activities. This 
analysis can be observed in two ways: at a PJint in time and, from a 
dynamic view by looking at ~he way the shares of various econcrnic activities 
have been behaving over time. The latter approach will first be adopted. 
During tlle thirteen year perioj from 1965 to 1978 tl1ere were 
sigr1ificant structural changes in the econany of Saudi Arabia so far as 
industrial origin of the GDP was concerned. There is a sharp contrast in 
3 
the composition of economic activity between 1965 and 1978, as table 1.1 
shows. Firstly, there was a relative shift to crude petroleum and gas 
Whose share of GDP peaked in 1974 and declined through the rest of the 
decade. The dramatic price rise for oil in 1973-74 resulted in significant 
reductions in the relative contributions of all non-oil activities in the 
econany in favour of crude oil and gas prcrluction. Secondly, same sectors 
of the econany achieved increased shares : construction 5 • 5 to 14 • 3 per 
cent; government services 3. 6 to 6. 8 per cent; and transport, storage and 
communications 1. 7 to 4. 5 per cent. This is in tenns of current prices but 
the situation is different When viewed at constant prices, that is, in 
tenns of real GDP. 
In tenns of constant prices, the structural shift appears to be less 
prcminent as might be expected When the significant rate of inflation has 
been accounted for. The table shows that the following activities all 
increased their shares of real GDP between 1965 and 1978: "other 
manufacturing", construction, corrmerce, restaurants and hotels, services 
and, other minerals. This occurred not only at the expense of crude oil 
and natural gas production, but also at the cost of reduced shares of other 
non-oil activities, suCh as, agriculture and government services. Over the 
thirt€len year period--it appears that the structure of t,h~ economy of Saudi 
Arabia in general shifted in favour of crude oil and gas production and 
construction. There was rrovement away from imp::>rtant sectors such as 
agriculture. In short, it appears that crude oil an:J natural gas 
pro:Juction generated 56 .4 per cent of GDP at factor o::>st (current prices) 
in Saudi Arabia in 1978. At constant prices t.his sector's share is reduced 
to 46.9 per cent. It is very unlikely that the next five years will show 
Table 1.1 
Seu+di Arabia's Gross fumestic Product by Economic Activity (per cent) 
Type of economic activity Current prices 
1965 1975a 1976a 1978b 
Constant prices 
1965 1975a 1976a 1978b 
Agriculture, forestry :;md fishing 
Mininr; ;:md quarry:l_ng: 
Crude petroleum and natural gas 
Other minerals ' 
Manuf:~.ctudng: 
Petroleum refining 
Other manufacturing 
EJ ectricity, gas and water 
Construcl:ion 
Commerce, restaurants and hotels 
Transport, storage and corrmmications 
Servi cc-s: 
Ownc~rship of dwellings 
Otherc 
Camnunity services 
Less bank charges 
Subtotal (GDP) of population 
Government services 
GDP in a factor cost 
8.5 
44.2 
44.0 
0.2 
8.3 
6.4 
1.9 
1.3 
4.9 
7.0 
7.2 
4.8 
4.2 
0.6 
5.5 
91.7 
8.3 
100.0 
1.0 
75.2 
75.0 
0.2 
5.2 
4.1 
1.1 
0.1 
5.5 
2.8 
1.7 
3.9 
2.5 
1.4 
0.9 
-0.2 
96.1 
3.9 
100.0 
0.9 
66.9 
66.6 
0.3 
4.9 
.3. 6 
1.3 
0.1 
9.6 
3.8 
2.5 
5.1 
3.2 
1.9 
1.2 
-0.3 
94.7 
5.3 
100.0 
1.0 
56.9 
56.4 
0.5 
4.4 
2.6 
1.8 
0.1 
8.3 
44.2 
43.9 
0.3 
8.0 
6.2 
1.8 
1.1 
14.3 5.2 
4.9 7.1 
4.5 6.9 
5.7 4.8 
3.4 4.2 
2.3 0.6 
1.5 5.7 
-0.7 
92.6 91.3 
7.4 8.7 
100.0 100.0 
3.7 
54.9 
54.6 
0.3 
6.3 
4.1 
2.3 
1.0 
7.8 
6.0 
4.1 
7.0 
5.2 
1.8 
1.0 
-0.2 
91.7 
8.3 
100.0 
3.5 
51.1 
50.8 
0.3 
6.2 
3.8 
2.4 
1.0 
9.6 
6.8 
4.6 
7.6 
5.6 
2.0 
1.1 
-0.2 
91.4 
8.5 
100.0 
Notes: a. Revised estimates. b. Preliminary estimates. c. Less imputed bank service charges. 
3.2 
47.3 
46.9 
0.4 
6.4 
3.8 
2.6 
1.3 
10.9 
8.5 
5.6 
8.3 
6.1 
2.2 
1.1 
-0.3 
92.3 
7.7 
100.0 
Source: Computed from SAMA, Statistical Sunmary, 1st issue (Rj_yadh, 1977), Tables 27 and 28, and 2nd issue 
(1977), Tables 28 and 29; SAMA, Annual Report (1977), Tables 28 and 29, pp. 146-9 and (1979), Tables 19 
~1d 30, pp. lGS-8. 
Source: El Mallekh, R. Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development, p. '29. 
_c, 
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the same upward trend. The desire I10VJ is to follow policies Which restrict 
production and encourage the diversification of the economy. 
Turning to expenditure patterns depicited in table 1.2 1 it is possible 
to discover how much private consumption I government consumption 1 capital 
fonnatian and foreign accumulation of savings have been taking place. The 
share of government ronsumption has increased quite ronsistenly over the 
last decade. This can be explained by the desire of the Saudi Government 
to share the wealth generated by oil with the Whole population via 
mechanisms of sUbsidies, provision of social services and increased state 
sector _anployment. That is, pJ;:ivate ronsumption is not an adequate measure 
of the econc:mic welfare of the population. The situation in Saudi Arabia 
is different to that existing in the west: private ronsumption to a large 
extent depends on government const.nnption. Private consumption and 
government consumption are complementary and the problem of the 1 crowding 
out effect 1 , Whereby private consumption is squeezed, does not arise to any 
great extent in Saudi Arabia . In other words I one does not take place at 
the expense of t.he other, a point lmked at in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
Between 1971 and 1978 the economy perfGrmed remarkably well by growing 
at an annual rate of 26.7 per cent. T'ne expansion lies in increased oil 
revenues although the years 1970 to 1975 saw an acceleration in the rate of 
inflation. The real rate of gruwth of GDP is muc.h lower than the naninal 
rate, that is, 14 .1 per cent. In so f-=tr as consuTnption per capita r<ay be 
regarded as a measure of how well off the Saudi population is beconing, the 
average citizen see_ms to be enjoying a steadily improving standard of 
Table 1. 2a 
Gross Domestic Product of Saudi Arabia by Expenditure Categories 2 19S3-70 (SR (Saudi riyal) millions) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Consumption expenditures 
Private 2,742 2,835 2~910 3,026 3,177 4,585 5~360 5,859 
Government 1,244 1,430 1,654 1,915 2,437 2,747 3,026 3,421 
-- --
3,986 4,265 4,564 4,941 5,614 7,332 8,386 9,280 
Gross capital formation 1,076 1,094 1 ~499 1,987 2,418 3~127 3,354 2,806 
Net foreign sector 3,611 3,961 4,341 5,011 5,196 4,197 4,235 5,312 
Expenditw~e on GDP 8,673 9,320 10,404 11 ,939 13,228 14,656 15,975 17,398 
Table 1.2b 
Gross Domestic Product of Saudi Arabia by Expenditure Categories, 1971-8 (SR millions) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975a 1976a 1977a 1978b 
Consumption expenditures 
Private 6,412 6,914 7,896 9,827 17,897 12,738 34,148 50,995 
Government 3 '798 4,285 5,335 9,864 15,911 28,883 41,033 47,034 
10,210 11,199 13,231 19,691 33,808 52,621 75,181 98,029 
Gross capital formation 2,272 2,498 5,694 8,400 17,841 33,705 51,416 67,136 
Net foreign sector 9,984 13,559 21,740 70,389 87,204 77 ,421 77~622 57,688 
Expenditure on GDP 22~921 28~256 40,552 99,315 139,600 164,526 205,056 223,747 
Notes: a. Heviscd estimates. b. Preliminary estimates. 
Sources: S!\MA, Statistical Surrmary (Decffilber 1970), Table 25 <ll1.d 2nd issue (1977)~ Table 30~ SAMA, Annual 
Reports 1977, Table 30, p. 150 and 1979, Table 31, p. 169 
Smu-ce: m MaUd;:h, H. Saucl.i Arabia: Tiush to Development, p. 31 
"::l 
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living. Since 1964- per capita private consumption has been rising at an 
annual rate of at least 8 per cent. However, real private consumption per 
capita provides a rate of growth of welfare of 4.2 per cent between 1964 
and 1978 and only 0.6 per cent between 1970 and 1978. It is suggested that 
this lo.v rate is canpensated by the very high rate Which the country added 
to its capital stock. Gross capital formation grew at a rate of 52.1 per 
cent between 1970 and 1978 due to the increased oil revenues after 1972 and 
the emphasis placed on infrastructural constructian. 3 
The inqx>rtant position of imports in the Saudi econauy in some ways 
reflects the dynamic processes of development Which the economy is 
currently experiencing. The total value of jmports rose approximately 
thirty times between 1960 and 1978. Between 1968 and 1978 total imports 
have gro.vn fran SR 2,578 million to SR 69,180 million. The largest 
increases have occured since 1973. The average annual gruwth percentage 
between 1973 and 1978 is 58.2 per cent including the 1976 figure of 107.0 
per cent and 1978 figure of 33.9 per cent. Of course the sharp rise in the 
value of imports for these years may be attributed in part to the 
inflationary trends. Still, a substantial part must represent satisfaction 
of the development requirement for the First and Second Development Plans 
(1970/75 and 1975/80 respectively) as well as an increase in ~1e marginal 
propensity to import of the private sector. P.ecause imp:Jrts are crucial to 
the development and economy of Saudi Arabia, both chapters 2 and 3 are 
devoted to a discussion of their role. 
Saudi Arabia's emergence as a political and econcrnic entity in tJ1e 
last three decades has taken place under conditions v.d.t..hCJut r:erallel aaong 
8 
developing nations. It is suggested that if the analysis of the Kingdom's 
evolution were integrated into the main body of political development 
theories, many changes would result. In short, the Saudi experience is 
often ignored and "theories" are often generalisations . Braibanti and Al 
Farsy put forward six conditions Which set the Saudi experience apart - and 
these conditions are wide ranging. 
Firstly, the Saudi cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic cohesion 
is unparalleled, although confronted by the use of resident foreign 
manpower. The Kingdom is the only rrajor nation Whose constitution is 
sacred scripture, the Holy Qu'ran. Secondly, its political system does not 
embrace such institutions as political parties and legislatures. Thirdly, 
quite a successful effort has been made to control the admission of non 
Saudi values on policy. Fourthly, development is taking place in the 
context of affluence rather than abject poverty and so creating an unusual 
national psychology. Fifthly, there has 'been a different sequence of 
development with institutional infrastructure being built before mass 
participation of Saudis in their economy. Finally, the policy has evolved 
in less than half a century and has been unimpeded by a colonial tradition, 
unlike !>.£rica and Latin Ainerica for example. Therefore, these m'Tlbined 
conditions make Saudi Arabia distinct fran the ma~ority of Third Wor!d 
Nations. 5 
1.2 REMOVAL OF FINN-1CIAL CONSTRAINTS 
"Tne escalation of oil prices, particularly in the mid 1970's, 
played a major role in lifting Saudi Arabia - almost overnight -
Table 1.3 
R.evenue from the Export of Petroleum and Production 
Revenue from the export Crude Petroleum1 
of Petroleum (Billions Production 
of Riyals) 
1970 9.89 34.8 
1971 14.92 45.3 
1972 18.82 58.9 
1973 28.93 75.8 
1974 110.54 85.6 
1975 104.54 71.3 
1976 136.91 87.0 
1977 154.98 93.0 
1978 128.56 83.2 _, 0 
1979 197.12 95.3 
1980 339.37 100.0 
1981 383.00 97.5 
1982 259.93 61.0 
1 1980 = 100 
Sourc.e: UfF International Finandal Statistics, Yearbook 1983, pp. 438-439. 
11 
Table 1.4 
Indexation of the Price of Saudi Arabian Crude Oil 
(1969 = 100) 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Source: BIT' Bureau of Statj sties, International Financial S1 aU st j cs 
I\onmber, 1979. 
1978 1979 
12 
The Goverrnnent is well aware of the problem and, as will be shown in 
section 1.3, it is attempting to use the oil income wisely. Although Saudi 
Arabia has a less acute problem concerning finance than most developing 
countries, the Goverrnnent still has to act within given financial 
constraints. It too is looking for the optimum utilisation of resources. 
Efforts have been made to develop downstream petroleum products that use 
crude oil as a major input. At the same time, the Goverrnnent accepts that 
sc:rne day the oil will be depleted (or in the future there may be 
insufficient demand £or its oil). Oonsequently, efforts are now being 
directed to the development of non-petroleum based industries • 7 
r~y factors allowed Saudi Arabia to increase the revenue it received 
fran oil. No attanpt will be made to provide a ccrnprehensi ve account of 
all factors involved, within this single section. Nonetheless, it will 
provide an outline of same of the more evident factors involved in the last 
two decades . Firstly, the £ormation of OPEC. As many are aware, OPEC ....as 
established in Septerrfr)er 1960 as a direct response to the challenge posed 
by the multinational oil companies in unilaterally reducing the posted 
prices of crude oil in February 1959 and in August 1960. Shortly after its 
foundation the organisation began an in-depth study of oil prices to 
determine a fair pricing formula, supported by a study of international 
pro-rationing. By June 1968 the Declaratory Statement of Petroluem Policy 
in part reOOThnended that posted prices (that is, the tax reference price) 
ought to be detennined by the government so that it was consistent wit_h the 
prices of manufactured goo:Js which enter into international trade. 
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Also by 1970, a 1 seller 1 s market' had emerged due to the increased 
consumption by the Western industrialised cormtries . This factor, coupled 
with factors like the closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1974, 
encouraged the prcducing countries to enter into negotiations with the 
rrajor oil companies. One of the aims of the 1970 caracas, Venezuela 
meeting was to establish a rmiform, general increase in the posted prices 
in all matiber countries at OPEC. This conference resulted in the February 
1971 Teheran Agreement Which provided for long sought financial rewards, 
reflecting the conditions in the global petroleum market. A further 
objective of OPEC was to protect the price of oil against potentially 
damaging fluctuations of exchange rates. This objective was fulfilled by 
- . 
the J"anuary 1972 Geneva Agreement. Together these Agreements protected 
Saudi Arabia from im,tX>rted inflation and price Changes that precipitated 
the balance of payments crisis in the late 1950's. OPEC is thus a 
sigr~ficant factor in Saudi Arabia's aChievement of increased revenues. 
In Saudi Arabia, goverrnnent incc:lln2 fran the oil sector consists of 1 ) 
oil royal ties fran operating companies, 2) in cane tax collected fran these 
companies, 3) to a much lesser extent, an oil-prcduct tax Which is levied 
on oonsumption of locally produced or imp::>rted oil products, 4) tapline 
fees and, 5) payments received by the government in respect of the 60 per 
cent participation interest in ARAMOO's production facilities. With this 
in miOd, it is now possible to look at the specific affects of ~1e 
agreements on Saudi revenues. For example, between 1970 and 1972 exports 
increased by 29 p=-_r cent fran l, 722.1 millio:1 barrels to 2, 195.2 million 
ffirrels. This vvas accomrnp::mied by a rise in the p:lsted prices leading to a 
rise of 43 per cent in the value of exr::orts of cn1de oil and refined 
14 
products, from $3,838.8 million in 1971 to $5,491.5 million in 1972. In 
fact, as a result of the ccrnbined effects of sharp increases in production, 
exrorts and changes in posted prices and tax rates, the revenue from oil 
more than doubloo in a pericrl of only two years, fran $1,214 million in 
1970 to $2,744.5 million in 1982. 
Despite the achievement of vast increases in oil revenues in the last 
decade, Saudi Arabia' s image and actions are those of a "moderator" . This 
is partly because the Government is trying to find a oaffibination of oil 
production levels and oil price levels to satisfy all the competing 
internal and external forces. That is, fran Saudi' s_ requiril}g a high price 
level and low prcrluction and fran consuming countries, especially Third 
World countries suggesting the price is too high. 8 Perhaps the December 
1976 OPEC Confernce convened in IX>ha, Qatar provides a good example of the 
moderating influence of Saudi Arabia on other oil endowed states. At this 
Conference, the majority of members supported a 10 per cent price increase 
as of January 1977, to be followed by a further rise of 5 per cent in July 
of that year. Saudi Arabia, as well as the United Arab Emirates, 
successfully pushed for the effective establiShment of a two tier pricing 
s-yste11 within OPEC. This instance and the unanimity of price increases m 
the past was due overWhelmingly to the strong r:csition of Saudi Arabia. 
The country has massive petroleum reserves believed to be in excess of 
177.5 billion barrels and a 'cushion' of surplus funds allowing a 
relatively wide rru1ge of output fluctuations. These massive reserves 
certainly play a part in allowing Saudi Arabia to act as a price moderator. 
Saudi Arabia's actions could be regarded as 'limit pricing'. If t,-,e price 
of petroleum rose too quickly, the west would turn increasingly to 
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non-oil substitutes (although it is argued that this has already happened). 
This would mean that in the long nm Saudi Arabia might be left with large 
unsold reserves . By keeping the price at a ' reasonable' level, or moderate 
level, oil consumption levels are sustained. 
Also, Saudi Arabia ' s decision to provide lower price petroleum 
reflects her view of the international econany. In 1977 Saudi Arabia 
considered the imp:>rted inflation rate too high and the \o\Orld' s econanic 
recovery was considered insufficient to absorb or manage a 10 per cent oil 
price rise. Furthermore, the Saudi's saw their moderation as an incentive 
to the industrialised consumer nations to deal with Third World problems in 
a constructive and affinnati ve manner. Saudi p:>licy also represented the 
desire to involve the United States in resolving the Middle Eastern 
political conflict and in bringing peace to the region. 9 
1 • 3 NEED FOR PLANNING 
It is hoped that 1.2 has made the reader aware that, unlike rrost 
developing countries, in the mid 1970's Saudi Arabia was in a position 
whereby, there -were no financial constraints on the economy' s expansion o 
In fact, revenues exceeded the budget~ requirements of the existing 
Second Development Plano The First Plan covered 1970-75, the Second Plan 
1975-80 and the Third Plan was launched in 1980. For the most part, the 
first two plans have been implemented successfully. For example, between 
1970 an 1975 GDP grew 3. 7 per cent above target. T.ttis brought the growth 
of GDP at cxmstant prices to the rate of 13.5 per cent. Between 1975 and 
1980 growt_h in the GDP was around 8 per cent, sanev.hat below Lhe projected 
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rate of approximately 10 per cent. However, the level of productivity is 
sc:rneWhat uncertain due to the large expenditures made during the 1970's as 
a result of the effective removal of financial constraints. Actual 
expenditure was a]Jrost 200 per cent rrore than planned expenditures in the 
First Plan. Both the Second and Third Plans were thus conceived at a time 
When, for all practical purposes, no financial limitations existed. The 
Second prograrrrne was almost nine times larger than the First in tenns of 
total planned expenditures (in 1974 to 1975 constant prices); the Third 
Plan was 50 per cent larger than the Second. 
The structural features of the three plans have differed. The primary 
purpose of the first was to lay dawn a firm infrastructural foundation for 
future development. Consequently, fhysical infrastructure was stressed. 
As table 1 .1 shov-ls, the Second Plan with the virtual elimination of 
financial constraints, was more ambitious in accelerating the development 
of physical infrastructure While also allowng for more overall development. 
The Third Plan signalled a rather dramatic dhange in that, a consolidation 
of growth was projected in order to curtail the am:>t.mt of expatriate labJur 
employed. Also, during the 1980 to 1985 period there has been an emphasis 
on the need for the development of Saudi manp::>wer and, diversification of 
the economy. All faced up to the problem of using available resources 
effectively. 
Although Saudi Arabia is exceptional regarding financial limitations, 
the country has faced. ITBny of tJ1e problems experienced by other developing 
cow1tries. In t11e Saudi case, llie min bottlened~s have been inadequate 
administrative capacity, m.a.DJX>wer shortages, and fue inability of physical 
infrastructure to absorb llie increas2d expen)i tures. Inflation w:1s a nujor 
17 
setback during the Second Plan so that the Government was forced to freeze 
budgetary appropriations fOr 1976 to 1977 at the 1975 to 1976 level of SR 
llO. 9 billion. This action abated the high rate of inflation and allowed 
expenditure appropriations to return to SR 130 billion and SR 160 billion 
in the final two years of that plan period. However, sane econanists warn 
that the higher oil revenues resulting from the 1979 and 1980 price 
increases could set off another substantial round in the inflationary 
spiral. According to the offical statistics of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency, the per annum increase in the cost of living index for 1977 to 1978 
was estimated at -1.6 per cent indicating that restrained fiscal policies 
may allow the country to avoid inflation. 
A recent trend has been towards a closer balance between the real and 
budgeted expenditures of government. The 'gap' had been 21 per cent during 
the span of the First Plan, however, the Second Plan showed clearly the 
accelerated rise in absorptive capacity. Actual expenditue exceeded the 
original appropriations and had to be financed by supplementary allocations 
during the course of the fiscal years. More significantly, the budget 
difference between actual and allocated expenditures in each of the first 
three years of t.l-te Second Plan has exceeded the total budgeted outlay of 
the full five years of the First Plan. 
Inadequate labour supply remains a massive problem of the Tnird Plan. 
Stated imported labour requirements in the Second Plan to 1980 of 812,600 
were so inadequate, that a 60 p2r cent overrun was recorded in 1979. 
Unfortunately, the limited response of the indigenous pJpulation to rre2t 
the labour needs aggravate:J the problem. The Second Plan attempte:l, and 
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now the Third Plan attempts, to upgrade local labour skills through 
vocational training programmes. The immediate financial rewards available 
in trade, real estate, and the lower ends of government bureaucracy have 
tempted Saudis more. Another problem experienced between 1975 and 1980 was 
the slow implementation of the petrochemical projects, While construction 
in public infrastructure projects rushed ahead. In the latter case, there 
was a near saturation of construction in projects such as hospitals, 
schools and government buildings. Petrochemicals fonn a vi tal cc:rnponent in 
the development schemes of any oil based economy but £ortuantely, the delay 
did not result in a major negative impact, in part because the 
international market in petrochemicals had been depressed. 
--------- - --~-- ------- --- ---- ~---- --- --- --
The Second Plan prcrluced a bigger range approach to planning forcing 
three major changes. First, the Saudis changed their entire strategy of 
econc:rnic developnent by deciding to abandon a blunderbuss approach to 
diversification and instead.to £Deus on developing new industries to 
maximise resources. The shift in the early 1970's was a result of the 
Saudis facing up to the fact that over the long run their oil wealth is a 
wasting asset. The Second Plan contained the assumption that by the year 
2000 ~1e Saudis would no longer earn a significant amount of money from 
exporting fuel oil, although such assumptions have since changed. Second, 
the Saudis decided to invest enough of their surplus resources abroad to 
assure that their income from these investments would be able to subsidise 
Saudi economic growth, after the income from the direct sale of fuel oil 
declines or disappears. 
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Finally, the Saudis decided to Change their entire modernisation 
strategy. In the First Plan, Where money was a constraint, there was an 
incredibly ambitious policy of industrial diversification designed to 
create a minature United States 1 The Second Plan marked the realisation 
that the Saudis would never have enough money and manpower to develop all 
industries simultaneously. Instead, the Saudis decided to narrow their 
industrial profile to maximise their natural advantages in oil and 
minerals. The aim was to develop a diversified oil-based chemical industry 
so that by 1990 Saudi Arabia would be able to J)hase in the the export of 
petrochemical commodities and manufactured products fran its oil wealth 
faster than it phased out the e.xport of fuel oil itself. 
The Third Development Plan emphasises the need for diversification of 
the economy. Stress is placed an the social aspects of development, 
particularly in labour resources and training. The Saudi economy still 
lacks sufficient back-up activity and so maintenance in general is, and 
must be, given praninence. The emphasis on diversification policies mean 
that the areas of productive and services industries, manufacturing and 
certain aspects of agriculture are important ones. In general it can be 
said that the role of the Saudi Government in t~e development process of 
the country has essentially been to undertake policies WhiCh would 
diversify the economy and improve the standard of living of the population, 
without sacrificing the freedcm of the individual and the private sector's 
ability to respond to the government's incentives within a free market 
10 
system. 
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In the very long nm, planners envisaged that Saudi Arabia would 
become one of the world's major centres of advanced research and 
development, subsidised by billions of dollars from Saudi investments 
abroad. Although it was accepted that the Saudi petrochemical industry 
would have to be subsidised for rrany years, the reasoning was that the 
centre would assure that eventually Saudi industry would be able to thrive 
in the highly ccmpetitive chemical and msic metals industries within 30 
years without any subsidies. Another goal vmich was conceivable only 
within a time-frame of 20 years or more, was national self-sufficiency in 
foo:l. Not until the actual budgeting of the Second Plan was finalised in 
May 1975, did strong priority on expensive water prograrrrnes, as an 
essential part--of the agricul t~al i~frastructur~, materiaiise. 11 
1.4 SAUDIZATICN OF THE EOOKa1Y 
The guidelines to the Second Plan state that the :pJlicy option of 
rapid progress underpinned by foreign labour poses the threat of 
m1dermining religious values and weakening ti1e social structure and of 
turning Saudis into second-class citizens in their own land. The principal 
challenge of accelerated econc:mic grov..>th in Saudi }\rabia was the danger 
that Western education and Western influences would destroy the Saudis' 
understanding of their own culture, that is, of the moral and intellectual 
values on Which their entire society is based. Culture is the fomation 
and refining of the individual's moral and intellectual nature a~d can be 
religious in origin. The v.'Orry was t11at the WlCUl tured Saudi v.':::Yuld confuse 
the tecru1ological tools of Westel-nisation v.riili the materialism which tends 
to accanpany the technological modernisation process. That is, the purs,Ji t 
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of material well-being, might undennine the spiritual well-being of the 
Saudi people. Therefore, in Saudi Arabia v.nere national survival and 
spiritual well-being are felt to be one and the same, they are given a 
higher priority than material well-being. 
Planning in Saudi Arabia has shown an awareness of p:>tential problems 
caused by changing the society fran an overwhelmingly rural, to an 
overvmelmingly urban ba.se. Consistent attempts have been rrade to ensure 
that a sense of community, essential to the survival of cultural values, is 
left intact. A uniquely radical shift in the demogra,Phic make up of Saudi 
Arabia was deemed essential for modernisation and for the maintenance of an 
eqUitable income distribution during the m:rlernisation process. In general 
the government's p:::>licies for econanic growth are careful not to destroy 
Islam but rather to a:mtribute to a new Islamic renaissance. The 
guidelines to the Second Plan provide four major goals to prevent the 
degeneration and p:::>ssible destruction of Saudi Arabia: firstly, the need to 
upgrad2 the quantity and quality of religious e::lucation. The aim here is 
to harness technology and rranagement to traditional values so that economic 
and social change will be guided and understcx:rl within the context of the 
l'i'ahhabi doctrine. 
The second goal was to foster the cultural values of individual 
initiative e-nbodied in the econcrnic system of free enterprise. 
Fol~unately, the values of private property and individual responsibility 
are basic to Islamic thought on human dignity. They are vie.,.·ed as the key 
to the production of econo:nic wealth which is a necessity if the arribitious 
Saudi plans for social justice are to be implemented. Thirdly, is the 
promotion of the key institutions of Islam of Which the highest ranking are 
the 'hajj' the Bedouins as the living example of Islamic values and, the 
practice of the 'Shari' a' Which applies Islam to the legal system. Perhaps 
the Shari'a should be the major influence for all national planning-
certainly, the rrore orthodox religious leaders say so. One of the rrost 
ambitious courses of action in bolstering the influence of the Shari' a was 
the decision in 1976 to found a new Islamic University in Mecca. 
The fourth prime cultural goal of the guidelines is to control foreign 
culture in Saudi Arabia Whilst harnessing foreign manpower, developing 
Saudi human resources, stimulating programmes of ccmnunity development and 
exp:mding the role of the traditional legal system as a means to apply the 
Shari' a in modern life. In general, manp:JWer planning in Saudi Arabia is 
designed to harness £oreign manpower but replace it as rapidly as possible 
. d . . . and 1 .t: • 12 m or er to nul11.11Use contra LOre1gn manp:JWer. 
In practice the Saudi Government has to deal carefully with religious 
leaders and opinion. Politically, an alliance between the ultra 
conservative religious group and the overseas educated intellectuals is 
seeB as presenting the most probable possibility of radical change. TI1e 
authorities are cautious not to allow a Saudi version of the Iranian 
Revolution to occur. So far, the pro-growth lobby has been successful in 
placating the cx:mservathe group. For exainple, in the spread of 
television, great care was taken to ensure that the Wahhabis and their 
followers were always consulted. Tne r:ower of television to reinforce 
Islam has been use:] fran the start. 
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other examples of official sensitivity to religious opinion include 
the progressively harsher restrictions on employment, freedan of movenent 
arid educational opp:>rtunity for women, and also the strict adherence to 
laws concerning alcohol. Writers often point to the close tribal and 
family links of the Saudi royal family with the widely dispersed tribal 
groups in Saudi Arabia as the means by Which the Saudi royal family feels 
the rolitical pulse and cnntrols Saudi society. Probably such factors are 
effective in maintaining the loyalty of most nationals • This system can 
act as a sensitive warning mechanism of any significant dissent although 
the take over of the Grand Mosque does not suggest this. Perhaps one of 
the rrost imminent threats to stability in Saudi Arabia comes from within 
the royal family itself. The very size of the family - numbering sane 
2,000 princes - engenders disagreements and marks fundamental differences 
ba ed d .. nal 11' . 13 s an tra 1t1o a 1anc1es. 
1 • 5 FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The financial institutions constitute a critically important element 
of any economy, especially one that is as dynamic as Saudi Arabia. 
Financial institutions a£fect the developnent of the econany a.'1.d have been, 
in turn, funda:nentally affected by that development. Presently, Saudi 
Arabia does not possess financial institutions equal in number or 
versatility to any western countries. The institutions that have developed 
are characterised by the way they are tightly controlled by government 
agencies. This control is exercised mainly by tJ1e Saudi Arabian 1-'lonetary 
Agency (SPMA) which acts as a central h-=mk, altJ1ough it d02s not 
formally serve as a lender of the last resort. The currency is also 
managed by SAMA. 
The Saudi Riyal (SR) is divided into 100 hallalas (H). Fbr years its 
value remained pegged at the rate of SR 4. 50 to the United States dollar, 
nntil the crisis of 1971 and the subsequent devaluation of the dollar. The 
final collapse in 1973 of the Bretton Woods financial agreements led to the 
establishment of a new parity, SR 3 . 53 per US dollar. Ho.Yever, the 
continual instability of the dollar meant that on 15 March 1975 the Saudis 
pegged the riyal to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR 1 s), a rmit of acconnt 
consisting of a weighted average of 16 currencies. The offical parity 
-became 1 SDR = 4.28255 SR, with a trad~g b::md of plus or minus 7.5 per 
cent around parity. Still in practice, the Riyal was still expressed in 
tenns of the US dollar, despite the oontinued fall of the dollar. 
In 1977 the Riyal finally started to rise in relation to the dollar, 
reachi~g 3. 25 to 1 US dollar in October 1978. It is not in t.'1e Saudi 1 s 
interests to keep the dollar devalued with respect to the Riyal because 50 
per cent of their foreign assets are denaninated in dollars. Hence, as 
early as June 1979, the Riyal stocx]_ at 3. 38 to the US dollar. 
The role and influence of the Government is even rrore pronounced in 
its financial activities. It has been estimated that with the help of tJ1e 
oil revenues, the government sector was responsible for 86 per cent of 
gross national proouct in 1974, This percentage is likely to decrease in 
the future as the non oil sector of tlle economy tmdertaKes its expansion 
programme. Consequently, tlle Government has created a vast network of 
Table 1.5 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHIGI PROVIDE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank 
Established: By Royal decree in 1962 
Head Office: Riyadh 
Capital: SR 30 million. Liable to increase • 
The General Investment Bank 
Established: By Royal decree in 1971 
Head Office: Riyadh 
Capital: SR 1000 million. Increased to SR 3000 in 1974/75 
Real Estate Development Fund 
Established: By Royal decree 
Capital: SR_ 250 mil linn. Increase:] to SR 3000 million 
The Saudi Industrial Development F\md 
Established: By Royal decree in 1974 
Head Office: Riyadh 
Capital : SR 500 million. Increased to SR 3000 million 
The Contractors Financing Programme 
Established: By decision of Council of Ministers in 1974 
Capital: SR 50 million. Liable to increase. 
Tne Islamic Development Bank 
Established: By decision of the Second Conference of the Ministers of 
Finance of the Islamic State in 1974 
Head -Office: Jeddah 
Capital: 2000 million Islamic dinars • 
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government agencies and institutions to provide loans and financial 
incentives WhiCh in more developed countries are normally provided by the 
private sector. A list of same of these institutions may be seen in table 
1 . 5 • In general, the table shows that the initial capital outlay for each 
institution has been increased in resp::mse to demand • Anyway, it should be 
noted that the institutions listed in table 1.5 follow Islamic principles. 
This means that loans are granted without interest although a small service 
charge is levied usually around 2 per cent per annum, to cover 
administrative overheads . Of course, the reason for this is that the 
Shari'a, or Islamic law, prohibits the taking of fixed returns or interest. 
This does give rise to difficulties. 
For example, the absence of fixed interest payments means mortgages on 
houses are likely to remain in the hands of the real estate development 
fund . No private bank could afford to lend money without ccmpensation 
especially with the Saudi inflation rate varying between 5 and 10 per cent. 
On the other hand, such interest free loans contribute a good deal to the 
econcmic growth of the country and the dissemination of wealth by allowing 
poor and middle class individuals to Obtain funds under favourable 
conditions. There is, however, a nee:l for the presence of private 
financial institutions. 
These can be divided into three categories: l:B.nks fro.rn v-12stern origin, 
banks fran l'1uslirn countries and, Saudi Banks. The first banks to cane from 
the west were the First National Bank of Ne-w York, the lligeme2n Bank from 
Holland, ~1e BritiSh Bank of the 11iddle East, followed by the Banque de 
1' Indochine et de Suez (France). Banks from other !v1uslirn countries 
...,.., 
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include Banque du Caire (Egypt) 1 Banque du Liban et d 'Outremer (Lebanon) 1 
Bank Melli (Iran) 1 the Arab Bank (Palestinian capital), the United Bank 
(Pakistan) and de Jazirah Bank (National Bank of Pakistan). Finally, the 
two Saudi Banks are the National Canmercial Bank and the Riyadh bank. 
These Saudi banks have branches and offices across the country, While the 
foreign ownership banks were limited to between one and six. However, in 
1977/78 the banks were forced to accept a 60 per cent Saudi ownership. All 
eventual! y ccrnplied. In each case, the Saudi controlling interest is 
obtained by increasifB the capitalisation of the banks. At the same time, 
new shares are issued and bought by the Saudi public. The banks were also 
renamed to reflect their joint Saudi foreign character, for example, Banque 
de L' Indochine et de Suez became Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi and the British 
Bank of the Middle East became the Bank Al Saudi Al Bri ttani . 14 
The role of the cammercial banks in providing development finance has 
been limited. Much of their lendifB has been to finance traders, mainly 
with their purchase of imp:>rts . Of course in so far as the imp:>rts 
purchased are capital goods, they may make a contribution to development. 
It is the question of imp:>rt CXlrtlJX>si tion Which will be considered in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DETERY!INANTS OF IMPORI'S 
Saudi Arabia commands a significant position in the international 
econany. The country is the third largest oil prcrlucer, endowed with 
approximately one quarter of the \\Orld 1 s proven oil reserves. It is 
difficult to overstate the value of a working partnership with Saudi 
Arabia, founded an the principles of mutual economic co-operation and 
benefit. Despite the present depressed state of the petroleum market, 
Saudi Arabian purchasing p:>wer remains considerable. . The p::>licies the 
country follows have significant ~lications for the future of western 
exporters. The Second Development Plan needs an expenditure of $149, 500 
million and Saudi Arabia plans to spend $235,000 million in the Third 
Development Plan. As has been shown in chapter 1, Saudi Arabia is 
dependent on imports to a large extent for econanic growth, and its massive 
expenditures have very important ~lications nor western industralised 
nations. In fact, they can be regarded as having a stake in the successful 
grOVJth and development of t_he Saudi econany, as has Japan. 
International trade is the 1 backbone 1 of the Saudi economy. The oil 
sector accounts for 60% of the country's Gross National Product. The 
dependence of the economy on foreign trade can be determined by the ratio 
of total trade to Gross National Product. This reveals that the dependence 
of Saudi Arabia is nearly nine times greater than for a c.nuntly like the 
3U 
United States of America, a nore 'closed' economy, although a different 
picture is obtained by canparisons with other smaller economies o Saudi 
economic expansion, induced by trade is based on interdependence and 
specialisation - the benefits fran Which may be reaped by all partners o In 
many ways, the greater the degree of trade, the greater are the benefits 
and progress towards econamic development o As well as the standard static 
gains from trade through specialisation, there are transactions within the 
foreign sector Which will provide certain 'dynamic benefits', such as the 
.imp::>rt of capital goods, technical and managerial skills and services and 
other infrastructure requirements Which are essential to econanic growth. 
In other words, international trade can be an 'engine of growth' 1 
This chapter looks at the detenninants of imp:>rts. It has already 
been pointed out just how massive the expenditures involved are. 
Therefore, the policies followed by Saudi Arabia as regards its imp:>rts 
have far reaching implications. For example, the demand for swiss rolls 
fran Saudi Arabia has signalled the prosperity of a firm in the north east 
of England. It is not only the kinds of fcx::d or goods imported Which are 
significant. The expenditure involved is so large that the de.-nand from 
Saudi Arabia can have significant multiplier effects, even in the developt...~ 
industrial nations • These points and others are looked at belCY.V. 
2 .1 SECIDRAL DIVISION OF JMPORI'S 
Firstly, it is Lnstructive to look at table 2.1 compiled fro~ the 1980 
Yeartx::Dk of International Trade Statistics o T'nis table examines i.inr:orts by 
broad a.'"'Onanic category as a p2rcentage of the total value of imp::>rts 
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between 1974 and 1980. Category 1, foo:l and berverages, shows a marked 
change between 1974 and 1980. The percentage of imp:>rts in this category 
has decreased frc:m 17 ol per cent to 12 o 2 per cent and even this latter 1980 
figure shOINS an increase on the lONest figure of 9 ol per cent in 1977 o The 
situation regarding category 2 is quite a different one. Industrial 
suppliers have steadily increased their percentage of the total value of 
imports up to 1980. In contrast, category 3, fuels, as might be expected, 
ccmnands a very small part of the total value of imp:>rts. There has been 
same variance betwen 1974 and 1980 but it represents only a very small 
percentage of the total value. 
Category 4, a significant category by size, has rrore or less steadily 
increased. It was 16.3 per cent of the total in 1974 and rose to 27.1 per 
cent in 1978. However, 1979 and 1980 shov.'S an apparently new declining 
trerrl When machinery represented 23.8 and 21.4 per cent respectively. The 
category of transport shows a decline in its percentage of the total value 
of imports. It decreased fran l8o2 in 1974 to 15.2 in 1980 but the period 
in between has varied. The final category of table 2 .1 is consumer goo::ls 
Which shows no very significant changes over the period. There has been a 
consistent nove away fonn non-durable gcx:rls towards durable and semi 
durable goods o 
Although looking at r:articular i.Jnr:ort categories as a percentage of 
the total value of imports can be useful, it can also be misleading o It 
does not s"how the et'tanges of value of total irnp::>rts. This means that the 
amount spent in a particular categm:y can re!lain unchanged but if the total 
value of imports increased, it c~ represent a percentage decrease in total 
Table 2.1 
Imports by I3road Economic Category (% of total value) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
-- --
1. Food/Bev~rages 17.1 13.7 10.4 9.1 9.9 11.0 12.2 
Primaty 6.8 6.2 4.2 3.9 4.1 5.2 6.2 
Processed 10.3 7.5 6.2 5.2 5.8 5.8 6.0 
2. Industrial SupJ2lies 26.6 24.0 28.f3 31.2 30.9 31.2 31.2 
3. Fuels 0.9 0.6 0 .'l 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 
4. Machineri: 16.3 18.2 23.8 26.5 27.1 23.8 21.4 
5. Transport 18.2 22.3 18.8 13.3 13.2 14.6 15.2 ~J 
"J 
Ii1elust:rial 8.1 10.8 11.0 6.8 5.4 6.2 6.1 
6. CDnsumer goods 20.5 18.2 16. Ei 18.3 18.2 18.5 19.1 
Durables 8.5 7.2 7.Ei 8.0 8.7 9.1 9.2 
Semi durables 7.2 6.4 5.£1 7.2 6.5 6.4 6.8 
Non durables 4.8 4.5 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 
TOTAL IMPORTS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: UN 1980 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 9 Vol. I, p. 382. 
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value. This is particularly significant When observing a country like 
Saudi Arabia Where the Saudi import position reflects the dynamic processes 
of development Whim the country is experiencing. The total value of 
imports rose approximately thirty times over the period 1960 to 1978 in 
current prices. Duri119' the period 1968 to 1978, total imports have grown 
from SR 2578 rrrrllion to SR 69,180 million Which represents a twenty-seven 
fold increase. The largest increases have occurred since 1973. Fran 1973 
to 1978 there was an average 58 per cent annual growth rate. The sharp 
rise in the value of imports for these years may be attributed in part to 
inflationary price trends. Still a large proportion of the increase in the 
total value of imports must be attributed to the satisfaction of 
development requirements for the First and Second Development Plans . Part 
of this reflects an increase in the marginal propensity to tmport in the 
private sector, although many of the imports are a direct result of public 
spendi119' programmes • 
Recent figures released fran the Saudi Central Department of 
Statistics suggest a deceleration in the growth of imports in 1979 to 16 
per cent, compared with the high growth rate of 81 per cent in 1976. 
Thereafter, it accelerated to 20 per cent in 1980 and 22 per cent in 1981. 
Again, the primary factor responsible for this rever~~l is the growth in 
Government spending in 1979, 1980 and 1981 after its substantial 
deceleration in 1978. The role of the private sector is also rrore 
si~1ificant during this more recent period. 1 
A t11e;11e throughout iliis iliesis is the Saudi Government's e.'lcourage.rn2!1t 
of the private sector. The Government urges the private sector to tal<;:e ilie 
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initiative and in particular it Shows a continual desire £or wealthy 
individuals and entrepreneurs to have a stake in the successful development 
of the Saudi economy. It is interesting to note that the private sector 
has averaged over 76 per cent of the total value of imports since 1973, an 
encouraging sign. In 1977 and 1978 almost 22 per cent and 17 per cent 
respectively of the total import value went to the public non-oil sector. 
The oil sector accounted £or 2 o 3 per cent and 5 o4 per cent in the same bNo 
years o The share of the private sector climbed steadily during the Second 
Plan from approximately 68 per cent in 1975 to almost 78 per cent in 1978, 
again reflecting the Government's emphasis an the private sector as a force 
in the Kingdom's development. 
If the actual comp:>sition of i.mp:)rted goods in absolute terms is 
observed, the combination of machinery, transJX>rtatian equipment and 
electri('.al appliances is nost significant. The total £or this group 
increased fran SR 846 million in 1968 to an estimated SR 28 880 million in 
1978. There was also a very significant increases in the value of irnj:x)rts 
of glassware, precious/semi precious stones, precision instruments and 
sound EqUipment. Mallakh suggests that up until 1978 the third largest 
import category was building materials, refusing the Second Development 
Plan's emphasis on construction. Unfortunate! y, Mallakh tends to 
categorise imports in a rather different way to other specialsistso 
HO\veVer, depsi te t_"'r}e difference in o::JTrU:)inations used, the same ilnp:::>rts in 
general cane out as significant, if in a slightly different order. Mallakh 
sees food .imp:Jrts as a substantial lj11IX)lt category, ranking fourt_h in 
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importance with vegetable pro:Jucts, prepared items such as beverages and 
tobacco as well as dairy products, being significant. 
It has already been pointed out above that there has been a downward 
trend in the relative share of foodstuffs to total imports, although in 
absolute tenns there has been a steady increase in value. This, and the 
tendency towards increasing imports of m:mufactured goods, machinery and 
transport equipment, seems to indicate that imports will be primarily 
directed towards secondary activities. This is in response to the needs of 
the oil industry and the major infrastructural construction pr03rarrmes for 
the development of utili ties, highways, airports, <XliTUTiunication networks 
and other facilites. Certainly, this latter tendency complies with the 
pJlicy expressed in the Second Development Plan and the fonner oorresponds 
with the idea of encouraging activities in What Saudi Arabia has a 
canparative advantage, Which is inherent in the Third Developnent Plan. 2 
This shift in the cnmposi tion of i.mp:Jrts is exhibited very often in 
developing econanies. As the increase in oil revenues leads to growing 
prosperity, the quantity of food demanded by the economy is increasing, but 
at decreasing rates. The relative shares of fc:x:Xlstuff imports to total 
irrq:orts has declined from 31.6 per cent in 1970 to 24.2 per cent in 1973 
and to about 10 per cent in 1978. Mallakh examines private sector ii1Tports 
paid through commercial banks as a close prm,:y to actual trends in the 
canposition of ~nports. These figures show that While the share of 
foodstuff :Lmr:orts has declined fonn 29.7 per cent in 1970 -to an estiiTated 
15 per cent in 1978, the share of capital gcx:ds has been rising at an 
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increasing rate. This reflects government p:>licy. The Government is 
trying to shift resources fran const.nnption to developnent. 3 
There is little discussion of Saudi economic policy regarding imports 
in the Third Development Plan. It states simply that the prcrluct 
imposition of the Kingdom's imports fOr the two consecutive period 1969/73 
and 1973/77 "confinns the growing prop:>rticn of materials and machinery 
imports during the Second Plan pericrl at the expense of fo:xl imports". 4 
However, When discussing the strategy £or the Third Development Plan, it 
states that the Kingdon will "continue its policy of diversifying the 
sources of purchases abroad to ensure better value and service"5 - a point 
we turn our attention to in the next section. During the Second Plan 
period there has been a close almost one to one relationship between the 
current value of oil GDP and the value of imported goods and services, 
representing a high propensity to import. This is expected to continue in 
the Third Plan and allowance has been made fOr a slightly higher growth in 
imports than in non oil GDP on account of an expected rise in canpo:-~ents 
and products substituting £or labour . 
2 • 2 ::DURCES OF IMPORT'S BY CDUNTRY 
Few would deny that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent. 
Yet, this has not generated an equitable sharing of the benefits of trade 
but the dichatamization of the world between the developed and the 
developing cow1tries. T'ne nations in th2 latter group generally supply 
prLmellf products to feed e1e industries of the former with little or no 
influence on issues affecting even their own destinies. Developed 
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conntries have a larger voice in world affairs, in part because they supply 
manufactured and sophisticated capital goods WhiCh have the characteristics 
condusi ve to attaining favourable tenns of trade. 
Also, developed conntries have stronger bargaining p:JWer. Until the 
1970's When the oil price increases catapulted oil-producing oonntries into 
the limelight of the international scene with Saudi Arabia in the centre, 
no supplier of raw materials from the developing world had received 
recognition consistent with the importance of that primary prcrluct. 
Factors like the unilateral hike in oil prices and the fear of 
imminent exhaustion of the world's natural resources have meant a shift in 
the power relationship. This p::Mer has becane almost pennanent for the 
oil producing countries because of the nature of the raw material allowing 
organised action on the part of suppliers even When the market is weak. 
This is especially so for Saudi Arabia WhiCh has received world recognition 
within a relatively short span of time. As the OO\.mtry with the second 
largest exchange reserves and, as the principal exporter of petroleum 
globally, the Kingdom is an imp:>rtant p::>wer. Not only can Saudi Arabia 
sup.r:ort and so strengthen the developing block, the country as a massive 
i.rnpJrter, can choose Which developed counties it wishes to support and 
strenghten. Although there are "hi cups" frcm time to time such as the 
January 1983 disunity of OPEC, Saudi Arabia is now imj_X)rtant to the West as 
. . 6 
a maJor 1IDporter. 
There will be a close relationship betv.reen the c,'Jange in t_he level of 
exports in any region and ll•1p:::>rt changes, especially if value figures are 
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used Which take accmmt of the prices of traded cnmmodi ties as well as 
quanti ties o Through the 1970' s, petroleum exporters accounted for an 
increasing share of the regions imp:>rt market, as might be expected o By 
1975 Saudi Arabia in fact had overtaken Israel and becane the second 
largest importer in the Middle East, as a consequence of its vast oil 
revenues o It has been regarded as paradoxical that a largely desert state 
with a small indigenous population still consisting of nomads for a large 
part, was able to import more than a country such as Turkey \'fuich has a 
population at least five times as large and a much more soPhisticated 
econcrnic structure.· 
-
The increased petroleum revenues have not only widened the gap between 
the oil exportin:J states such as Saudi Arabia and non-Arab Middle Eastern 
States such as Turkey as far as imp:>rts are concerned, but also caused a 
widening of the marked differential amongst the Arab states themselves. 
Expenditure on imp:>rts rose only slowly in Egypt, Syria, the Sudan and 
Jc:LC.an between 1968 and 1973. In real terms the increase was negligible as 
these countries suffered balance of payments difficulties. In 1974 
however, all these countries were able to spend a much larger arrount on 
imports owing to credits advance by their fellow Arab oil prry3ucing states. 
It was the benevolence of Saudi Arabia \'fuiCh allowed Jordan to continue 
purchasing petroleum at pre-1974 prices. This was halted by 1976 vmen it 
became clear that soue of the oil supplied at concessionary prices ~Bs 
being resold to third parties! Anyway, by this time Saudi Arabia was 
spending more ti.n"e appraising the domestic needs of the <xmntry. National 
self-interest became rrore impot~anto 
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It has often been noted that the arbi tary distribution of oil wealth 
is unfortunate in the Arab world. For example, Egypt has a much greater 
need for imp:>rts than Saudi Arabia but the latter has a much greater 
capacity to import. Saudi Arabia and states like Libya lacked the required 
trained personnel and b3.sic infrastructure to use the foreign exchange 
eamings for local development. In the past ships carrying import 
consignments often had to wait at Saudi Arabian ports for six weeks before 
they could unload . Even When the equipmer1t was brought ashore in many 
cases there were long delays before it was installed. Also, large p:lrtions 
of funds have been spent indiscriminately an the imports of expensive 
durable goods such as luxury cars, while conntries like Egypt have not been 
able to replace existing capital equipment in the manufacturing sector. 
Clearly, the imperfect rrarket situation created by OPEC, led by Saudi 
Arabia means a growing import market in the oil prc:ducing states, but the 
trickle-down effect to the non oil prcducers of the Middle East has been 
'nimal' 7 1111 • 
At first sight there appears to be a tremendous scope for trade and 
commerce between the nations of the Middle East. To a large extent, these 
nations complement each other with regard to their resources. Yet, as will 
be seen below, Saudi Arabia only imports a small per~~ntag~ of its total 
imr:orts form Middle Eastem countries. Fbr example, Saudi Arabia with its 
abundant financial resources but labour shortages, is an obvious location 
for capital intensive industries, especially those requiring a plentiful 
supply of cheap energy, although technolo:Jical deficiencies v.r.:>uld first 
have to be overcane. In cx:mtrast, Israel boasts a high level of technology 
and has a trained workforce yet suffers a shortage of revenue. Intraregional 
40 
specialisation \t.Dllld tmdoubt.edly be advantageous as wasteful duplication of 
production facilities would be avoided. In the Middle East there are 
numerous instances of separate plants being developed stmultaneously in 
several countries. As might be expected, each is operated at only a lOIN 
level of its potential production capacity so that economies of scale are 
not taken advantage of. If each nation did specialise in the production of 
goods or services Which it had a a:::rnparative advantage, intraregional trade 
would probably increase. While this does not occurr, imports from Middle 
Eastern nations to Saudi Arabia will not reach their true potential.8 
In contrast, the increase in European Conmuni ty exp::>rts mirrored the 
oil tmport changes up to the mid 1970's, with export proceeds covering 
around half the tmp::>rt bill. After the 1973 oil price increase, the 
prq::ortion of export receipts to tmport payments actually rose, fram 47.4 
percent in 1973 to 74.8 per cent by 1978, a remarkable exp::>rt success for 
the European Cannuni ty. Exports rose from 420 million European Community 
Units (ECU's) 9 to over 5659 million by 1978 and by 1980 to 7283 million 
EOJ. The export problens associated with the demise of the Iranian market 
after the Revolution, illustrates the problems £or the European Community 
of overdependence on a single Middle Eastern export market. Ira."1 alone in 
1978 accounted £or almost 23 per cent of all European Corrnnuni ty ~~les to 
the Middle East, While Saudi Arabia accounted for almost 22 per cent of 
exp::>rt sales. By 1980 the Saudi Arabian share had risen to over 23 per 
cent, While the share of Iran had fallen to 10 per cent. Given Saudi 
.1\rabia' s ambitious develop:n211.t plans and app3rent stability, prospects for 
CoiTfflLm.i ty exJX>rts continue to be encouraging. Prospects for countries such 
as Libya look less certain, p:rrticularly after the April 1984 shooting of a 
BritiSh policewoman, outside the Libyan Embassy. 
European exp::>rts to the Middle East do not have the problem of over 
dependence an a single ccmnodity, unlike Middle Eastern exports to the 
Ccmnunity. Most European Cc:rnmunity exports o:::rnprise manufactured goods, 
machinery, capital equipment and supplies for the construction industry, 
and the prices of these items are much less volatile than those of primary 
CCI11111Crli ties such as oil, despite OPEC. The deterioration in the European 
camnunity's terms of trade in 1973-74 and again in 1979 is well known, but 
still the long-run underlying trend has been for manufactured goods to 
appreciate in price vis-a-vis primary commodities, including oil. 
Predicting the future price trends in oil vis-a-vis the price of 
manufactured goods is not a simple task. Oil prices not only affect the 
value of European Camnunity imports fran the Middle East, but also affect 
European community exports by ultimately, determining the ability of the 
Middle Eastern states to pa.y for Conmuni ty exJ:X>rts. If oil prices fall, 
hCJ<.Never, the effect on European Corrmunity exr:orts is likely to be less 
marked than the impact an imrx:>rt savings. The time lags may be greater 
before any effects "WOrk their way through to O::rnmuni ty exp:xts, v.hereas the 
effect on the Corrmunity's bill is more inmediate. 
Tne ambitious developm2nt plans for inc'lustralisation and social 
infrastructure represent long-term camnitm~nts on the part of the 
oil-exp:>rting countries and they cannot easily be scaled down in repsonse 
to short-run petroleum price falls. Saudi Arabia along 1.dth the ot11er less 
J:X>pulous Gulf states, has substantial official reserves to ccrry itself 
.La.JJ.l..t' tCJ.~ 
Sources of Imports 1968-78 (SR millions) 
1963 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1.978 
U.S.A. 571 622 569 615 917 1,407 1,735 2,538 5,739 9,621 14,434 
Europe 807 1,281 1,150 1,295 1,43:8 2,079 2,696 4,669 10,844 19,424 31,323 
Comnon Market ( EEC) 721 1,120 979 1,116 1,228 1,721 2,542 3,784 8,327 15,624 24,742 
of which: Delguim 57 82 65 91 88 172 308 243 512 832 1,234 
France 65 123 88 79 108 156 180 332 821 1,728 2,668 
Ge:rn1any 174 267 313 289 294 458 612 1,017 2,538 4,320 7,467 
ILal.y 115 117 143 161 191 198 280 578 1.:,504 3,168 4,945 
Not her lands 119 170 140 169 198 256 403 430 1,135 2,278 3,011 
U.K. 192 301 231 328 34.5 466 492 1,147 1,815 3,182 5,093 
Other Western Europe, 48 108 102 102 117 198 266 768 1,189 3,430 5,607 
of which: Switzerland 15 50 44 52 49 100 118 419 1,094 1,510 1,952 
Eastern Europe 37 52 69 77 93 161 139 117 328 370 974 
Mtdclle East 5.54 629 636 810 1,009 1,625 2,836 3,647 7,296 7,243 2,739 
of which: Do.hrai.n 30 44 47 79 92 152 238 201 640 762 15Ei 
Jorddll 44 64 46 41 50 49 100 135 620 429 264 .!:> r-0 
Kuwait 42 46 63 86 136 252 445 722 2,690 2,300 359 
Lebanon 267 334 363 474 579 867 1,547 1,537 739 1,165 1,064 
Syria 49 53 51 55 9'i' 207 330 681 2,019 1,816 326 
Asia 463 625 611 712 1,025 1,641 2,487 3,152 5,673 10,468 17,612 
of which: India 47 93 102 69 84 93 194 153 329 601 805 
Japan 234 348 314 414 676 1,133 1,616 2,267 3,371 5,981 10,659 
Pakistan 55 44 31 48 50 68 120 153 236 238 322 
Africa 14.5 152 127 152 216 225 272 321 366 451 710 
o·f which: Somalia lOG 97 87 105 141 115 110 173 166 122 304 
Oceania 31 62 95 66 86 183 89 104 128 310 537 
OLhc~rs 8 5 10 17 17 36 34 392 536 3,868 1,341 
TOTAL 2,578 3,377 3,197 3,668 4,708 7,197 10,149 14,823 30,691 51,662 69 '180 
Source: El Ma:Ll;lkh, R. Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development, p. 352 
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over any short tenn adverse balance of trade movements. It also receives 
incane fran its overseas investments and nowadays, this has become an 
important invisible current account item. A further factor WhiCh results 
in sane degree of stability in European Ccmnunity export sales to the 
Middle East is that many deals are worked out on a meduim or long-term 
cnntract basis, especially for intermediate and capital goods. Saudi 
Arabia like most Middle Eastern custaners is careful not to obtain a bad 
reputation for its treatment of suppliers. If it does, tenders in the 
future would build in a higher premium for risks, adding to import costs. 10 
The major sources of Saudi Arabian irnp:>rts in 1978 were Western 
Europe, the United States of America and Jap-:m, as table 2.2 shows. The 
rapid growth of Saudi i.mp::>rts that we have already examined has not been 
acccmpanied by any distinct changes in the position of suppliers of these 
imp:>rts. Nevertheless, Western Europe has dramatically increased its share 
frcr.: 36 per cent in 1970 to 45 per cent in 1978 . Most notable of these 
Eul.'-'~an nations have been vilest Germany, the U.K. and Italy v.hich have 
ranked in that order since 1975. The U.S .A. supplied an average of just 
over 19 per cent of the Saudi imp:>rts between 1970 and 1978; the American 
share was raised to almost 21 per cent in the latter year. Behind the 
u.s.A. the second largest, single nation-supplier in the 1970's ~s Japan. 
Its share expanded fran 9.8 _pp....r cent to 15.4 per cent of the Saudi import 
rrarket in 1978. 11 . The latest figures from the Central Department of 
Statistics indicate that in 1980 the U.S.A. and Japan re~in the first and 
second leading exp_Jrters with 20.4 and 17.3 per cent of the share of 
imports. H:::r.vever, as table 2 . 3 slnws, tJ1e UK has now increased its s11are 
of imp:>rts frc:m 6. 9 per cent in 1979 to 8. 7 per cent in 1980 whereas 
Table 2.3 
Saudi Imports by Origin 
(Million Dollars) 
Percent Percent First half 
change share 
1978 1979 1980 in 1980 in 1980 1980 1981P 
--
u.s 4,370 4,875 59 768 18.3 20.4 2,727 3,457 
Japan 3,284 3,803 4,882 28.4 17.3 2,213 2 '773 
Germany 2,079 2,412 2,358 -2.2 8.4 1,173 1,110 
U.K. 1,511 1,895 2,441 28.8 8.6 1,156 1,228 
Italy 1,467 1,883 2,075 10.2 7.3 1,006 946 
France 877 1,100 1,456 32.4 5.2 684 718 _, 
-"" 
Sjx-count1~ sub-total 13,588 15,968 18,980 18.9 67.2 8,959 10,232 
Other 8 industrial countries 2,412 2,838 4,123 45.3 14.6 1,485 1,514 
Total 14 industrial countries 16,000 18,806 23,103 22.8 81.8 10,444 11 '746 
rlest of the World 4,021 4,725 5,135 8.7 18.2 2,611 
Total FOB imports (in dollars) 20,021 23,531 28,237 20.0 100.0 13,055 
Est jmated freight and insurance 3,404 4,000 5,, 083 27.1 2,220 
Total imports, CIF (in dollars) 23,425 27,531 33 ·' 320 21.0 15,527 
(in Riyals) 79,636 92,526 110,846 19.8 50,976 
' 
WP.ighted average excl1ange rate (Rl.s per $) 3.3996 3.3608 3.:3267 3.3372 3.3523 
Sources: Central Department of Statistics, Partner-country, Data and Capital SAMA estimates. 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Tr1e Statisttcal Indicator. 7th edition, 1982, p. 48 
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Gennany has decreased its share fran 8. 7 to 6. 7 per cent, respectively. 
The UK thus becanes the third largest producer of exp::>rts to Saudi Arabia 
with Gennany fourth. 12 Regional Middle Eastern trade accounted for 
slightly over 14 per cent of Saudi imports between 1970 and 1978 with 
Lebanon being the rrost regular supplier fran year to year. 
Although the balance of trade will be rrore fully examined in chapter 
6, it is interesting to note here that in 1978 West Gennany and the UK were 
the only nations with Which Saudi Arabia had a net deficit in their current 
accounts. Since 1974, \\hen the tenns of trade were rrost favourable to the 
Kingdom as a result of the massive 1973/4 oil price hikes, various forces 
--
have been in operation relative to the l::alance of trade. While the 
tendency has been for surpluses to deteriorate with increased Saudi demand 
for tmports in the public sector because of economic development needs, and 
in the private sector due to rising standards of living, the demand for oil 
fran certain nations (such as Japan, France and the USA) has kept the 
balance largely in favour of Saudi Arabia. 
2. 3 TARIFF AND IMPORI' CONTROlS 
The range of protective duties in Saudi Arabia is very limited in 
comparison with other Middle Eastem nations. In canparison wi Lh coW1tries 
such as pre-revolutionary Iran, Saudi Arabian duties are much less 
restrictive, as might be expected given that the country is an even larger 
oil producer than Iran but has a population only a fraction of L~e size. 
Saudi Arabia grants tariff protection to 29 local infant industries, rrost 
of which manufacture ronsumer non-durable. These include items such as 
4f, 
detergents, paper handkerchiefs and chocolate, Where imported gocds are 
subject to 20 per cent duty. cars and cxxrrnercial vehicles enter with only 
a 3 per cent tariff, and there are no duties payable on imported machinery 
or capital equipment. In 1975, 'hovJever, a joint venture company v.e.s set 
up, Saudi Arabia Motors, in Which General Motors of Detroit held 60 per 
cent of the capital, with 40 per cent subscribed in Saudi Arabia. This new 
canpany has been licensed to assenible 7800 vehicles a year, including 
Chevrolet Trucks, a small nurrber of buses and, 'Ibrana cars, a successful 
Australian rrodel. It is expected that tariff protection will be given to 
the new c:x:rnp:my' s vehicles. As a consequence, General Motors hopes the 
value of its exports to Saudi Arabia will actually rise after the opening 
ofits subsidiary, as it expects that it will increase its market share, 
WhiCh would mean greater sales of American vehicle can.rx:onents. 
Although in Saudi Arabia the nurrber of a::mmodities subject to import 
duty is limited at present, as the country develops new infant industries 
tile Lange of tariffs is likely to be extended. This will largely affect 
consumer durables in the first instance WhiCh will enjoy a high degree of 
effective protection, as intermediate and captial goods continue to enter 
free of duty for the foreseeable future. Such a tariff policy should do 
much to encourage expansion of infant industries in fields Where there is a 
reasonable markeL The scope for do11estic captial or intermediate gocds 
manufacture in Saudi Arabia seems much less pro~ising, despite the 
country's ~~itious plans for the steel industry. Any tariff protection on 
steel nay only serve to lo-.,,r.:'!r the effective protection given to consumer 
goods industries, ard lower tJ1eir prospects of profitability. 
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Perhaps Saudi Arabia represents the beginning of a trend away from 
free trade in the Middle East. Still there are same countervailing forces 
at work, such as the Arab Common Market although Saudi Arabia did not join 
this as they feared trade diversion effects would outweigh possible trade 
creation. Another factor actually encouraging trade has been the 
subsidies intr<rluced an focrl imp:>rts by Saudi Arabia as well as other Gulf 
states which in effect constitute a negative tariff. They \l.rere brought in 
basically as an anti-inflation mearsure to augment available food supplies 
and keep down internal prices. In practice, they reduce wage pressure by 
lowering the rate of cost of living increase WhiCh effectively increases 
the rate of effective protection for danestic industry. Hawever, such 
measures do not encourage local agriculture. 
Many of the countries of the Middle East have adopted same system of 
import licensing whereby prospective importers have to apply to the 
government for permission to purchase foreign goods. However, Saudi Arabia 
has no suCh policy. There are no quantitative restrictions an imports 
apart from goc:xls from Israel Where the pro-Palestinian, Arab boycott 
applies, and imports form Zirnbabv.7e (formerly Rhodesia) vmich were 
prohibited under the United Nations sanctions p:>licy until 1982. Neither 
are imports of alcoholic beverages allowed, as consumption of alcohol is 
forbidden under Islamic Law. 13 
Exchange arrangements in Saudi Arabia are quite straightforward. As 
discussed at the end of Chapter 1, -Lhe currency of Saudi Arabia is pegged 
to SDR and Dece.'Tiber 31, 1981 ISDR=SRls 4. 28255. Saudi Arabia at present 
applies margins not exceeding 7. 25 per cent arotmd that fixed relationship. 
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The middle rate of the Saudi Arabian riyal for the US dollar I quoted by the 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency ( SAMA) is detennined on the basis of the 
funds 1 s daily calculation of the US dollar -SDR rate. On Decenber 31 1981 
SAMA 1 s middle rate for the US dollar was SRls 3.415. It sold US dollars to 
banks at SRls 3. 42 per US $1 and l:ought fran banks and the principal 
prcxlucer of petroleum at SRls 3.41 per US $1. These rates served as the 
basis for exchange quotations in the market, the banks being permitted to 
charge up to 0. 25 per cent above am below the monetary Agency 1 s buyi119' and 
selling rates. The Monetary Agency also sells sterling to banks. There 
are no taxes or subsidies on purchases or sales of foreign exchange. 
However 1 the use of currencies of Israel and South Africa is prohibited I 
although no other of currency requirements are in force. Payments may not 
be made to Israel or South Africa or be received fran them for all types of 
transactions Whether of a current or capital nature. 
No exchange control requirements are imp::>sed on capital receipts or 
payments by residents or non residents. SAMA has issued guidelines to its 
foreign correspondent banks requiring them to seek approval prior to the 
flotation of riyal-denaninated loans. The Foreign Capital Investment law 
provides for specified benefits to be extended to approved foreign 
investments in Saudi Arabia. Approved foreign capttal enjQys the same 
privileges as domestic capital under the 1962 Law for the Protection and 
Prc:motion of Natio~l Industry. Further, capital invested in industrial or 
agricultural projects \-lith at least 25 per cent Saudi Arabian participation 
is exenpt fran inccme and coq:::orate tax for ten years after pro::'luction has 
begun. The situation regarding gold is also simple. The m'Jnetary 
authorities and all other residents, including private persons, may freely 
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and without license, purchase, hold and sell gold at heme or abroad. They 
may also, without a license or :p3.yment of any custans duty or tax, import 
and exr:ort gold in any form. This is with the exception of 14-c.arat gold-
. f . . hlb" ed 14 the lffiJX>rt o v.iluCh 1s pro 1t . 
The liberal payments system gives little protection to local 
industries and the link with the SDR pranotes trade rather than imr:ort 
substitution. As the exchange rate is very stable vis a vis the currencies 
of rrost of the country' s tradi03 partners, this has encouraged imports. 
Furthermore, as the SDR has appreciated rrodestly against rrost European 
currencies and the Japanese yen, this has made it more attractive for Saudi 
imr:orters to purchase fran these countries in recent years. The extent to 
Which the m:::Xlest exchange rate changes have prarroted total imports, or 
merely resulted in the substitution of one source of foreign supply for 
another must, however, remain a matter for debate. 
2.4 ABSORPTIVE CAPACI'IY OF SAUDI A..RABIA 
Since 1974 Saudi Arabia has had the second largest international 
reserves in the world. In 1977 Saudi reserv·es were valued at US $30 
billion oompared with $39.7 billion for West Germany and $19.4 billion for 
the USA. By 1981, these reserves almost reached $40 billian. 15 As a 
result of the Kingdom's oil revenues and the country's inability (or 
refusal) to absorb this wealti'1 through danestic consumption and investment, 
Sau::Ji Arabia nov; has a significant status in international liquidity. 
These surplus funjs and the Saudi require~ent for economic developnent 
obviously have :Lrnrnrtant implication f-or the future demand for i.lnp::n"ts. 
~u 
Various projections of Saudi Arabia's ability to absorb real gocrls and 
services have been made, based upon the growth of the Kingdom 1 s economy. 
This concept of absorptive capacity has been defined as "that amount of 
investment • • • as a proportion of GNP, that can be made at an acceptable 
rate of retum. The future of Saudi Arabian economic development must be 
focused upon its ability to expand its absorptive capacity and 
subsequent! y, the ability to import gocrls and services. "16 The above 
mentioned overall increase in imports shows that constraints and growth 
were overccme in previous years, and a considerable expansion in absorptive 
capacity has taken place. 
According to a US Deptarment of Treasury study, the major constraint 
upon the achievement of the Second Plan 1 s objective of increasing imports 
by 30 per cent per year consisted of InanfJO\'/Br shortages and the 
inefficiency of air and sea ports. While facil ties for importing to the 
Kingdom were inadequate during the early 1970's substantial expansion in 
the second Plan pericrl increased port capacity to 130 berths in 1980 fran 
the 24 in operation in 1975. For example, the Gulf p::>rt of Damman raised 
its port capacity more than fourfold to 12.7 million deadweight tons in 
1980. 
The Treasury Department study predicted a moderate rate of import 
growth to 1980, thereafter accelerating sharply once the major constraints 
were overcame, to an estimated SR 61 422 million (17.4 billion in constant 
1974 dollars) by 1985. However, this study underestim3ted the ability of 
the Saudi &.."'Onomy to absorb linp:Jrts. The total imports in 1978 had 
already exceeded the 1985 projection. Apparently, a 1976 study prepared 
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for the US Depart.ment of State, Where Saudi import projections were based 
upon the absorptive capacity of the country and a 'particular oil revenue 
scenario', was not correct either. Physical constraints to the expansion 
of dcmestic absorptive capactiy included population, man:rower and 
infrastructure and, the implementation of the Second Development Plan was 
seen as questionable o A subsequent study suggested that such constraints 
II are not expected to prevent Saudi Arabia from experiencing a high rate 
f . rowth . . . . "dl ,.17 o econcnuc g or contrnUlng to 1ncrease l.lllpOrts rap1 yo The 
result of this latter study predicted a 14.4 per cent average annual growth 
rate of imports unitl 1980, thereafter slowing down to 4o7 per cent per 
year up to and until 1985. Relative shares of imports of major trading 
partners were expected to remain generally the same as in the past. 
As stated above, nnports increased at a 64 per cent average annual 
rate between 1975 and 1978. Also, the source of imports shifted slightly 
in the direction of Western Europe, Japan and the USA o FUrther, the 
projections of planners for the 1980-85 span are for imports to gnaw at a 7 
per cent annual figure. The absorptive capacity of the Saudi ecarnony has 
therefore expanded faster than many predictions suggested it might. 
With the restricted growth projections for the Third Development Plan, 
import growth is projected to return to its historical trend of 
approximately 7 per cent average annual increase. However, as import 
markets continue to develop in the Saudi econcrny, the reciprocal 
relationship between grawth and trade \~11 become increasingly ~ide. 
Furthermore, to the extent that surplus oil revenues exceed absorption 
capacity, reflecting the level of that country's imports, Saudi Arabia's 
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holding of international reserves and foreign exChange will continue to 
grow. 
2 • 5 IMPORI' DE'l'ER-1INANTS 
Table 2.4 shows that the value of imp:>rts increased every year between 
1965 and 1980 in Saudi Arabia. Between these years the value of imp:>rts 
increased about seventy times. The increases in the value of imp:>rts were 
muCh larger after 1973. For example, between 1968 and 1972 there was a 
forty per cent increase, While between 1973 and 1974 alone imp:>rts doubled, 
as they did between 1974 and 1975. This would suggest that the increase in 
demand for irnp:>rts up to 1973, reflected the pace of economic developnent 
in Saudi Arabia. However, the increase in oil prices and revenues received 
by Saudi Arabia, meant the removal of financial constraints in the short 
tenn after 1973, as discussed in Chapter 1. This massive increase in the 
purchasing p:>wer of Saudi Arabia v.e.s immediatedl y reflected in the demand 
far bnports, as Saudi industries were insufficiently developed. 
COnsequently, between 1975 and 1978 there v.e.s an approximate 50 per cent 
increase per annt.nn in the total value of imp:>rts. Even When inflation is 
accounted for, this real rise was still substantial and probably 40 per 
cent per annt.nn. The Goverrnnent' s recognition Q% the problem pf inflation 
meant a policy to curb inflation Which is reflected in the 1978/79 figure. 
Between 1978/79 there was a comparatively small increase in the total 
value of im]X)rts of approximately 15 per cent suggesting that the 
authorities had managed to control i_r1f1ation. This was followed by an 
approximate 30 per cent increase between 1979/80. Sane of the detennjnants 
Table 2.4 
Import Determinants 
Govt. Govt 0 fixed Private Consumer 
Year Imports Consumption Capital Consumption Prices 
Formation (1975 = 100) 
t M G I c p 
1965 1,948 1,654 1,712 29909 43.9 
1966 2,255 1,915 2,330 ' 3,026 44.6 ' 
1967 3,538 2,674 2,158 4,001 45.5 
1968 4,392 2,747 2,392 4,585 46.3 
1969 4,851 3,026 2,632 5,360 47.9 
1970 4,990 3,421 2,597 5,859 48.2 
1971 5,205 3,798 2,933 6,412 50.3 
1972 6,303 4,285 3,403 6,914 52.5 
Ul 
1973 8,272 5,335 5,694 7,896 61.2 w 
1974 15,293 9,864 8,400 9,828 74.3 
1975 17,257 15,911 17,699 18,039 100.0 
1976 42,863 28,883 33,540 23,903 131.6 
1977 62,699 41,033 51,191 34,372 146.5 
1978 91,505 47,034 66,891 54,607 144.2 
1979 107,179 71,904 76,654 60,845 146.8 
1980 134,351 88,206 94,977 70,186 151.5 
million riyals 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1981 Yearbook, p. 367. 
SAMA Annual Report 1399 (1979), p. 161 
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of imports s'hc:>vl similar changes during the 1970 1 s. Government consumption 
increased rrore than 50 per cent each year fonn 1973 to 1977. The 
Government 1 s policy to roouce inflation is shown clearly in the decreasing 
rate of the increase in government cnnsumption. Between 1977 and 1978 the 
increase in governnent consumpticn was less than 20 per cent. The 
Govenment was also successful in reducing fixed capital formation. '!here 
were very large increases in this item up to 1977 When the rate of increase 
began to slow down. Between 1978/9 the Government had mmaged to reduce 
the increase to approximately 15 per cent. Likewise, private cansuption 
shows quite a steady increase up to 1978. However, private consumption 
only increase:] by approximately 10 per cent between 1978/79 and 15 per cent 
between 1979/80 suggesting perhaps a less significant relationship between 
private consumptioo curl total imports than government consumption and 
imp::>rts • It appears to be easier for the Government to control government 
consumpt.ian than private consumption. 
'l'o verify Whether government consumption, government fixed captial 
formation and private consumption were significant factors in explaining 
the Changing trends for the total value of im.rorts, fonnal linear 
regression analysis was applied, with the relationship rnstulated of the 
fonn 
m = a + bG + ci + dC (1.0) 
Where the dependent variable M is total value of imports, the independent 
variables G, I and C being government conswnption, govennent fixed capital 
fonnation and private consumption, respectively. The p3.rameters a,b,c, and 
d are to be estimated When applied to annual data from 1965 to 1980 (16 
observations), this yielded the result 
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M = -4242.95 + 1.50 G 0.84I + 1.33C (1.1) 
(-2.26) (24.50) (-2.44) (2.91) 
2 Figures in parentheses are t values, R = 0.99, Durban Watson= 1.13. The 
equation reveals a significantly positive relationship between government 
consumption and imports and to a lesser extent private consumption, as 
might be expected. There is however, an apparently· negative relationship 
betwen goverrunent fixed capital formation (I) ~iCh is quite significant 
given its t value. This might be explained in that I does not vary so much 
in the short tenn as it is dependent on medium- and long-tenn contract 
agreements. 
The Durban Watson value in equation 1.1 is low, revealing 
autocorrelation. The Cochrane-Orcutt iterative least squares technique 
was used in equation 1. 2 in an attempt to boost the Durban Watson value. 
This failed. 
M = -3.52707 + 1.44G 1.171 + 1.74C (1.2} 
(0.98) (19.34) (-4.72) (5.46) 
2 (R = 0.98, Durban Watson 0.85) 
A better result was obtained When imports were regressed against the 
same independent variables (G,I and C), but using t-1 Where subscript t 
represents time. This was done because it is likely that the dependent 
variable might be influenced by the independant values of the year before. 
The equation for the regression is thus written 
M = a + bGt-1 + clt-1 + dCt-1 (2.0) 
Equation 2.1 reveals a positive relationship between government consumption 
and imports and private o:msumption to a lesser extent. The t value for 
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goverrnnent fixed capital fonnation suggests the revealed negative 
relationship is not significant. Further:more, the Durban Watson value 
reveals autocorrelation. 
M = -1113.33 + 1.85G - O.Oli + 0.46C (2.1) 
(-Q.65) (33.63) (-Q.03) (1.13) 
(R2 = 0.996, Durban Watson Value 0.90) 
After correction using the Cochrane Orcutt iterative technique this becanes 
M = -376.37 + 1.84G - O.OlSI + 0.41C (2.2) 
( -1.16) (30.64) (-Q.07) (1.42) 
2 (R = 0.996, Durban Watson value 1.88) 
In equation 2.2 the Durbcm Watson value is satisfactory. The significantly 
positive relationship remains particularly with government consumption and 
imports and also with private consumption. The low negative t value of 
government fixed capital £ormation(I) suggests that the relationship is a 
weak one however, it is notable that I is negative throughout equations 1 
and 2. Equation 2 suggests that the determinants of irnpJrts may well be 
affected by earlier values. 
Therefore, in equation 3 each independent variable G,I and C was 
observed minus its value in the preceding year that is, the import level 
W&3 regressed against charges in the inde~ent variables. The equation 
for the regression is thus written: 
M = a + b ( G-Gt -1 ) + c ( I It-1) + d(C - Ct-1) (3 .0) 
The Durban Watson Value was teo low again revealing autocorrelation in 3.1 
as £ollows 
M = -2461.72 + 6.17 (G-Gt-1) - 3.87 (I-It-1) + 5.73(C-ct-1) (3.1) 
(-0.86) (18. 27) ( -6 018) (7.03) 
2 (R = 0.97, D.W. = 1.03) 
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After correction using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique this becomes 
M = -846.88 + 6.0(G-Gt-l) - 3.46 (I-It~l) + 5.20(C-ct-l) (3.2) 
(-0.17) (12 .21) (-6.49) (7.42) 
(R2 = 0.94, D.W. = 1.56) 
In equation 3. 2 a satisfactory Durban Watson value was achieved. This 
equation reveals a different emphasis in the ~rtance of government 
consumption, private conslUTlption and :i.mJ:orts. Private consumption is 
canparatively rrore significant than in equation 1 and 2, although 
government constmtption according to the t values is rrost significant. 
Also, the t value for government fixed cpa.ital formation is strongly 
negative perhaps reflecting medi~ and long-term contractual agreements, 
as suggested above. 
In equation 4, \'.hen regressing changes in imp::>rts against changes in 
G, I and C, the results were less pranising. Fonnal linear regression 
analysis was applied and the equation thus written 
Mt-Mt-1 = a + b(Gt-Gt-1) + c(I-It-1) + d(C-ct-1) (4.0) 
The annual data from 1965 to 1980 gave the result 
Mt-Mt-1 = 559.66 + 1.34(G-Gt-l) - 1.12(I-It-l) +1.67 (c-Ct-1} (4.1) 
(0.48) (9.87) (-4.43) (5.08) 
2 (R = 0.92, D.w. Value = 0.80} 
Once again a low Durban Watson Value v.es obtain revealing autocorrelation. 
After correction using the Cochrane Orcutt iterative technique, the Durban 
Watson value was not boosted sufficiently as equation 4.2 shows. 
Mt-Mt-1 = 2578.88 + 0.91 (G-Gt-1) - 0.87(1-It-1) + 1.32(C-ct-1) (4 0 2) 
(0.70) (3.65) (-4.42) (4.91) 
(R2 = 0.84, D.W. = 1.17} 
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When imfOrts are regressed against G, I and C using logarithms the 
results achieved are better. The equation for the regression is thus 
written 
lDg M = a + b log G + c log I + d log C (5.0) 
Once more annual data fran 1965 to 1980 was used giving the result 
lDg M = -D.93 + 1.06 log G - 0.20 lag I + 0.28 log C (5.1) 
(-2.18) (21. 73) (-1.64) (2.13) 
2 (R = 0.99, D.W. value 1.39) 
Quite a reasonable Durban Watson Value \\B.S obtained. Using logari t.hms 
tended to confinn the results of earlier equations. Government consumption 
seems to be the most significant determinants of im.IDrt and private 
consumption is also fOSitively related. Notably, gO\I'ennent fixed capital 
formation was negative again. 
Given this quite promising result, equation 3 was repeated using 
logarithms. The equation for the regression in thus written 
lDg M = a + b log Gt-1 + c log It-1 + d log Ct-1 (6.0) 
The annual data between 1965 to 1980 gave the result 
Log M = -D.03 + 0.95 log Gt-1 + 0.23 log It-1 - 0.10 log Ct-1 (6.1} 
(0.92) (-D.35) 
(R2 = 0.98, D.W. Value= 0.76} 
The results in 6.1 cannot be used as llie Durban vlatson Value is too low. 
v1J1en using the data between 1965 and 1980, in general equations l to 6 
tend to confirm that government consumption is a significant determinant of 
imp:xts. This is also true of private consumption but to a much lesser 
59 
degree. Therefore, it could be said that if the Saudi Government wishes to 
influence imfX)rts, governnent econanic fX)licies could well be used 
successfully. It is interesting to note that government fixed capital 
formation has consistently obtained a negative result as a determinant of 
i.m.f;:orts, a robust result that a cursory glance of the data would rot 
suggest. 
As was suggested in the first p:rrt. of this section, 2. 5, the price 
level affected the value of imfX)rts to sane extent. As all the data are in 
current prices, the close relationship may only reflect variations in the 
role of price increase. In order to firrl out how significant this factor 
has been, equations 1 to 6 are used once more including Consumer Prices 
(1975 = 100). Three of the results were useful and are stated below. That 
is, formal linear regression analysis was applied with the relationship 
postulated of the form 
M = a + bG + ci + dC + eP (7.0) 
Where w1e dependent variable M is total value of imports and the added 
independent variable P, is Consumer Prices . In the following equations, a, 
b, c, d and e are to be estimated. Wr1en applied to annual data fran 1965 
to 1980, this yeilded the result 
M = 9918.93 + 1.34 1.01 + 1.50 + 97.89 (7.1) 
(-3.03) (18.21) (-3.17) (3.62) (2.02) 
2 Figures in parentheses are t values, R = 1.0, Durban Watson= 0.95. This 
equation reveals a positive relationship between Consumer Prices and the 
value of :iJnp::nts. T'ne relationship is weaker t11an that wi tl1 private 
consumption or government consuinption. The equation cnnfirms the negative 
relationshp of fixed capital formation (I) with imports, as seen in earlier 
equations. 
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As with equation 2, 'When cxmsumer prices were discluded, a better 
result was obtained 'When imports were regressed against the same 
independent variables (G, I, C and P) but using t-1. The subscript t 
denotes time. It assesses \>.hether the dependent variable was influenced by 
the year before. The equation for the regression is thus written 
M = a + bGt-1 + cit-1 + dct-1 + ept-1 (8.0) 
Equation 8.1 reveals a more positive relationship between Consumer Prices 
and imports, although government consumption and imports have the strongest 
relationship. Private consumption only achieves a t value of 2.52 and I 
is less significant with a t value of -1.66. A satisfactory Durban Watson 
value was also achieved. 
M = 12369.69 + 1.56 0.40 + 0.75 + 225.26 (8 .1) 
(-3.56) (16.66) (-1.66) (2.52) (3.43) 
(R2 = 1.0, Durban Watson= 1.72) 
When imports are regressed against G, I, C and P using logarithms a 
useful result is obtained. The equation for the regression is thus written 
Log M = a + blogG + Clogi + dlogC + elogP (9.0) 
Once again, annual data from 1965 to 1980 was used giving the following 
result 
Log M = -1.93 + 0.91 0.39 + 0.45 + 0.58 (9.1) 
(-1.95) (6.41) ( -1. 88 ) ( 2 • 26 ) (1.1) 
2 (R = 1.0, D W value = 1.42) 
The use of logarithms o::mfirrned the results of the above e::ruations for the 
most part. Equation 9 slDw.s a positive relationship h~tw2en ConsLDner 
Prices and im.r:orts, although Oi!e that is less significant than G or c. It 
also reveals a negative real tionship between capit-al fixe) investment and 
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im}:orts. A reasonable Durban Watson value ...as obtained in this equation. 
2.6 cnNCllJSION 
Equation 1 to 9 attempt to assess the significance of same of the 
major detenninants of imports. The first six equations look at government 
consumption (G) , capital fixed formation (I) , and private consumption (C) • 
In earn case, the revelation was that G was the major determinant and C was 
significant but to a lesser extent. Additionally, I remained negative 
throughout so that it must be concluded that it did not influence the level 
of irrq:orts. Equations 7 to 9 included the independent variable, Consumer 
Prices and they attempt to assess the role of inflation in the determining 
of .i.mpJrts between 1965 and 1980. Each equation revealed a positive 
relationship for this variable but P's t value was always muCh lower than 
G. This shows that even When Consumer prices are included in the e:JUation, 
G is still the major detenninant and I still negative. Price variations 
for imports and domestic macro variables does not explain the relationships 
found. 
As investrnent does not appear to be a major determinant of im.r:orts, 
this ~lies that capital formation in import sUbstitution industrie? will 
ha·:~ little negative imract on the balance of p3yments. This agrees with 
data presente:J. earlier in this chapter. Indeed. the creation of such 
industries may eventually weaken the link between government expenditure, 
private expenditure and ~~po~~. Although Saudi Arabian govenvnent policy 
is rDt CD.'lstrained in the medium tenn by ba.lance of p3.y;nents 
considerations, it may be in t.he future if the demand for oil weakens 
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further. Diversification into irnrort substitution industries will 
ultimately give the government more independence in its policy decisions, 
\Ohile at the same time the short tenn irnrort costs seem likely to be 
minimal given the evidence presented here. 
In western conntries it is often stated with various rrotives that 
increases in government consumption can only take place at the cost of 
lowering investment. The suggestion is that the size of the 'cake' cannot 
be made larger so that one squeezes the other out. This does not appear to 
be the case in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps the removal of financial constraints 
in the 1970's has given rise to a different situation. 
It has been noted above that the growing demand for irnrorts could be 
seen as a reflection of the pa.ce of developnent. Sane econanists have been 
surprised by the ability of the Saudi Government to increase the pace of 
developnent, as revenues increased. The absorptive capacity of the econcmy 
has been underestimated in the past. Financial reserves have also been 
observed briefly in chapter 2. Oil revenues have been fluctuating in the 
1980's because of the over capacity in the oil market and it is likely that 
financial reserves will reflect decreases arrl increases in oil revenues. 
However, in the above analysis, government consumption has clearly been 
shown to be the major determinant of imports so that the Saudi Govenment 
must be well placed to influence de11and for imports. This must me.an that 
the potential for the government to infl uen02 the pace of import 
substitution p::>lir::ies is also great. A factor Which which o::mld be used to 
·the benefit of ti1e country. 
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CHAPI'ER 3 
SCOPE FOR IMPORT SUBSTITUTES 
3 .1 IMPORT SUBSTITUI'ICN POLICIES 
Saudi Arabia is aware of the difficulties associated with relying an 
export trade as the main 'engine of growth' • OVer-dependence on the export 
of one cx::llTilllCdity nakes the economy extremely vulnerable to changes in \\Drld 
market conditions. Adverse price trends and uncertainty with regard to 
fluctuations in market prices provides an economic rationale £or the 
adoption of an .import substi tutian policy as an alternative to 
specialisation in exp:>rt production. This was not possible in the early 
1960's because it was unclear that such a quantity of foreign exchange 
\\Duld be available to finance .imp::>rts. Politically 1 import substitution 
policies are an economic manifestation of the desire for national 
independence 1 as well as being p:trt of the nation-building process. 
When the pericrl of easy growth that is 1 oil dependent growth COTies to 
an end I the econcrny will have to "nonnalise". Nonnalisation means that the 
Kingdcrn will becane rrore dependent on the mobilisation of domestic 
resources. The public sector v.rill have to increase the share of domestic 
(non oil) revenues in total revenues and the private sector will have had 
to reach a level of sophistication where it is capable of depending on 
private savings and O"Jrp"Jrate pl-ofits for its grov.rth m::.mentum. Like other 
o::mntries of the f'.'!iddle East, Saudi Arriliia v.Bnts to industrial ise as the 
only viable means of development. Of tl1e prrouctive sectors, agriculture, 
industry, mines and services, only the industry and mining sector offers 
even the slightest p::>ssibili ty of achieving imp::>rt substitution. The 
possibility £or growth in agriculture and livestock, the most traditional 
sectors, is lirni ted because of lack of water, arable land and the 
unwillingness of Saudi labour to pursue a career in fanning. 1 
In short, an industrial revolution is seen as a necessity. The need 
to diversify the industrial base is accepted. This is despite the probable 
emergence of an urban proletariat Which might provide the basis £or leftist 
parties and opp::>se the conservative Saudi Goverrrrnent. In Saudi Arabia 
there has been little indigenous industry until recently so most 
irrlustrialisation constitutes .imp::>rt substi tutian. It would, however, be 
unfair to suggest that the country is totally without industrial tradition. 
Production of 10-13 million barrels per day of oil has inevitably involved 
the development of some industrial skills, despite the large input by 
expatriates. 2 The question still remains: How can this extensive 
industrialisation be achieved? In the initial aftermath of the increases 
in revenues in_the early 1970's the Saudis had tentative plans £or a Whole 
range of industries - fran refining and petrochemicals to steel and 
aluminium processing. Gradually, these plans vJere whittled dO'WI1 to a 
realistic core. For example, the car a~sembly plan was discouraged because 
it was labour intensive. NeverU1eless, t.he re-naining plans are aJTbitious, 
especially for a relatively unsophisticated econany. 
Even today Saudi Arabia has to imp::n-t rnany petroleum h"'lse-.4 p:o:-Jucts 
v.hich cannot be produced by the country's 0\llfl refinery plants. 
Unfortunately, however, local multiplier effects fran establishing 
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refineries to produce :i.mr:orts substitutes are minimal o This type of 
industry is by nature highly capital intensive and creates few employment 
opportunities o The majority of the nore highly skilled workforces are 
expatriates, Who remit a substantial part of their salaries to their hane 
countries, While their local consumption is usually not fran :i.mr:orted 
gociis. The absence of trainerl nationals acts as a limitation on imp:>rt 
substitution in Saudi Arabia so this is discusse:'l in the next chapter o 3 
Below, we look at import substitution policies in the First and Second 
Plans. 
Shaw and l.Dng state that the First Five Year Plan cxmtained the three 
primary goals: "maintaining the fundamental religious and social values of 
the Kingdom, increasing its defensive capability, and preparing the 
econanic diversification in the post-oil era" .4 The high dependency of the 
a..-unany on oil, and the high propensity to import in Saudi Arabia, means 
that econanic diversification goes hand in hand with import substitution 
pulicieso Successful diversification away from oil necessarily implies the 
implementation of irnp:>rt substitution policies o Initially, under the First 
Plan, preparations for economic diversification were constrained by 
financial considerations. Bo\Never, as tl1e Third Development Plan states, 
the nost outstanding feature of the First Plan period was "tlle complete 
change in the rate of obtaining revenues fran oil, and the degree of 
control over the Kingdon's oil resources". 5 Hence, during the later years 
of tJ1e First Plan, finance ceased to be the main constraint. Yet, other 
factors continue::l to limit develop.nent. 
bEl 
The First Plan was cautious but also flexible. It allowed the 
continual revision of budgets upwards throughout the five years with a 
paucity of educated technocrats, an inadequate data base, and no 
bureaucratic traditicn, the goverrnnent launched an accelerated effort to 
achieve the anibitious goals contained in the Second Plan. They included 
massive physical infrastructure projects - roads, ports, airports, 
industrial estates, and the beginning of industrial zones and far reaching 
social programmes. All these represent good preparations for economic 
diversification. The development plan effort was surprisingly successful 
in contructing physical infrastructure, and it set a finn foundation of 
education and other social institutions. Furthermore, the administrative 
inefficiencies of the government bureaucracy actually served to buffer 
against the social discrimination of the development process by impeding 
rapid implementation of so many major projects. 6 
Import sUbstitution policies were more prominent in the Second Plan 
but still they were only indirectly followed by the Saudi Government. 
According to the Third Development Plan, the strategy of the Second Plan 
concentrated on four main areas for development. One of the four areas was 
the private sector. Private enterprise v.es given a major role in the 
development of the productive sectors and assured all possible government 
. ta --'l f. . al . 1 . 7 ass1s nee a1~ 1nanc1 stlmU at1on. Tnis means tJhe non-oil related 
industries have been, and are being I encouraged. In this sector U1e 
objectives stated by the Saudi governuent include: 1) to increase U1e 
do:nestic econo11y' s capacity to proJ.uce at COTtfl2titive costs a wide range of 
pro:Jucts for danestic as well as for the exp::nt markets 1 2) the industrial 
exploitation of the sUbst..antial o:::fnparative advantages arising from low 
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cost energy and other natural advantages, 3) furthering the Kingdom' s 
access to rrodern technology, 4) to encourage the use of the capacity of the 
private manufacturing sector, 5) to increase prc:rluctivity through careful 
adherence to a policy of "optimal size" of plants, 6) to secure a regional 
arid balanced developnent of industry and, 7) to reduce dependence on 
expatriate workers by national skill creatian.8 
FDDm 1976 to 1980 Saudi Arabia experienced a 15 per cent growth rate 
annually in the general development of the non-hydrocarbon manufacturing 
sector Which exceeded the planning targets. The hydrocarbon-based 
projects, in spite of many obstacles, are often incredible range of their 
targets for the Second Plan. 'Ihe rapid transfonnation of Saudi cultural 
life may indeed dicate the incorporation of additional delays beyond those 
indicated within the planning process. However, that elongation may prove 
to be a significant asset in their orderley implementation. 
Half a decade later in 1980, the same goal of diversification remained 
one of the fundamental objectives for the long-tenm economic development of 
the Kingdc:rn and a key aspect of the strategy for the 1980-85 period. The 
private sector is still to be encouraged to pa.rticip3.te in capital 
investments . Only Where the size of investments is large and beyond the 
capacity of private individuals, will the govetnment itself undertake 
capital investment. The productive sectors, includb1g agriculture, 
industry and mining are to be Emphasised, with the developnent to be 
prirrarily undertaken by the private sector. The government's role is to be 
a supp:::>rtive one. The aim being to create a favourable environnent w11ere 
private business can prosper. 
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This support is to take the form of providing infonnation on the 
Op:pJrtuni ties for investment in the prcrlucti ve sectors of the econcmy. The 
information is expected to accrue £ram increased emphasis on economic 
feasibility studies and prograrrmes of applied research. Further government 
support will come from the oampletion of infastructure and the provision of 
services related to maintenance, marketi_nJ arrl transport Where needed to 
support productive industries. In particular, two areas were seen as 
crucial for investment by the private sector. That is, large scale 
mechanised agricultural projects and, projects "Which introduce appropriate, 
new econanic technologies. Both are seen as essential for the 
implementation of import substitution :pJlicies. It is worth noting that 
there are certain indications to suggest that planners are beginning to 
adopt a regional approach. The nuniber of projects involved are sma.ll at 
present and they are only between Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Economists suggest that planners are acting rationally and Observing the 
Gulf through remarkably un-nationalistic eyes. others suggest it is more 
of a case of not putting all their 1 eggs in one l::e.sket 1 , that is, saudi 
Arabia. 9 
However, as a result of the rapid eL~nomic growth, the IZingdom 1 s total 
value of irn:pJrts rose dramatically, as discussed in Chapter 2. Over the 
period 1973-78, irnrorts increased by an average armual figure of 58.2 per 
cent, reaching the amount of SR 69,180 million in the latter year. This 
high propensity to irnrort is expected to be maintained in the Third Plan 
perio:J. as well. Perhaps this pJints to a paradox in t.he Saudi plans. By 
encouraging the eLvnomic diversification of the no:-1-oil sector with the 
long-tenn strategy of successful implementation of iml_X)rt substitution 
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policies, the propensity to import may increase as more goods are demanded 
to· support such policies. The evidence in the last chapter does not 
support this it indicated that capital investment is not necessarily 
associated with increasing imports. Nevertheless, Saudi planners are still 
faced with the dilemna that import substitution cannot be achieved in the 
short-term. They have to be content with preparing the ground for import 
substitution policies. In fact, the intentions of the planners were for 
the imp::>rt growth rate to stablise at al::;out 7 per cent per annum. Inlp:Jrt 
comp::lsition for the five year span was expected to be influenced by a rise 
in comp::ments and pr<rlucts substituting for labour. 
Third Plan projections are for the petroleum sector to grow by only 
1 . 3 per cent per annum While the non-oil sectors will expand by a large 
(but more ll'lCrlest than in the Second Plan) rate of 6.2 per cent. In 
practice, there is evidence of a lower rate of growth for oil and a higher 
rate for the non-oil private output in the Third Plan in CXll11parison with 
the Second . However, oil continues to dcrnina te the econany. Yet, 
diversification efforts as provided in the Second and Third Plans have 
begun to bear fruit. Opportunities for business in the non-oil private 
sector are thus li.'k.:ely to grO\.v in the foreseeable f-uture. A noteworthy 
development pertaining to Saudi business opportunities WhiCh was expressed 
in the Third Plan involves the concept of 'Saudization'. This principle 
provides for priority in the awarding of tenders to be given to Saudi 
contractors. \"illen contracts are aworded to foreign contractors there will 
be a stip~latioz-1 th-"lt so:n2 of t11e work must b2 sub-contracted to Saudi 
conp:mies. In order to facilitate me p::>licy, it is intended that very 
large projects should be split up rather tJ1an awarded as a single 
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10 package. Foreign participation in the imp:>rt substitution process will 
be lcoked at specifically in 3. 3. 
3.2 PATI'ERN OF IMPORI' SUBSTI'IUI'ICN 
It must firstly be said that licensing is Obligatory £or new or joint 
industrial projects. Saudi finns Which expect to seek government 
protection and assistance rrrust also be licensed. Government licensing 
assures that the projects will contribute to plan fulfillment. 11 
Therefore, a fair assessment of the pattern of ~rt sUbstitution or 
econanic diversification can be obtained. In this case, the industrial 
licenses issued in 1975, 1976 and 1977 give a good indication as to What 
was happening during the Second Developnent Plan. In this period 1, 035 
licenses were issued and table 3.1 shows the percentage of total licenses 
issued by economic activity o The figures quoted were calculated fran the 
absolute figures cited in the Saudi Arctbian Monetary Agency ( SAMA) 1979 
Annual Rer:ort o 
Column l of table 3.1 shO\vs very clearly that the rrost L'ldustrial 
licenses were issued in the category of the manufacture of non metal goods. 
I_n fact,_ 49.37% of i:be total licenses were issued in this sector • This 
sector includes petroche~icals, rtfubP_r a~ plastics, all kinds of non 
metal pipes, general construction rrateria ls, china and glassware. By 
lcoking at the industrial licenses it CO'Jld be said that in general t11e 
Saudi Government has managed to diversify m::>st successfully away fran oil 
in the manufacture of gocx)s, relating to the constructin"1 irrlustry. 
Table 3.1 
Investment by Economic Activity in Saudi Arabia in 1975, 1976 and 1977 
Kind o:f: Economic Percentage of total Percentage of Percentage of paid up Ratio of paid up K 
Activity industrial licenses authorised capital capital (K) by to authorised K by 
by economic activity (local and foreign) economic activity economic activity 
by economic activity 
Bever8ges/Foodstuffs\ 17.78 14.35 13.39 .39 
Manuf;:cct.un~ of 
materials, e.g. 
I products of paper 8.12 
I 
5.27 5.99 .47 
pulp I 
i 
i I ~1anufacture of non 
metal products 9 e.g. 49.37 61.09 64.78 .44 
canent, lime 9 
' plastic and marble ! I 
iv!anuf act ure of I 
metals 9 e.g. I 24.44 19.14 15.54 .33 structural metal 
products 
Other products 0.29 0.16 0.30 . 79 
Source: S;:cudi Arabia.n 1\bnetary Agency 9 Annual Report, 1979. Table 36 9 p. 75. Proportions calculated by the 
author. 
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The second highest nurriber of licenses were issued in the manufacture 
of metals category. 24.44% of total licenses were issued for goods 
structured in metal. These included goods such as steel hangers, central 
air conditioning ducting and aluminium doors and windows. Goc:xls in this 
category supply both the domestic and industrial markets. Many of the 
gocxis for Which licenses have been issued in this category can be made with 
non-sophisticated machinery and without specialised manp:>Wer. This perhaps 
accounts for the relative daninance of this category. On the other hand, 
quite a high pro.r:crtion of licenses ( 17 • 78%) were issued in the beverages/ 
fcx:rlstuffs category. Yet this could be considered quite law, given the 
large nuniber of people working in the rural sector in Saudi Arabia. 
Columns 2 and 3 of table 3.1 show the percentage of investment by 
economic activity. Column 2 looks at "total capital" or authorised 
capital, and column 3, "paid up" capital Which could be seen as the initial 
investment with a view to a finn growing in the future. Again, the 
outstanding category is the manufacture of non metal prc:rlucts. 61.09% of 
the total of total capital and 64.78% of the total of paid up category was 
accounted for in this way. Apparently, investors see this area worthy of 
investment vklich is in 1 i ne with the idea t.~at there ·,.,d .. ll continue to be a 
demand for such goods. Cement 1 for example 1 will be needed for future 
construction projects. Not altogether surprisingly, Column 1 (industrial 
licenses issued) and colunm.s 2 and 3 shaiv similar results. T'nis is not the 
case for the manufacture of metals. It accounts for 24 .44% of the licenses 
(253) but only for 19.4% and 15.54% of authorised Ci=tpital and p3.id up 
capital, respectively. TI1is may mean that establish~ents in ~1is category 
are less capital intensive. or, this may suggest a lessening of confidence 
7C:. 
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for a a:mtinued demand for products in this category. Alternatively, it 
may reflect the high proportion of investment in the non metal category. 
This cnuld also be the case for the category, manufacture of materials . 
The ratio of paid up capital to authorised capital in table 3.1 has 
been calculated by dividing paid up capital by authorised capital • It 
should, therefore, provide a rough ccmparison of capital already invested 
and the future ambitions of a finn (total capital ) . The rrost notable is 
the "other prcrlucts" fran the SAMA table Which includes all gocrls not 
classified in the first few categories of table 3.1 There is a high ratio 
of 0.79 in this category suggesting firms were achieving their ambitions to 
a large extent. However, this category anl y accounts for 3 of the 1, 035 
licenses issued, hence no general conclusions should be drawn. There is 
not a very significant difference in the ratios of the other categories. 
The lowest ratio was achieved by the manufacture of metals category, 0. 33, 
suggesting firms in this category have plenty of room for expansion. 
Table 3.2 presents the same information for 1981 and 1982 Which can be 
seen as an indication of What is happening tmder the Third DevelOp!11P.Jlt 
Plan. This table has been calculated directly fran the quarterly lists of 
licensed factories and industrial licenses issued by the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia's Ministry of Industry and Electricity, the Industrial Affairs 
Agency and the Industrial Statistics Department in 1981 and 1982. Tnis has 
allov,•ed a further breakdown of categories so that table 3 .1 's manufacture 
of metals category has been broken dov.n into the manufacture of r.12tals, the 
r.snufacture of durable gocxls arrl trans.JX>rt goo:Js in 3. 2 In 1981 and 1982 a 
total of 634 licenses were issued. Again, the first column of table 3.2 
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shows the percentage of total licenses issued by econcmic activity. This 
column shows quite a lot of similarities with 3 .1 
Once more, the highest percentage of licenses were issued in the 
ma.nu£acture of non metal products category, 41.64% CXJ!Tipared with 49.37% in 
table 3 .1. As stated above, in general the licenses issuoo in this 
category are for gc:ods used in the construction industry. Econanic 
diversification in this category would appear rational, given the heavy 
transp::>rt costs involved in the rrovsnent of bulky gocxjs. HcYwever, although 
this category has retainoo its primary position, it is to a lesser extent. 
Why? The Second Developnent Plan gave a far greater snphasis on 
infrastructural projects than the Third Development Plan WhiCh instead 
emphasised selective economic diversification. That is, developmP-nt in 
sectors Where Saudi Arabia might have a ccrnparati ve advantage. 
\>Jhen the categories of the mmufacture of metals, the mmufacture of 
durable goo:is and trans}X)rt gocd.s are ca'llbined, a percentage of 28. 24% is 
achieved. This compares with 24.44% in table 3 .1 suggesting this category 
has becane more important. Certainly, more licenses have been issued for 
durable goods and transpxt goods in 1981 and 1982 than in 1975, 1976 and 
1977. This could sugg€st that the Saudi Government has row begun to lay 
the foundations of econc:mic diversification by its r:olicies t.mder the Tnird 
Developnent Plan. There is also a markoo change in the number of licenses 
accounted for in the category of beverages/fc:xXlstuffs. In 1981 and 1982 
this category accounte:l for 12.18% of the total (77 of 634), cunpared wit11 
17.18% in 1975, 1976 and 1977 (184 of 1,035). This decrease could be 
Table 3.2 
Investment by Economic Activity in Saudi Arabia in 1981 and 1982 
Kind of economic Percentage of total Percentage of ~ercentage of paid up Ratio of paid up K 
Activity industrial licenses authorised capital capital (K) by to authorised K by 
by economic activity (local and foreign) economic activity economic activity 
Beverages/Foodstuffs 12.15 
I by economic activity 
3.21 2.59 .26 
Manu:facture of 
materials 1 e.g. 17.51 6.56 4.60 .23 products of paper 
pulp 
Manufacture of non 
metal products, e.g. 41.64 82.06 84.75 . 34 
cEment, lime, 
plastic ~md marble 
Manufacture of metals 
e.g. sLructuraJ. metal 19.56 5.50 5.57 .33 
products 
Manufacture of durable 
goods, e.g. electrical 
i_nclustrial machinery 5.21 1. 70 1.63 .31 
Transport goods 3.47 0.87 0.69 .26 
Not elst:.where classifed 0.47 0.11 ~ 0.17 .54 
------ ----
Source: C.ompiled :md calculated by the author from the quarterly lists of licensed factories and industrial 
Hcenses issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Industrial Affairs 
Agency, Industrial Statistics Department in 1981 and 1982. 
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accounted for by the growth of other categories, rather than an actual 
restriction in the ~stuffs/bevergaes category. 
Columns 2 and 3 of table 3.2, like table 3.1, show the percentage of 
total capital and the percentage of p:1id up capital by econcmic activity, 
respectively. A similar result is achieved. Columns 2 and 3 are m::>re or 
less consistent for the manufacture of metals, however, as l:oth total and 
paid up capital account for more than 80% of their totals. Obviously, 
there has been very heavy .investment in the mmufacture of non metals 
category. This suggests that investors see a pranising future in the 
construction industry and, perhaps a certain amount of success in the 
Goverrnnent' s irnfX)rt substi tutian fOlicies o Bearing in mind that table 3 o 1 
accounts for 3 years and table 3. 2 for 2 years, the totals for authorised 
capital relating to table 3.1 is 10,249.6 and table SR 3.2 34,493.3 
million. A great deal more capital has been invested under the Third 
Development Plan. OVerall, SR 6,951.1 million was the total paid up 
capital .in the period relating to table 3.1, CXJITip:ired to SR 13, 684.42 
million .in the pericrl relating to table 3. 2. 
Due to the heavy h'!Vestments in manufactures of the non metal 
category, percen~~es relating to the remaining categories look less 
significant. They do show, 'however, a marked increase in investinent 
relative to 3 .1 . For example, only 4. 6% of paid up capital was acl1ieved by 
the manufacture of materials category. Yet, this accounts for SR 629.78 
million, co11parej to SR 414.2 million for tJ1e 3 years w1der table 3.1. 
However, the situation is reversed for e1e category beverages/foodstuffs. 
The total paid up capital invested in table 3 .1 cmd 3. 2 is SR 927.5 and SR 
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353.77 million respectively. In this category there has been a marked drop 
in investment. 
It appears that table 3.2 reflects a marked shift in capital 
investment away fran sectors like food/beverages and heavy investment in 
the industrial sector - and the construction industry in particular. The 
Government seems to have achieved sane success in its policies to encourage 
private sector participation Which is shown clearly in the total capital 
invested. The question of just how much of this investment was Saudi 
investment, and how much was foreign investment, will be discussed in the 
next section. 
The ratio of paid up capital to authorised capital by econc:mic 
activity is calculated by dividing paid up capital by authorised capital, 
as in table 3.1. The data for 1981 and 1982 gave much lower ratios. 
Nonetheless, with the exception of the not elseWhere classified section, 
the ratios within this period were not dissimilar. The highest ratio was 
again achieved by the manufacture of non metal category but only by 0.01 
(0.33 was achieved by the manufacture of metals category). Perhaps 
overall, the ratios might suggest gDOWth for the firms in the future. 
CirclllTtStances in the early years helped to praTIOte the Government's 
lo:fB term aim of import substitution. The Government provided services, 
plots in industrial states, cheap r:ower and inexpensive finance. Private 
Saudi firms also benefitted fr011 the appalling delays in lan1ing goXls in 
1976-77 J:;._..~ause of p:Jrt congestion. In the years 1975, 1976 and 1977 aver 
600 new industrial plants were initiated. As a result of this growth, 
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Saudi Arabia is now virtually self-sufficient in the principal building 
materials: production of cement, clay, concrete and sand lime bricks, 
tiles, aggregate precast concrete and prefabrication systems, doors, 
windows and a nurriber of other i terns. The same applies to screws, 
scaffolding, fencing and insulation materials. As stated above, the bulky 
nature of such prcrlucts make them obvious choices for local prcrluction. 
More recently, emphasis has been placed an oonsumer goods, as well. 
Household goods like detergents, and furniture and household appliances 
like refrigerators, all contribute to lessen the dependence for importation 
items of consumption. 
The future for the private sector looks promising but many 
difficulties must be overcome. Reliable statistics on current output, 
investment, employrrent and industrial capacity are not available and this 
is at least unhelpful. Government machinery operates weakly and sanetimes 
as an obstacle. Few government employees are familiar with the 
characteristics and probl6TIS of industry. Another problEm is that nearly 
all planning activity is centralized in Riyadh wit_h a consequent limiting 
effect on the plaru1ers' perspectives. This reflects the historical policy 
of not allowing local government and private interest groups to became 
strong, rather than a fault in t_he planners' approach. 
Finally, "t11e limited size of the market maJ~es it difficult to foresee 
a long vigorous grov1th in import substitution projects, since many of the 
available sectors, particularly in building mterials, are n:Jw iJ1 a supply-
d=~T>=>nd 'l'b • II 12 =uoJ• egul 1 rlu.m . Opp::ll"tunitjes do exist in focx:Jstuffs, plastics, 
che-nicals and metal working. It is argued (am tJ1is will be discussed 
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later in the thesis) that increasing attention must be focused on export 
possibilities using feedstock from the large petroChemical plants planned 
for Yenbo and Jubailo The extent to Which downstream exp::>rt facilities 
will be erected depends on the government approach o By maintaining a cheap 
capital and energy supply, and by subsidising the necessary raw materials, 
many possibiliies will undoubtedly present themselves. 
3 o 3 FDREIGN PARI'ICIPATION IN THE IMPORI' SUBSTITUI'ION PROCESS 
As table 3 o 3 shOINS, 226 industrial licenses were issued to projects 
with foreign participation in the years 1975, 1976 and 1977. Table 3.3 is 
ccmpiled and calculated fran the industrial licenses published by the Saudi 
Ministry of Planning by the author. It shows that of the 226 issued, 76 
were issued to nationals of other Arab a::>nntries and 150 to non Arab 
nationals o When the table is examined in tenns of econanic activity, the 
manufacture of non metals category is again predaninant. More than 40% of 
the total of industrial lic~~ses issued with foreign participation were 
issued in this category showing the daninant r:osi tion of the a::>nstruction 
and construction-related industries again. Table 3.3 also shows the 
predominant r:os.i tion of West European nationals for this category. 51 of 
these 104 licenses included participation by West European nationals, 25 to 
other Arab nationals, and 17 to the United States. 
The second most important category is the manufacture of metals, as 
with the total mnnber of industrial licenses i:osued (Jocal and foreign). 
56 licenses were issue:l in this category. 25 of these licenses were issuej 
to proj~~s with vlest European participation, 21 to other Arab countries 
Table 3. 3 
Foreign Investment according to Industrial Licenses issued in 1975, 1976 and 1977 
! Kind of Economic Number of Industrial Number of Industrial Licenses Average Percentage Range of Percentage 
'Activity Licenses issued to issued according to nation by of foreign capital of foreign capital 
I ventures with economic activity share in ventures share in ventures by 
foreign investment by economic activity economic activity 
I by economic activity 
i ARAB NON ARAB IDWEST HIGHEST 
j BevGrages/Foodstuffs 20 10 W. Europe 5 41.12 5 66.65 
U.S.A. 2 
I Canada 1 
I Aus1:ralia 1 
! Hong Kong 1 
L 
! ~1a1.1ufacture of I I W. Europe 3 
1. materials, e.g. 13 8 Asia 2 49.94 20 100.00 products o:f paper 
pulp 
Manufactm~e of non W. :Europe 51 
:metal products, U.S.A. 17 
1 e.g. CEment, lime, 104 25 Canada 2 43.79 10 100.00 / plastic and marble Asia 4 
I Other Americas 2 
! Other 3 
I 
~1cmufacture of W. Europe 25 
metals, e.g. U.S.A. 4 
structural 56 21 Asia 3 47.85 7 .8 100.00 
metal products Iran 2 
I 
Other 1 
I 
1 Manufacture of W. Europe 12 
1 durable goods, e.g. 33 12 U.S.A. 6 48.49 15 100.00 I electrical machinery Asia 2 
;:md equipment Iran 1 
i 
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the quarterly lists of licensed factories, and industrial licenses 
is.sued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Industrial Affairs Agency, 
Industrial Statistics Department in 1975, 1976 and 1977. 
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and only 4 per cent to the U.S.A. Overall, When table 3.3 is examinro in 
terms of \Jllch cot.mtries have participated to the greatest extent, western 
Europe is most imp:>rtant for each category. In tenns of a single country, 
the U.S.A. holds the primary .PJsition. 29 industrial licenses were issued 
with American participation. In general, the U.S.A. is involved with the 
high technology, capital intensive projects, like the nanufacture of 
plastics. The Europeans major input appears to be in the construction and 
construction related industries. 
Column 4 of table 3 • 3 Which shows the percentage of foreign capital 
share in ventures has been calculated slinply by adding the percentage of 
foreign participation in ventures in each category and dividing by the 
number in that category. In general, the average percentage of capital 
shares in ventures in 1975, 1976 and 1977 is similar in each category. The 
manufacture of materials category provides the highest average percentage 
of foreign capital share, 49.94. There is, however, little foreign 
participation in this category. The lowest percentage is 20% so this is 
perhaps not a significant result. The lawest average percentage of foreign 
capital share in ventures is in the beverages/foodstuffs catego1-y, 41.12%. 
Again, this probalby reflects the small range. The highest for 
beverages/foodstuffs is only 66.65% (and it is 100% for the other 
categories) • 
Auiliorised capital investment by f-oreign investors in 1975, 1976 and 
1977 (table 3.4) \'vBS calc-u.lated by arJding up the autr1orised capital 
invested by foreign countries in each category and dividing by the nuniber 
in that catego1-y. The highest average auU1orised capital invesbnent is 
Table 3.4 
Foreign Investment according to Industrial Licenses issued in 1975. 1976 and 1977 by Authorised Capital Investment 
Kind of Economic Activity Capital Inve~tment by foreign countries 
according to Economic Activity in million 
riyals 
AVERAGE IDWEST HIGHEST 
~erages/Foodstuffs 21.71 2.2 120.2 
Manufacture of materials 
e.g. products of paper 8.32 1.5 20 
pulp 
~nufacture of non metal i 
I 
p:roducts, e.g. cement, 7.27 1.28 117.63 
lime, pla._stic and marble 
1v1anu:factur0. of metals 
I 
e.g. sLrucLural metal 24.19 0.3 322.67 I products 
Manufacture of durable 
goods, e.g. electrical 18.97 0.96 140.8 industrial machinery 
'd . 8.11 equ :I.pment 
Sow.~ce: Compiled and calcu;lated by the author from the quarterly lists of 1 icensed factories, and industrial licenses 
issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Industrial Affairs Agency, 
Industrial Statistics Department in 1975, 1976 and 1977. 
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achieved by the manufacture of metals category, 24.19. There is a very 
large range of authorised capital investment in this category - varying 
between 0.3 million riyals and SR 322.67 million. The highest was achieved 
by a finn prcrlucing steel bars with Luxeml:ourg as the foreign participator. 
The second highest average is achieved by ~~e £Dodstuffs/beverages 
category: SR 21.71 millicn. The venture with the highest authorised 
capital investment of 120.2 million has a 30% Lebanese participation and 
was issued in 1976. The smallest average is achieved by the non metal 
product category: only SR 7.27 million. Authorised capital investment in 
this category varies a great deal. 
Table 3.5 shows a marked decrease in £oreign participation under the 
Third Developnent Plan, canpared to the Second Plan. Only 93 industrial 
licenses were issued to ventures with £oreign participation in 1981 and 
1982, canpared to 226 for the 3 years of 1975, 1976 and 1977. Although 
table 3 . 5 anl y accounts £or 2 years aJmp:ired to 3 years in table 3 . 3, this 
factor is insufficient to account for such a marked decrease. This is 
perhaps a reflection of concept of 'Saudization' expressed in the Third 
Plan. This principle provides for priority in the awarding of contracts to 
to Saudi cx:mtractors. Nhen contracts are awarded to foreign mntractors 1 
there is a stipulation that sane of the work must be sub-contracted to 
Saudi CX::lillp:mies o In order to facilitate this fX)licy 1 it is intended that 
vexy large projects should be split up rather than av-BrdErl as single 
13 p3ckage, as already stated in chapter 2o 
vvhen table 3 o 5 is examinErl in terms of econonic activity, as with 
table 3 o 3, the manufacture of non metal category dominates: 44 industrial 
Table 3.5 
Foreign Investment according to Industrial licenses issued in 1981 and 1982 
Kind of Economic Number of Industrial Number of Industrial Lieenses Average Percentage Range of Percent age 
Activity Licenses issued to issued according to nat ion by of foreign capital of foreign capital 
ventures wtth economic activity share in ventures share in ventures by 
foreign investment by economic activity economic activity 
by economic activity 
ARAB :t'DN ARJ1B IOWFSI' HIGHESI' 
Beverages/Foodstuffs 4 None W. Europe 3 35.4 20 49 Other 1 
~1anufacture of U.S.A. 1 
materia1s 9 e.e;. 10 6 W. Europe 1 54.2 33 100 products of paper Asia 2 
pulp 
' 
Manufacture of non U.S.A. 7 
metal products 9 e.g. 44 5 W. Europe 18 47.9 15 75 
cement 9 lime 9 Asia 6 
: plastic ru1d marble Other Americas 9 
Manufacture of U.S.A. 3 
1 
metals, e.g. 25 14 W. Europe 4 45.4 16 100 
1 structural Asia 3 
metal products Other 1 
, ~1anufacture of U.S.A. 1 
' durable goods 9 e.g. W. Europe 4 
electrical 10 3 Asia 1 45.7 25 70 
industrial machinery Other Americas 1 
and equipment 
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the quarterly lists of licensed factories and industrial licenses 
issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Industrial Affairs Agency, 
Inclustral Statistics Department in 1981 and 1982. 
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licenses were issued to ventures with foreign investment. In this 
category West European countries accounted for 18 licenses, other Americas 
(Cayman Islands, Argentina) 9, U.S .A. 7. As in table 3. 3, the second 
largest category for foreign investment is the manufacture of metals 
category for 25 licenses. Although the number of industrial licenses 
issued in each category is much lower in 1981 and 1982, the categories have 
generally retaine:l their order of significance. Additionally, the 
countries involved in foreign investment have also kept their fOSi tion of 
imFOrtance. West European countries account for 30 industrial licenses, 
Arab countries for 28 licenses and the United States for 12 • 
Column 4 of table 3.5 s~ the average percentage of foreign capital 
share in 1981 and 1982 in ventures by economic activity. This varies 
between 35.4% and 54.2%. Unlike the years 1975, 1976 and 1977, there is 
foreign dominance in this category of manufacture of materials. However, 
there u.rc only a total of 10 licenses issued in this category and 6 of 
these w·.=re issued to other Arab countries. This result is therefore not of 
great significance. Besides, the range of percentage of foreign capital 
share in this category is not great ( 33 to 100) . The lowest average is 
found in th~ beverages/ fooistuffs category, but only 4 licenses were 
issued in this category. Also, the highest is only 49% Which is much lower 
than the other categories. 
Table 3. 6 autJ1orised ca. pi tal investment by foreign investors was 
calculated by the sa::n:? m-2thcd used in table 3. 4. The results ware quite 
different. Drrp"'laticall y, the highest average of autJ1oriseJ capital 
investment is found in Ll')e category, manufacture of non metals. The 
Table 3.6 
Foreign Investment according to Indust~.:ial Licenses issued :Ln 1981 and 1982 by authorised capital investment 
Kind of Economic Activity Capital investment by foreign countries 
according to Economic Activity in million 
riyals 
AVERAGE IDWEST HIGHEST 
Beverages/Foodstuffs 38.85 15.9 69.72 
Manufacture of materials 
e.g. products of paper 30.17 1.99 136.0 
pulp 
:Manufacture of non metal 
products, e.g. cEment, 824.41 1.27 8,303.0 
lime, plastic and marble 
Manufacture of metals 
e.g. structural metal 16.70 1.50 100.0 
products 
Mc1.nufacture of durable 
goods, e.g. electrical 20.91 5.1 50.0 industrj_al machinery 
and equipment 
---'~ -
Source: Compiled and calcul~ted by the author from the quarterly lists of licensed factories and industrial licenses 
issued by the J(li1gdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Industrial Affairs Agency, 
Industrial Statistics Department in 1981 and 1982. 
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highest 'authorised capital' £or a single project is achieved by Panama in 
1982, SR 8, 303 • 3 million. The industrial activity is listed as petroleum 
refineries. Products include naftha, jet aircraft fuel, fuel oil and 
sulphur. It is disapp:>intin:J to find this heavy investment is in an oil 
related industry. Also, same Panama o,.med ventures may merely represent 
holdirg canpanies with substantial Saudi participation. Therefore, it is 
not pure foreign investment. 
The second highest average authorised capital investment is found in 
the beverages/ focdstuffs category. The average here is SR 38. 85 million. 
The lowest and highest authorised capital investment is SR 15 . 9 and SR 
69.72 million, respectively. The irrlustrial activity for the highest is 
cited as soft drinks and carbonated water industries and the country is 
Italy with 49% share. Only 14 licenses were issues in this category so the 
results cannot be seen as very significant. 
it is worth noting that the category with the lowest average 
authorised capital investment is the manufacture of metals o This is the 
category with the highest average authorised capital investment in 1975, 
1976 and 1977. The years 1981 &'1d 1982 show heavy invest..Ttent in the 
construction related industries. 
Although there appears to have been a marked decline in foreign 
participation under the Third Plan, it sill has a major role to play o It 
has been stated above that there has rnt been a shmtage of capital in 
Saudi Arabia for alrrost a decade. Then v.hy should the Government enoourage 
foreign p3rticipation at all in Saudi Arabia? In pa.rt, the ans-Ner can be 
fmmd in Saudi Arabia's industrial strategy o Closer attention is being 
given to the selection of new technology and the means of incorporating 
the existing technology o The Saudi Goverrnnent is interested in the 
transfer of technology, not only internally between various industries and 
scientific researdh, but also internationally from similar institutions in 
other countries o By encouraging foreign participation, the successful 
transfer of technolonr may be achieved o 
The value of the transfer of technology can be seen When it is 
accepted that industrialisation is adhieved not only through prcrluction but 
also through the development of national design and application capability. 
Among the major obstacles that the Saudis have had to overcame in their 
attempt to absorb new technology are 1) lack of industrial infrastructure 
and an industrial tradition, 2) lack of skilled manp:JWer and, 3) the 
reluctance of many £oreign oampanies to co-operate sincerely in the 
transfer of tec1molo:JYo This has meant that the government has not relied 
on foreign p:rrticipation alone £or the transfer of technology. It is 
recognised that sustained growth of the technolOJical base is almost 
directly correlated to the quantity and quality of research and development 
work. As a consequence, t."te government has been investing heavily in its 
institutions of higher education and also, establishing a data base. 
It is too early to determine whether t11e govern;nent has begun to 
implement its imp:>rt substitution p:>licies successfully, especially on fue 
h."'isis of data presented in tl1is chapter Which only covers iJ'il""ticular years 
between 1975 and 1982. In any case, it could be said fuat the country is 
going through an experimental period. The Kingdon must determine what the 
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future of its oil and gas sector is and continue to scrutinise its r:clicies 
of diversification. An industrial culture takes time to build up. 
Perhaps it is questionable v.hether it is worth developing industries that 
have to be nm by expatriates. This may lead to loss of Saudi culture 
Which the Saudi authorities are trying to protect. Saudis in general 
appear disinterestErl in learning manufacturing skills. {It is to be 
remembered that it is less than a decade since the planners had sufficient 
financial resources to encourage the manufacturing sector and for the 
labour force to adopt new attitudes.) If this is the case, perhaps Saudi 
strategy should be to develop a limited range of capital intensive hydro 
carbon processing industries. In other words, they should leave the labour 
intensive industries to other countries. 14 
In fact, the government has been careful to encourage industries and 
techniques of production Which are sui too to its factor endowments. In 
terms of import sUbstitution policies, this has meant investing in 
industries like cement and steel manufacturing. The petrochemical industry 
is encouraged with the aim of diversifying exp:>rts . Labour problems in 
industrialised cow1tries prevent the innovation of capital intensive and 
efficient techniques but this is n::Jt a problem for S::tudi ltrabia. The 
Kingdon can therefore make use of the most up to date technol03Y and use 
foreign manpower. In the longer term, the resulting dependence on oil 
revenues is a weakness. Conseque..T1tl y, one of the major objectives of the 
Third Plan is the upgrading of hurran resources, as described in the next 
01apter. 
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a-IAPTER 4 
MANPOWER ffiNSTRAINTS ON IMPORT' SUBSTI'I'l.JI'ION 
The subject under consideration in Chapter 4 is the role of the labour 
force. Throughout this thesis Saudi Arabia's economic diversification 
policies are being evaluated. It has emerged that Saudi Arabia is 
dependent on imports to a large extent, so continually the question is 
being asked: haw successful have the import substitution policies been? In 
particular, this Chapter looks at the extent to Which the labour force has 
limited the success of those policies. 
The Saudi Government, as the central planning body, has experienced 
numerous problems in diversifying its danestic eoonany. Growing oil 
revenues have meant that financing development has not been a problem, 
although by 1983 there were clear signs of this situation changing. 
Previously, one of the problems has been to limit development to v.rithin the 
capabilities of the current structures. During the 1970's the absence of a 
stable infrastructure slowed-down development but under the extensive 
projects of the Seo:md Plan, problems like bottlenecks at rorts have rrore 
or less been removed. It was also thought that the absorptive capacity of 
the economy would be inadequate. Chapter 2 gave evidence to suggest this 
is not a proble11. 
Much success was achieved in the 1970's. Tne g:cowth rate of tJ1e 
eoono-ny has been impressive but it has only been achieved by tJ1e use of 
foreign ITBnp:>wer. In scrne sectors, for example in the l::Bsic metals sector, 
9·1 
rrore than 95 per cent of the workforce has been non-Saudi. l\1ore than 25 
per cent of the total labour force has been non-Saudi. There has been a 
high dependency on foreign labour Which has caused concern. By 1980 a 
two--tier labour force had anerged: a m:::dern sector and a traditional sector 
with non-Saudis prevalent in the modern sector. Foreigners apparently 
dominate the Government revenue producing sector, despite the earlier 
nationalisation of the oil companies. The situation also looked 
unsatisfactory because of the potential economic and political dangers of 
having so many foreigners in the country at the same time. As a result, 
the Third Plan attempts to consolidate the non-Saudi workers at the 1980 
level. 
4. 1 EMPLOYMENT POLICIES UNDER THE THIRD PlAN 
"The policy area with the mst far reaching quantitative and 
qualitative changes in the Third Plan period is that relating to 
1 
manp::>wer and employment". 
The economic development strategy of the Third Development Plan is 
b::J.sed on the same three key objectives vlnich directed the Second Plan. 
These objectives are 1) Diversification of the economic base, 2) 
Development of the Kingdon's maJ1fX)Wer resources, and 3) A balancai p3ttem 
of economic growth. That is, growth w11ich ensures the developm~nt of all 
regions, benefits to all sectors of the conmunity and, suppol~s individual 
effol~ and achieve.:11ent. Not surp1.:-isingly, all three objectives are 
essen-tial to any discussion of t...he role of the lal..JOur force. As stated, in 
Chapter 3, alrrost any diversification of the 2\...""'0nomic base represents 
successful 
~lernentation of nnport sUbstitution polices such is the importance and 
dominance of imports in the Saudi econany. However, in the Third Plan, the 
growth cibjecti ves are more selective than under the Second Plan. The 
manpower policy aims at consolidating the size of the foreign labour force. 
By utilising the infrastructure facilities created in the Second Plan, the 
Third Plan makes further progress towards diversifying the econany in the 
direction of capital intensive development. 'Ihis approach is seen as the 
best, long term caffibinatian of the Kingdom's capital and labour resources. 
Another feature of the Third Plan is the policy requiring new employment to 
correspond as closely as possible to the domestic availability of new Saudi 
manpower . This represents a o:::mstraint on the growth target . The total 
number of non-Saudi labour force, which has always been under 
administrative control through a system of work permits, is being 
consolidated at about its 1980 size. However, its skill composition will 
be kept flexible to meet any priority demands £or special skills and 
expertise. 
The selective changes of Emp!1asis for sectoral growth will be c:btained 
by smooth transition rather than abrupt change, in accordance with the Plan 
strategy of econanic diversification and of giving priority to t."he 
development of the prcducing sectors. The main trends in the Third Plan 
will be for a substantial part of the new investment to promote higher 
value production and diversification in the oil sector and in those 
industries v.here there is a clear cnmp?~.rative advantage. The latter 
usually relates to those 'which are energy-intensive. AgaL'1, t_he constraint 
on foreign ffi311.P::Jvler will reduce t.]1e scope for growth t11rough incre;:;sed 
e.rnployment. These considerations indicate that the ec:onony will enter a 
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pericrl of structural transformation v.hich may last longer than the Third 
Plan itself. Despite the constraint on manr:ower; the results of increased 
capital efficiency should become evident during the Third Plan period in 
the fonn of higher productivity. However, higher prcrlucti vi ty within 
sectors of the non-oil economy will depend largely on the private sector's 
willingness to direct its autonomous growth from the areas of easy profit 
making. That is, v.hether they rrove from areas such as property development 
and trade to more competitive branches of activity with a better potential 
for long tenn growth. 
Ironically, the Government's recognition of ~he PEed for Saudi 
nationals to participate to the fullest extent in the development of the 
economy, has meant that labour is even rrore scarce in the short term. The 
Government has allocated 18. 5 per cent of its total expenditure on 
development under the Third Plan to "h\.ll1Bn resource development" . This 
represents SR 129.6 billion. 2 Members of the workforce are being trained 
and educated instead of being available for work. Although education and 
training are essential, if Saudis are going to participate in the rrodern 
sector, their temporary absence has made L~e short term situation more 
difficult. 
Such are the aims of the Third Plan. However, there are signs that 
they will not be fully imple,uented. ':!'"'he Saudi Finance Ministry assu.;·w2s a 
severe drop of more t.llan 28% in its BlJdget revenue 1983/84. 3 This follo"'S 
a &~ller decreases in previous years. The 1983/84 decrease is a result of 
the forecast cut in oil production aDd associated revenues. Other 1ncane 
earning sectors are exp'=c-ted to sho..; a rise, as tBble 4 .1 shoh'S. 
Table 4.1 
Expected 1983/84 Budget Revenue By 
Source and Per Cent Changes fran1 1982/83 
(SR nm) 
% 
Revenue Change 
Oil Production 37,680 -37.9 
Income tax 113,830 -43.4 
Oil firms' profits 6,986 -20.1 
Oil products tax 6,000 50.0 
Customs duties 5,300 33.3 
Service fees 730 29.9 
PIT & telex 6,500 37.5 
Government sales 100 -31.0 
Rents & instalments 617 48.3 
Zakat 400 23.4 
Miscellaneous 47,075 19.3 
TOTAL 225,218 -28.2 
SouTce: Quarterly Econonic Review of Saudi Arabia. The Economist InteJ ligent 
Unit 1983, p. 14. 
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Table 4.2 
Saudi Arabian Budgets 1982/83 and 
1983/84: Expenditure Allocations by Sector 
(SR rrm) 
% 
Sectoral Totals 1982/83 1983/84 Change 
Defence & security 92,889 75,733 -18.5 
Manpov.er development 31,864 27,791 -12.8 
Transport & communications 32,533 24,950 -23.3 
Health & Social development 17,011 13,591 -20.1 
Economic Resources 22,045 13,209 -40.1 
Infrastructure 11 '705 9,583 -18.1 
~funicipal services 26,224 19,070 -27.3 
Credit institutions 23,382 20,000 -14.5 
Domestic Subsidies 11 '162 9,020 -19.2 
Public administration & 
government services 9,480a 47,053a 
Miscellaneous 35,106a _a 
TOTAL 313,400 260,000 -17.0 
a Reclassification changes. 
SauTee: Quarterly Economic Review of Saudi Arabia, 111e Economist Intelligent 
Unit 1983, p. 16. 
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The result has been a 17 per cent cut in budget expenditure to match a 
considerable portion of the expected fall in revenue. What the situation 
will be in 1985 is largely dependent on forces outside Saudi Arabia's 
control . 'IWo factors are crucial: the degree to which demand for oil picks 
up as the predicted 'world econcrnic recovery' proceeds, and the proJ:X>rtion 
of the hoped for increase in demand \\hich Saudi Arabia and OPEC can supply. 
Table 4. 2 shows the extent to which manp::>Wer develapnent will be affected. 
Canpa.red to other sectors it is relatively lightly affected with a 12.8 per 
cent drop in its expenditure. 
4.2 MANPOWER PROJECTIONS FOR 1980 - 1984 
Civilian employment is expected to increase from 2.47 million in 
1979/80 to 2.63 million in 1984/85, 4 as table 4.3 shCJVJS. 'Ib arrive at 
these estimates projections were made concerning the growth of the Saudi 
labour force, labour supply and de..rnand, employment structure, and 
prcrluctivity. Projection of these variables is difficult and the subject 
is continuously under review, in case it proves necessary to re-evaluate 
the policies. The following is a detailed review of the individual 
aspects, as outlined in the Third Plan. Firstly, the grovlth of the Saudi 
labour force. The proJ:X>rtion o:f Saudi males ( 12 years of age and above) 
participating in the labour force will continue to register a slight 
decline, from 65.3 to 64.1 per cent over the expansion of education and 
training programnes. This "schooling factor" will influence, in 
particular, the participation rate of the 12-19 age group. 7ne decline of 
the I..Brticip3tion rate arrong this age group is the cost of investment in 
society's future development, the opportunity cost in econonic te1ms. 
Table 4.3 
Projected Civilian Employment in Saudi Arabia 1979/80 and 1984/85 
Saudi men 
Non Saudi men 
Subtotal men 
Saudi women 
Non Saudi oomen 
Subtotal wornen 
Subtotal: Saudis 
Subtotal: Non Saudis 
TOTAL 
Civilian Employment 
1979/1980 
1,308.4 
1,014.9 
2,323.3 
103.0 
44.9 
147.9 
1,411.4 
1, 059.8 
2 ,471. 2 
1984/1985 
(Thousands) 
1,437. 4 
1,023.9 
2 ,461. 3 
120.0 
44.9 
164.9 
1,557.4 
1,068.8 
1,626.2 
Source: TI1ird Development Plan 1980- 1985, p. 98 
Net Change 
129.0 
9.0 
138.0 
17.0 
17.0 
146.0 
9.0 
155.0 
Annual Growth Rate 
1979/1980 to 1984/1985 
(Per cent) 
1.9 
0.2 
1.2 
3.1 
2.2 
1.9 
0.2 
1.2 
_, 
'.:l 
C! 
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On the other hand, there will be little change in the overall 
participation rates of Saudi wanen. Following the growtb in the 
educational system, there will be an expectation of nore educated women 
finding opp:>rtunities in mainly urban employment. However, the numerical 
impact of this increase will be offset by a decrease in the mmiber of 
female farm workers. This is especially the case regarding the younger age 
groups because of the increased schooling factor. During the Third Plan 
period, the average participation rate for working Saudi women will 
therefore remain at approximately 6 per cent of the total. The projection 
for labour supply and demand underlying the civilian employment is also 
complicated. The projected increase in the size of the civilian labour 
force over the Third Plan is 155,000, representing an annual gDOWth rate of 
1. 2 per cent. 
This increase corresponds to the difference between new civilian 
employment opportunities (310,000) and the estimated number of people 
leaving agriculture (70,000) and construction (85,000). The limitation on 
the growth of expatriate workers means the non-Saudi segment of the larour 
force will only increase by 9,000 qualified personnel. The net increase in 
the indigenous work forc-e for civilid11 employment will be 146,000. 
The changes in civilian Hnployment during L'he Third Plan and a 
canparison of the grovtl:h rates betv,reel! the Second and Third Plan are shO'.\TJ1 
in tables 4.4 and 4.5 o Table 4.4 also COI-npares the percentage distribution 
of euployment by economc activity in 1979/80 "'rith the projP.ctions for 
1984/85. Against an e.e1ployment increase of 725,000 during the Second Plan, 
the projected net growth in the Third Plan v.-ill be only 155,000 o This 
Table 4.4 
Changes in Civilian Bnployment in the Third Plan 
(estimated employment in 1979/1980 and in 1D84/1985 by economic activity) 
Economic Activity 
Producing Sectors: 
Agriculture 
Other mining 
Other manufacturing 
Utilities 
Construction 
surrro.r 1-\L: 
Services Sectors: 
TraclC' 
Transport 
Finance 
Other services . 
Government (1) 
Su13TOI' AL: 
Total non oil economy 
Oil sector 
TOTAL 
Bnployment In: 
1979/80 1984/85 
(In Thousands) 
598.8 
7.3 
104.2 
31.5 
330.1 
1! 071.9 
310.6 
214.6 
34.8 
482.3 
321. 0(2) 
1,363.3 
2,435.2 
36.0 
2,471.2 
528.8 
9.8 
164.2 
47.0 
245.1 
994.9 
339.6 
274.6 
44.8 
505.3 
421.0(2) 
1,585.3 
2,580.2 
46.0 
2,626.2 
(1) Excludes non civilian employment 
Percent Change 
1979/80- 1984/85 
(11.7) 
34.2 
57.6 
49.2 
(25.7) 
(7 0 2) 
9.3 
28.0 
28.7 
4.8 
31:.2 
16.3 
6.0 
27.8 
6.3 
Percent Distribution 
1979/80 1984/85 
24.2 
0.3 
4.2 
1.3 
13.4 
43.4 
12.6 
8.7 
1.4 
19.5 
13.0 
55.2 
98.·6 
1.4 
100.0 
20.1 
0.4 
6.3 
1.8 
9.3 
37.9 
12.9 
10.5 
1.7 
19.2 
16.0 
60.3 
98.2 
1.8 
100.0 
(2) This government figure includes an estimated 49.6 thousand daily workers, not class'ified as civil servants. 
Source: Third Development Plan 1980- 1985, p. 100 
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Table 4.5 
Changes in Civilian Employment in the Second and Third Plan Periods 
Comparison by economic activity 
Employment Increase Annual Growth Rate 
Economic Activity 2nd Plan 3rd Plan 2nd Plan 3rd Plan 
(Thousands) (Percent) 
Producing Sectors 
Agriculture (96.2) (70.0) (2.94) (2.46) 
Other mi_nj_ng- 3.9 2.5 16.51 6.07 
Other rrnnufacturing 29.8 60.0 6.97 9.52 
Utilities 15.4 15.5 14.37 8.33 
Construction 157.8 (85.0) 13.89 (5.78) 
Subtotal 110.7 (77.0) 2.20 (1.48) 
Service Sectors 
Trade 157.0 29.0 15.12 1.80 
Transport 100.1 60.0 13.39 5.05 
Finance 21.7 10.0 21.58 5.18 
other services 252.3 23.0 15.96 0.94 
Government(1) 74.3 100.0 5.41 5.57 
Subtotal 605.4 222.0 12.46 3.06 
Total non-oil economy 716.1 145.0 7.21 1.16 
Oil sector 8.6 10.0 5.61 5.02 
TOfi\L 724.7 155.0 7.19 1.22 
( 1) R'<cludes non civilian erriployment. 
Source: 1hird Development Plan 1~)80 - 1985 p p. 101 
c 
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represents a decline in the average annual growth rate of employment from 
7.2 per cent in the Second Plan to 1.2 per cent during the Third Plan. The 
sector Which is most important, if the economic diversification policies of 
the Government are to be implemented, is the non-oil private sector. 
Employment in this sector is estimated to increase by a net total of 45,000 
at a rate of 0.4 per cent annually. The scope for public sector 
(civilian) employment growth is estimated at 100,000 aver the next five 
years. 
The final projection concerns productivity. The Third Plan states 
that it is "axiomatic" for the Kingdon that its labour force, cc:rnprising 
aver 65 per cent of the male and 5 per cent of the female population of 
working age, should achieve progressively higher levels of productivity. 
This is to be measured in terms of value-added per employee. It is the 
pre-condition for the non-oil economy's sustained expansion, including.non-
inflationary incane growth from employment. On page 103, the Third Plan 
also states that without an increase in productivity in the five years to 
1979/80, the necessary increase in employment would have been about 1.7 
million, not 710,000. The Second Plan achieved this productivity gain by 
migration from low productivity agriculture, and from new entrants to the 
work force joining the high productivity sectors, especially construction. 
TI1e Third Plan lS expected to see gro~th in sectoral productivity of 
b2tween 4 and 5 per cent per year, representing a doubling of U1e 
o::mventiona 1 typ2 of productivity gro.•lth relative to the Second Plan. The 
gains will come fran t.'ie following sectors: agriculture (due to furtJ1er 
migration); manufacturing (on account of high productivity projects 
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financed by SDF): energy and water (reflecting the substantial capital 
outlays in roth areas); and transport, camrmmications and storage (mainly 
resulting from large-scale capital-intensive developments). A relatively 
low rate of productivity increase is likely to a::rne from construction, due 
to the fact that it will be the larger (foreign) firms that will withdraw 
from the construction market rather than the local contractors operating on 
a smaller sector. The expectation is that ccmpetitive pressure will mean 
effective utilisation of both capital and labour. 5 
4. 3 LABOUR FORCE PROBLEMS 
In 1982 Shaw and Long wrote: 
"The principal mrrier in every sector of the Saudi economy 
today is the lack of available manpower" . 6 
No confirmed figures are available for the overall population of the 
Kingdom both because the Saudis are sensitive about the size of their own 
percentage of the population, and because of the size of the foreign 
population. Inflated numbers of Saudis in the work force tend to be set 
against extrernel y conservative estimates of the m.miber of foreign \..Or:ker:s 
for a cosmetic effect. The magnitude of the problem is summed up by a 
recent American State Department estimate that 80 per cent of t.he non 
agricultural workers in Saudi Arabia are foreign. 
According to the 1974 Population and Housing Census, there were 
slightly over 7 million people in the Kingdon at the end of 1974, including 
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e>..-p3triates residing in the conntry o The 1974 Population Census was the 
last official population survey to be taken o This number also includes the 
1.88 million nnsettled p::>pulation. Table 4o 7 shows there were 16 cities in 
1974, each with a population of over 30,000. Riyadh, the capital of the 
Kingdan, is the largest city with a p::>pulation in excess of 667,000. In 
all, the 16 major urban areas represent about 37 per cent of the total 
p::>pulation. Since the Census, the ur'ban p::>pulation has grown very fast due 
to a large inflow of people fran the agricultural sector as well as fran 
outside the Kingdom o "A Guide to Industrial Investment" , published in 
1981, suggests that the population has increased by 1.5 million to about 
8.5 million in 1980.7 
However, in 1979 Birks and Sinclair carried out an extensive review of 
the size of the population of Saudi Arabia, considering both historical and 
conteJ'TlfX)rary sources o They fotmd that even the 1974 Census contained major 
shortcomings. A series of estimates, approximations and calculations were 
L<cied in order to produce 1 an acceptable figure of p::>pulation 1 o Table 4. 6 
summarises these estimates. The total population of Saudi Arabia in 1974/75 
Table 4.6 
SAUDI ARABIA: Estimate of Population and Emploxment in 1974/75 
Saudi Arabian Nationals 
Na1 nationals 
'IDTAL 
Population 
4,592,540 
1,562,400 
% 
74.6 
25.4 
Employment 
1,026,400 
773,400 
% 
57.0 
43 .o 
-----------·--------------
6,154,940 100.0 
------------ ·~--------
Source: Birks, J.S. and Sinclair, C.A. The Intern'?_tiona!__Mig:ra"t:ion Project 
University of Durham, 1979, p. 33 
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was estimated by Birks and Sinclair at 6 .1 million people. 4 . 59 million of 
....man are Saudi Arabian nationals and 1. 56 of \'.han are non nationals. The 
workforce was estimated at 1 . 8 million of whan 1 . 03 million are nationals 
and 773,400 are migrants.8 
There is therefore, sane debate regarding the actual mmiber involved 
in the Saudi population and workforce. There is, however, general 
agreement that the Saudi labour market is a two tier :mrrket. On one level 
is the modem sector fran which the developnent effort must draw its 
managers and technicians. On another level is the traditional labour 
market with limited skills, limited literacy and an anti-development bias. 9 
While the modern sector has forged ahead and is associated with the 
development of private urban centres, the rural agricultural sector has 
remai1-1ed relatively traditional and subsistence based . There are only a 
few areas which have been transformed by large scale agricultural projects. 
The tv;.o separate labour markets have meant that a large proportion of the 
Saudi Arabian national workforce has not participated in the developnent of 
its own country. 
The reasons ~1ich account for so many Saudi Arabian nationals 
remaining outside the modern sector are complex. Until the implementation 
of the Second Development Plan and the investment in infra structure, the 
sheer distaDces and poor communications between regions was a significant 
factor. Also, not until the great increase in oil revenues in the 1970's 
did the pressures and opp:lrtunities exist for Sauc:Jis to join tJ1e m:Xlern 
sector. Paradoxically, Goven1IT1ent loans aTJd grants to s.rnall fanners have 
had an ennervating effect on some - actually preserving the subsistence 
City 
Riyadh 
Jeddah 
Makkah 
Taif 
Medina 
Damnrun 
Hofuf 
Tabuk 
Bur aida 
Mobarraz 
1[JS 
Table 4.7 
Cities with Populations of 30 ~000 and over in 1974 
(thousand) 
Nurrber of Households 
102 
97 
68 
31 
35 
22 
15 
11 
9 
8 
Khamis Mushai t 8 
Al-Khobar 9 
Najran 9 
Hail 6 
Jizan 6 
Abba 5 
'IDTAL 441 
Note: Figures rounded to nearest thousand 
Population 
667 
561 
367 
205 
198 
128 
101 
75 
70 
54 
50 
49 
48 
41 
33 
30 
2,677 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, A Guide to Industrial Development, 6th ed. 
1981, p. 3 
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based rural sector. Another fact is the high value Saudis place on leisure 
and perhaps, a disinclination to work. The availability of so-called, 
unearned incomes, like payments resulting from patronage and rents, have 
not helped. 
There are other reasons. It does seem likely, however, that Saudis 
in the traditional sector will be drawn into the rrodern sector by virtue of 
the continuing expansion of the economic system. This will be a gradual 
process and in the meantime, non nationals cause concern. The increasing 
efforts of the Government in the field of human resource development have 
yet to come to tenns with the motives and aspirations of Saudi Arabian 
individuals and how to change them in the short tenn. There is a 
suggestion that the Government might be more successful if the general 
level of wealth was reduced. 10 However, although same might be stimulated 
into action, others might feel extremely dissatisfied, and the overall 
effect might well be negative. 
It seems, at least for the present, that the Kingdom betrays symptoms 
of conflicting objectives. Migrant workers are still a necessity if 
developnent is to continue at the saine rate. Perhaps the decline in the 
rate of increase of foreign workers demanded by the Third Plan is too 
ambitious. Table 4.8 Shows the brea~down of the different nationalities 
working in Saudi Arabia. The C'.,overnment is concerned. that the inmigrant 
communities will increase and even outnurriber the Saudis. There is not only 
conc.:?rn for the mnnber of Injians and Paldstanis. Despite a suggest l\rab 
1 solidarity 1 , Saudis appear detached from Palestinians, have 1i ttle respect 
for Yemenis and mistrust Egyptians. They feel that such workers are 
11 [I 
Table 4.8 
Foreign Residents in Saudi Arabia in 1982 
Yemen is 
Egyptians 
Palestinians and Jordanians 
Sudanese 
Lebanese 
Syrians 
Other Arabs 
Koreans 
Thais 
Filipinos 
Chinese 
Indonesians and Malays 
Indians 
Pakistanis 
Bangladeshis 
Sri Lankans 
'furks 
Afghans 
Somalis 
Other Muslims 
Japanese 
Ar!Brican 
Germm 
French 
Italian 
Swedes 
Greeks 
Other Europeans (includes Canadians 
and Australians) 
1DTAL: 
600,000 
300,000 
100,000 
50,000 
15,000 
40,000 
10,000 
100,000 
50,000 
200,000 
7,000 
15,000 
75,000 
300,000 
15,000 
5,000 
40,000 
20,000 
50,000 
5,000 
5,000 
40,000 
10,000 
15,000 
13,000 
3,000 
10,000 
10,000 
Source: Shaw, J.A. and Long, D.E., _Saudi Arabian ~lodernisation 
The Impact of 01ange on StabHity. Praeger, 1982, p. 47 
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benefitting inordinately from Saudi Arabian development. At the same time, 
there is an under-current of a return to strict Islamic principles. Same 
apsects of economic development and modemity appear to be unacceptable to 
religious leaders. 
The consequence of these conflicting £Drees, the one to modernise with 
foreign assistance, the other to retain a dist:i,.nctly Saudi Arabian and 
religious society, results in paradoxical and sometimes, apparently 
unstable si tuatian. For example, Saudi Arabia wishes to see more local 
nationals employed in services, but it prohibits the employment of females 
in most goverrunent offices. These tensions may be ignored by entrepreneurs 
and others managing development, but eventually they will have to be 
11 faced. Perhaps this is the reason £or the attempt by the Third 
Development Plan to restrict the growth of expatriate workers in the 
country. Same v.c>uld say that the Third Plan has tried to change the 
~ i.. tuation tcx::> quickly. Hov.rever, it may be that the Government is aiming to 
mark time, While it develops its own indigenous human capital. It may also 
be that the Saudi Goverrunent recognises it has aimed high, perhaps too 
high, Which may be reflected in the following statement of the T"nird Plan: 
"There will be continuous review of the Whol-e subject of 
manpower and employment in case it proves necessary to re-evaluate 
th 1 ' • 11 12 e p::> 1c1es • 
11 2 
4.4 ROLE OF EXPATRIATE LABOUR IN IMPORI' SUBSTI'IUI'ION 
Expatriates have played a major role in the economic development of 
Saudi Arabia. All development plans to date have demanded rapid 
development and Saudi manpower has been, and still is, insufficient to meet 
these needs. However, in this section there is an attanpt to find out more 
about the actual part played by expatriates. Table 4. 9 looks at the 
calibre of the entire work force in Saudi Arabia, both Saudi and non Saudi. 
It also looks at the probable changes ... m.ich have taken place bet.....een 1975 
and 1980. The table shows the canparatively high number of non Saudi 
managers and officials in 1980. It also shows that there are a high number 
of Saudis Who are trained professionals. In 1980 there were 52, 900 Saudi 
professionals in the work force, camp:rred with 23 ,500 non Saudis. Another 
interesting feature of table 4. 9 is the service sector. In 1975 there were 
105,200 Saudis working in the service sector, more than double the number 
of non Saudis. By 1980 the situation had changed so that there are more 
non Saudis working in services. The 1975 situation reflects the Saudi 
contentment to work in occupations like providing a taxi service. The 1980 
figure reflects the need for expatriates to maintain projects already 
canpleted. Finally, it is worth noting that t.."'lere are no expatriates 
working in Saudi Arabia v.ho might be described as unskilled. Ther~ is, of 
course, an abundant supply of unskilled lal:our of Saudi nationality. 
Having looked at the calibre of non Saudis working in Saudi Arabia, 
the next questio:'"l is L11e kind of firm t11ese non Saudis work in. Do non 
Saudis work predominantly in large firms? Or, is it nnre a question of the 
mjority working in a particular economic sector? Table 4.10 gives details 
Table 4.9 
I 
Estimated Manpower Distribution in Various Occupational Groups 
Occupati.onal grouns 
Managers and officials 
Professionals 
Technicians and sub-professionals 
Clerical 
Sales 
S(;rvice 
Operatives 
Skilled workers 
Semi-skilled 
Subtotal 
Unskilled 
Farmers 
Bedouin 
Subtotal 
Gll!IND 'IDTAI-' 
(thousands) 
1975 
Saudi 
7.4 
48.4 
25.0 
67.5 
82.3 
105.2 
40.0 
70.1 
170.0 
615.9 
244.0 
311.2 
114.9 
670.1 
1,286.0 
1975 
Non-Saudi 
6.3 
15.7 
31.4 
31.4 
47.1 
47.1 
25.1 
47.1 
62.8 
~114.0 
:n4.o 
1980 
·Saudi 
8.7 
52.9 
33.4 
99.6 
97.2 
134.5 
57.1 
93.5 
265.0 
841.9 
296.4 
281.0 
98 o'7 
1,518.0 
2,359.9 
Source: El l\·1allakhi R. Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development, 1982, p. 418 
1980 
·Non-Saudi 
12.4 
23.5 
81.3 
121.8 
112.6 
145.2 
51.4 
101.9 --" _, 
UJ 
162.5 
812.6 
812.6 
Table 4.10 
Number of Establishments by Employment Size and Economic Activity in 1981 
Number of Establishments % of total employing 
by Employment Size 1 2-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ Total 50+ in each sector 
Food, Beverages and 445 1,121 339 149 69 22 26 2,171 2.2 Tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and 2,142 4,846 923 93 12 3 2 8,021 0.06 leather 
Wood, Wood Products 372 831 507 214 48 9 4 1,985 0.65 
and fun1iture 
Paper Products and 143 174 116 100 47 13 15 608 4.6 Printing 
Chcm:i.cal, Pet rolcwn 26 28 32 33 43 15 18 195 16.9 _, Plastj_c Products _, 
.10> 
Brtcks, Blocks, Cement 146 942 817 371 130 47 47 2,500 3.76 
and Glass 
Basic Metal Industries 19 25 46 19 12 2 4 197 3.04 
Fab. IvleLal Products 1,476 3,078 1,205 491 :200 69 60 6,579 1.96 and Machinery 
Other manufacturj_ng 172 121 9 7 5 2 1 317 0.95 Industries 
1DT!\L M/\Nu F'/\CTIJIUNG 4,9 111 11 ,23G 3,994 1,477 566 182 177 22,573 0.78 
Source: Kj_ngdom of Saudi Arabia, Census of Private Establishments, 1981, Table 4, Percentages calculated by author. 
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of the size of firms in Saudi Arabia in 1981. As might be expected, the 
vast majority of finns employ 1 to 10 workers. When one lcoks at the 
larger firms by sector, it is interesting to note that nearly 17 per cent 
of finns in the chemical, petroleum, plastic products sector employ 50+ 
workers. This is easily the highest percentage. The bricks, blocks, 
cement and glass sector has 3. 76 per cent of firms employing 50+ and, the 
basic metals industries 3 .04 per cent. However, these percentages include 
Saudis and non Saudis Employed by finns. The next question must be, What 
is the percentage of non Saudis working in each sector. Table 4 .11 
provides information on this question. 
From table 4.11, it can be calculated that the average percentage of 
nan Saudi workers of the total workers in each sector is 89 per cent. The 
lowest per cent being 82.0 per cent in other manufacturing industries and 
the highest, 92 . 5 per cent in food, beverages and tobacco. In general, 
there are no great differences in the distribution of Saudi and non Saudi 
workers in each sector. With table 4 .10 in mind, tl1ere are sc::me 
indications, therefore, that many non Saudis are working in large firms in 
tl1e sectors of bricks, blocks, cement and glass; basic metal industries; 
and, chemical, petroleum and plastic products in particular. How-ever, 
definite conclusions cannot be drawn from tl1ese results. 
The last column of table 4.11 looks at the percentage of non Saudis in 
each sector as a percentage of ~he total number of non Saudis Ln 
m311ufacturing. It shows that only 5.0 per cent of non Saudi VX)!""kers v.ork 
in tl1e chemical, petroleum and plastic prcducts sector. Thus, although it 
may still be s3.id that many non Saudi w:::>rkers in this sector v.ork in large 
Table 4.11 
N~r of Establishments and Employment by ~ype and Economic Activity in 1981 
Percentage of Percentage of 
Type of Employees non Saudis of non Saudis of total workers total non saudis 
Non-Saudi Saudi Total to each sector in manufacturing 
Food y Beverages and 15 y311 1,244 16,555 92.5 10.8 
Tobacco 
Textiles y clothing and 20,411 2,061 22,472 90.8 14.4 
Leather 
Woody wood products 10' 113 1,211 11,324 89.3 7.1 
and furniture 
Paper products, and 6,957 987 7,944 87.6 4.9 
printing 
-> 
-> 
01cmica1, Petroleum, 7,128 1,0G8 8,196 87.0 5.0 en 
Plastic Products 
Bricks, Blocks, Cement 32,063 2,365 34,428 93.1 22.6 
and GLJSS 
Basic Metal Industries 2,338 117 2,455 95.2 1.6 
Fab. Metal Products 46 '718 4,820 51,538 90.6 32.9 
and l\1achj_nery 
Other ITkLnufacturing 963 212 1,175 82.0 0.7 
industries 
----
TOTAL MA.t"'DFACIURING 142,002 14,085 1.56,087 91.0 
... 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Census of Private Establishments, 1981, Table 1. Percentages calculated by author 
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firms, those enployed in this sector do not account for many of the non 
Saudis working in Saudi Arabia in 1981 • This also applies to basic metal 
industries Which accounts for only 1 .6 per cent of non Saudi workers. 
Table 4.11 shows that the najority of non Saudi workers are employed in the 
more construction-orientated industries of bricks, blocks, cement and glass 
and fabricated metal products and nachinery. Regarding the former sector 1 
table 4.10 and 4.11 together shc:M that although only a small nurriber of 
firms employ 50+ w:::>rkers, this sector employs a large percentage of non 
Saudi workers in Saudi Arabia. 
Together these two tables provide a fair indication of What the 
situation was at the end of the Second Development Plan. The next question 
must be What changes can be expected in the future? In earlier chapters, 
it has been made clear that many of the major infrastructural projects have 
now been completed or 1 are nearing completion. By 1985 a much smaller 
percentage of non Saudi w:::>rkers can be expected to be accounted for in the 
cons·lL uction-orientated industries. Also, as the larger foreign 
construction canpanies withdraw, the smaller, Saudi (construction) firms 
will become more irnp::>rtant. However, there are no major reasons to suggest 
"Lhat the sector of chemical, petroleum and plastic prooucts will not retain 
its primary r:osition regarding nurribe_£s of large firms. Although much 
capital is employed in this sector, the scale of activities such as 
petroleum, mean large numbers are anployed. 
4. 5 THE REGIONAL .8'1PLO\'MEI\TT 81'iV\'I'EGY lJl\'DER THE 'YtURD PIAN 
The Third Development Plan introduces a more explicit and co-ordinated 
apprCBch for dealing y.,d_ th the regional diJttensions of 1Btio:1al planning. It 
11 B 
states: 
"In the most general terms, regional planning aims at 
providing a spatial counterpart to the objectives pursued at 
the national level, and acts as a means for co-ordinating the 
. al . . . f d 1 . ..l3 reg1on act1v1t1es o eve opment agenc1es. 
The Government has tried to put this strategy into practice in recent 
years by setting up development agencies with a regional responsibility. 
There has been an attempt to apply national cibjecti ves in b:rth rural and 
urban environments. The long term aim is to achieve an even geographical 
distribution of material and social progress . The idea is to develop 
productive activities in all regions to enable them to retain as many of 
their inhabitants as fOssible. Also 1 to extend the distribution of 
services to assist those communities with the potential for self 
sufficiency, in accordance with the principles of Islam. The governrnent is 
t.ry_i_I.tg hard for many Saudis all over the Kingdcm to benefit fran the oil 
revenue. Regional strategy, like others, is essential to political 
stability. 
However 1 one of the indirect results of regional FClicy, can be a 
slower national growth of indust_ry ~1iCh may reduce the de~d for Saudi 
labour. This would 1 therefore 1 be counter-productive. On the other hand, 
it may reduce urban la:tour supply by keeping workers in the countryside, as 
already m<2J1tioned. Like developed <Xluntriesl Saudi Arabia has the problem 
of ~at principle to follo-w in its regional p:>licy. Should it be trying to 
bring jobs to workers or, w:::>rkers to jobs? Tnere are advantages in using 
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either principle. A major problem of bringing workers to jobs, that is, 
the urban areas, is one of regional inbalance. 
Briefly, Saudi Arabia's regional strategy has three key elements. 1) 
The co-ordination of activities, projects and programmes of ministries and 
the other development agencies having regional or district responsibility. 
2) The rrore ~table distribution of socio-econanic activities, and 3} The 
provision of a development framework for the design and ~~lementation 
policies and programmes in all regions, especially rural areas. Such a 
framework will pay critical attention to the availability of resources, 
man_p::JWer and water in particular. In the future the aim is to introduce 
national, regional and district centres spread fairly evenly throughout the 
. d 14 K1ng an. 
Table 4 .12 looks at the changes Which have taken place in the size of 
firms between 1976 and 1981, by region. The table shows t..hat the total 
mmiber of firms in the Ki...ngdan rrore t.."'-J.an doubled from the begirming of the 
Second Plan to that of the Third Development Plan. It is also interesting 
to note that the absolute total of establishments for each region, has 
double::'l in those five years, wi L'1 the exception of the \tJestern region. 
However, it must be said that in 1976, as well CiS 1981, the Western region 
had by far the highest number of establishments. In 1976, Whereas the 
Western region had 31, 976 establishments, the Northern region had only 
3, 701. Table 4 .12 also sho-ws that there are still many more establishments 
in the Central, 'VI'es tern and E2stern regions, than Northern 0 .. nd Southern. 
At the same tiJne, t3ble 4 .14, v.ihich sumnarises cert_ain aspects of table 
4.12 and 4.13, appears to sho.v that the stated regional strategy of the 
Table 4.12 
ComparisOn of Establishments by Region and Employment Size in 1976 and 1981 
r- Rffii~N ~-;;;--r----r---------~-;~ ESTABLISITh~~-;--;-~~ SIZE 
l TOTAL I 1 2-4 5-9 10-·19. 20-49 50-99 100+ 
CThl'J1\AL 
1976 
1981 
'IVESTERi"J 
1976 
1981 
E/\STEilN 
1976 
1981 
NOfn1IEllN 
1976 
1981 
SXTTIIEP.R 
1976 
1981 
IDTAL 
1976 
1981 
22,640 
42,875 
31,976 
1 58 ,640 
I 
' ·-··---~ I , 
I i 
I ' I 12,994 · 
1 25,19'6 
t 
3,701 
10,095 
5,993 
' 14,052 
! 77,304 
I 1150,858 
12,540 7,189 
18,111 16,730 
18,047 10,816 
25,841 23,493 
7' 177 4,049 
10,620 9,034 
2,296 1,144 
5,237 3,840 
4,068 1,561 
7,489 5,218 
1 '714 
4,433 
1,861 
5,547 
899 
2,658 
150 
652 
222 
965 
44,128 24,759 4,846 
67,298 58,135 14,255 
605 
2,000 
640 
2 '153 
408 
1,32.S 
57 
241 
6'7 
26:3 
1, 777 
5,98;) 
333 
923 
387 
932 
282 
742 
31 
78 
41 
72 
1,074 
2,747 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Census of Private Establishments 1981, Table 3. 
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305 
114 
329 
65 
401 
9 
31 
17 
27 
319 
1,093 
145 
373 
111 
345 
114 
413 
14 
16 
17 
18 
401 
1,165 
_, 
~'-' 0 
Table 4.13 
Comparison of Nun-ber of Establishments and Total Employment for the Same Cities in 1976 and 1981 Censuses 
-
·--
I 
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENI'S NUMBER OF EMPlOYEES 
I I 1976 1981. 1976 1981 I I 
--· I CENTRAL REGION ! ' 305,8271 'lffiAL i 22,640 41,329 111 '934 i Riyadh 16,409 30' 611 94,991 272,376. 
1 Buraid8h ! 2,005 3,281 5,392 11,200! 
. 
I 
· WESTER.t~ HEGION 
: 'IDTAL 32,015 57,822 114,302 326' 735 
~bJ;:knh 8,111 12,332 22,657 43 '632 
: Jiddah ' 13,828 28,651 62,907 221,975 I I 
i Taif 4,805 6,735 11,902 22,005! 
I 
: EASIEnN REGION 
j'IOTAL 12,994 24,164 92,437 302,533 
[Ill Dommm I 6,003 10,274 17;095 151,671 I -' i /\1-Kiluh~Lr ; r~J I -' !Al-Hufaf 2,630 3,878 6,593 10,6521 I ,' 
. NORTHER.~ REGION I 
!TOTJ\L 3,662 8,936 12,893 26,336 
!nan 
' 
1,198 2,721 2,332 8,968 
jTabuk I 1,015 2,719 6,336 8,299 
I 
I 
: SJlmiERN l1EGION 
I 
1'JDTAL 5,993 12 ,815 16,622 33,700 
i Jlliamis Mushait 1,489 3,002 4,860 8,608 
~KINGIDM TOTAL 77,304 144,436 348 '188 995,131 
I 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Census of Private Establishments 1981. Table 9. 
REGICN 
' 
CENTRAL 
: 
I WESTERN 
I 
I 
I EASTET?N 
NORTHERN 
SJtm-mii.N I I i 
: 
1DTAL OF REGIONS i 
i 
Table 4.14 
Percentage changes between 1976 and 1981 by region 
(based on 4.10 and ·1.11) 
Percentage increase Percentage j_ncrease Percentage increase 
in firms employing in total number of in total number 
50+ by region in firms in each reg ion employed in each 
1976/1981 1976/1981 region in 1976/1981 
261.78 189.38 273.22 
299.56 183. 3~1 285.85 
454.75 193.90 1071.16 
204.07 272.76 204.27 
132.35 234.47 202.74 
313.61 195.15 285.80 
------------ -
L__ __ - ---
Percentages calculated by author. 
_, 
rv 
N 
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Third Plan has succeeded to scrne extent. The Northern and Southern regions 
appear to have a higher rate of increase in tenns of nl.liTber of 
establis'hrriE>nts . 
Column 2 of table 4.14 sho.vs that there have been some very large 
percentage increases in the m.nnber of finns in the Northern and Southern 
regions. This at least shows greater o::mnercial activity in these regions. 
When one looks at the size of the finns, table 4.12 shows ccmparatively few 
firms enploying 50+ workers. However, \\hen table 4 .14 looks at the 
percentage increases in firms employing 50+ workers between 1976 and 1981, 
this time the situation look less promising. Both Northern and Southern 
regions are well below the percentage increases of the other three regions. 
Eastern region has a notably high increase, 454.75 per cent in finns 
enploying 50+ workers. This is discouraging because of the low base that 
the Northern and Southern regions start from. One of the reasons for this 
is the very large scale activities taking place in cities like Jubail, 
Clarmldfl, al-Khubar and Dhahran. For example, the iron and steel joint 
venture with Korf involves construction of an integral steel complex at 
Jubail. 15 It appears that although NortJ1ern and Southern regions are 
attracting neMr establishments, they are not attracting the larger firms. 
This means that these regions are not able to enploy anything like as many 
as the other three regions, the Westen1, Central and Eastern regions. 
Inhabitants of Northern and Southern regions might be e:1couraged to n-ove to 
a different region to seek et~ployment. If this happens to any great 
extent, the character of ~1e regions and Saudi ~rabia ~ill change ~~ich is 
not in 1 ine with Government policy. 
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Table 4.13 shows the significant difference in numbers employed in 
each region. The largest number of employees in 1981 is the Western region 
with 326,735 and the sma.llest in Northern region with 26,336. Table 4.14 
looks again at the changes in employees between 1976 and 1981. When 
colurrm 3 is observed, it may be concluded that attempts at regional balance 
have not succeeded. Not only was the situation much worse in tenns of 
number of employees in the Northern and SOuthern regions, but it is not 
getting better. The situation has beccrne more acute. There was an 
increase of just over 200 per cent for Northern and SOuthern regions 
compared with 273 per cent, 285 per cent and 1071 per cent for Central, 
Westen1 and Eastern regions, respectively. T'ne 1071 per cent increase for 
Eastern region is in line with the 454 per cent increase in firms employing 
50+ workers shOINll. in colurrm 1 . As was p:::>inted out above, this is a direct 
result of new large scale enterprises, particularly around Darrrrnan. At 
least, the regional changes Which have taken place under the Second Plan, 
have not meant an overall centralisation around the capital and in the 
Cent.:._-al Region, as might have happened. Even before the growth of Riyadh 
made itself felt, there was already a number of market towns spread over 
Central Arabia. 16 This 'natural' trend could have continued, Which cx:mld 
suggest sane success by t.~e Government. Hav;ever, it is difficult to 
evaluate this analytically. 
vlhen this regional inbalance is looked at regarding im.[Drt 
substitution policies, the current situation does not look premising. 
After all, a d~-nestic rmrket is essential to the success of bnp:::>rt 
substitution p:::>licies. Wnere there is purchasing p:JWer, donesticall y 
produced goods can be l::ought - the larger the nlllTi!::€r of establishment-s and 
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anployees, the larger the dcrnestic market. Additionally, the lagged effect 
of the multiplier is also bnpJrtant as nore products and services are 
prcduced in response to the needs of already existing firms. If the Third 
Plan continues to produce the poor results of the Second Plan regarding 
regional balance, the Northern and Southern regions will hardly participate 
in the development of Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, the geographic features 
of these regions has a negative effect an their involvement in development. 
The reasons surrounding the existence of the two tier labour market 
have already been discussed. Many Saudis do not participate in the rncx3ern 
sector, but it is as potentially dangeroU$, if regions do not receive the 
benefit of the oil revenue. Sane inhabitants of the Northern and Southern 
regions will rmdoubtedly move to other regions and so benefit. However, 
this will not alleviate the problem of those remaining in the Northern and 
Southern region. Those remaining may well be rmskilled and \o.Orking in the 
traditional sector and most vulnerable to political provocateurs. The 
Government accepts that it can encourage the people to move but not to 
force them. It is hoped and is possible that gradually the less 
economically attractive settlements will become de-populated through young 
. 17 
people leaving them. 
4. 6 MANPOWER AND EHPIDl'l'·fr]\JT IN SELECTED CITIES 
A major aspect of development in Saudi Aabia is tJ1e fact that 
developnent has ta}~en place around particular areas. Industrialisation is 
concentrated in the major cities a'ld outside the Je:'ldah, Riyadh and 
Damman/Al Kho1:B.r areas, there is surprisingly little development. Table 
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4.13 looks at the Changes taking place in selected cities. Same 
significant facts emerge. The city of Riyadh; Central Region accounted for 
20 per cent of establishments in 1976 and 27 per cent of e:nployment. In 
1981 it accounted for 21 per cent of establishments, but the situation was 
unchanged regarding anployees. There was rrore change in Jeddah. In 1976 
it accounted for 19 per cent of establishments and 22 per cent of employees 
and five years later it accounted for 18 per cent for l::oth categories. The 
Eastem region did not shaw a more marked change either. In 1976 the 
Damman area, including the mt.micipalities from Rahima to Al Thuqbah, 
contained 10 per cent of establishments and 24 per cent of employment. 
Five years later, the Damman area accounted for 11 per cent of 
establishments and 21 per cent of employment. 18 
Table 4.15 looks at manufacturing in the three above mentioned cities. 
Tne table looks at the nuniber of establishments and total employment by 
economic activities for Jeddah, Riyadh and Damnan. The total manufacturing 
figures portray a similar situation to that seen in the regions as a Whole. 
canrered to Jeddah and Riyadh, IEmman has a large nurriber of bigger firms. 
The firms of Damman employ an average of 20 employees, While those of 
Jeddah anploy 9 and Riyadh 8. The oil-related industries of Damnan are 
more capital i11.!-e11si ve, large sc~le ®Q~~j:.Qkings. As earlier chapters have 
suggested, the firms in the category of che.11ical 1 petroleum and plastic 
products in Damman are particularly large scale. 
Also, the table sho.-,'S that the firms Ln Je::'k3ah in t._he food, beverages 
and tom ceo sector account for the employment of nnre tJ1an 5 1 000 1 a 
comparatively high nurriber. This can prooobl y be explained by the large 
I 
1, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
i 
I 
; 
CITI 
Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco 
Textiles, Clothing 
and J..Eathcr 
Wood, Wood Products 
and Furnjture 
Paper Products and 
Printing 
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Table 4.15 
Nwnber of Establishments and Total Elnployrnent by Economic Activity 
for Selected Cities, 1981 
JEDDAH RIYADH 
Number of Total Number of Total Number of 
DAMMAM 
Total 
,Establi.shments Employment Establishments Employment Establishments Employment 
267 5,072 462 3,535 58 1,281 
1,299 3,476 1,860 6,216 321 907 
314 2,455 365 2,656 92 772 
164 2,852 157 1,677 .•56 1,764 
51 2,094 61 2,002 31 2,427 
' 
387 7,519 451 10,519 95 5,680 
85 771 24 244 3 626 
1,121 11,200 1,591 13,723 331 6,993 
99 323 24 116 15 359 
3,820 35,762 4,995 40 '688 1,002 20,809 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Census of Private Establishments 1981, Table 3. 
I 
I 
I 
_, 
N 
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number of wadis in the Western regicn. The area. is relatively fertile so 
the manufacture of Doodstuffs can be described as vertical integration and 
a natural progression. Additionally, the Jeddah area. is the largest single 
market in the Kingdon for foodstuffs and the main entry p::>rt for food 
imports. Riyadh, an the other hand, accounts for a relatively high number 
of anployers in the sector of textiles, clothing and leather. An obvious 
explanation could lie in the fact that Riyadh is the capital city and like 
other capitals, it is the fashion leader. This is not so. In fact, there 
is very little fashion in Saudi Arabia as a Whole. It could be that the 
more cosmopolitan city of Jeddah creates a demand, as it is -well connected 
by road to Riyadh. Thus cloth is imported through the Eastern ports such 
as Damman, \o.hich is -well connected by rail and road to Riyadh, Where it is 
manufactured into clothing. Fran Riyadh a national distribution is easier 
for consumer goods, than from Jeddah or Damman. 
Damman already provides plenty of employment opportunities Which may 
be w1e reason Riyadh was selected as the administrative centre for the 
country. This would fall in line with training manr:ower in all regions . 
Planners see human resources as the country' s ITDst scarce and lasting 
resource, a .resource which is critical to Saudi Arabia's future. 19 A~l 
three cities, Jeddah, Riyadh and Danman show a large number of people 
employed in construction based industries. The firms in Damman appear to 
be larger scale. Earlier data in this chapter showed that the larger 
construction firms had foreign particiiJation. Further, it was suggested 
that these larger firms would w-ithdraw from Saudi Arabia in the future I so 
most of the large scale projects of the Second Plan have no.v been 
irnplE:!l1ented. Even when this fact is considered I Darrrnan, like the Whole of 
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the Eastern region, is expected to grow in the future. Although the 
industrialisation plans of the Third Plan appear to make this a virtual 
certainty, the dramatically reduced oil revenues of the 1980's must cast 
same doubt on the subject. 
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CHAPI'ER 5 
EXPORI' DIVERIFICATICN PLANS 
5.1 POLICIES FOR EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION 
"Diversification of the econany is one of the fundamental 
long tenn goals of development, am the strategy for the Third 
Plan is to accelerate the process of diversification."1 
The Objective for e-.::-onomic development is tc give priority to 
investment in the producing sectors of agriculture, industry and mining. 
The aim is £or this development to be underta~en by the private sector. 
The government's role is to support and stimulate the private sector in its 
tasks and encourage joint ventures with £oreign CXllTlpa.nies. Clearly, if 
exports are to be diversified away from oil, the domestic economy must 
first become diversified. 2 In Chapter 3, import substitiution policies 
were highlighted~ they can only go so far in Saudi Arabia because the 
domestic market is so small. EA?Ort diversification is essential if scale 
econanies are sought. Still, the govenunent has no alternative other than 
to accept that in tire short term cruae oil exp:Jrts wiTl fn.::iiritain their 
central imp:>rtance d011estically1 as well as internationally. Dcrnestically I 
they will cnntinue to provide financial cover for the Kingdom's exp2nditure 
budgeted for t.he perio:'l1 to p3.y for i1n_ports and other p3yments abrtX~d 1 and, 
o:mtinue to strengthe!l the Kingdon's international fj nC~nci al reserves. 
Internationally, crude oil and other hydrocarbon exports will rraintaL~ 
tJ1eir stabilising role in t..he WJrld econol1Y and supply e.r1ergy. 
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It is interesting to note here, that the daily level of crude oil 
exp::>rts v.hich would pay for the Government's aggregate expenditures an 
economic development during the Third Plan is slightly under 5. 3 million 
barrels a day, according to the Third Plan. However, at the OPEC meeting 
in Vienna in September 1983 Saudi Arabia's quota was agreed at 5.0 million 
barrels of the 17.5 million barrels a day total OPEC production. This 
suggests that oil revenues are not reaching their desired level, but this 
may not be the case . The Financial Times reported in mid october 1983 that 
OPB: was producing 18.5 million barrels a day with Saudi Arabia actually 
producing 5.5. Although such "facts" are as yet unconfirmed, they do 
highlight the need for diversification of the Saudi economy in the long 
term. 
In the Third Plan, it is stated that the private sector will be 
stimulated by providing information and research on investment 
opportunities for its citizens, by conducting more economic feasibility 
studies, and by gi vin3 supp:::>rt to applied research projects. Many 
financial incentives are offered and in p3.rticular, encouragement is given 
to the establishment of joint venture c~~ies with foreign as well as 
Saudi parnters, to undertake large scale projects. Completion of 
infrastructure projects is also seen as essential. Under the Third Plan, 
so--ne kinds of investment are given a higher priority than others. 
Regaraing imp:::>rt substitution policies, largc;,-scale mechanized agricultural 
projects should be ~noouraged. 'vith eA!Drt diversification policies in 
mind, projects v.ihid1 m"l.ximize the value-added fran crude oil prooucU 0:1 
through developing hydrocad:xm lased industries are im[D:ctant. Overall, 
projects vihim introouce new tecr1nologies are also given priority. 
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For t.."'l1e rrost part, development of the non oil sector is tmdertaken by 
the Saudi private sector, usually with the objective of import 
substitution. Alternatively, much of the development of the oil sector is 
expected to be, and is undertaken as joint ventures with foreign ccrnpanies 
with the aim of diversifying exp:>rts. Table 5.1 indicates the expected 
relative weights of the oil and non-oil sectors in the Kingdom's total 
gross dimestic product ( GDP) , expressed as a percentage of the non-oil 
economy. 
Table 5.1: Relative Contributions to GDP of the Oil and Non-oil Sectors a 
1979/1980 1984/1985 
Non-oil Sectors 100.00 100.00 
Oil Sector 
(crude and refined prooucts) 164.76 130.41 
264.76 230.41 
a In % of the non oil e2onany, calcuJ <'lted at average inte.cnatiorBl 
prices for oil products in 1979/1980, taking also into acooQ~t 
prevailing d::tllcstic prices v.':1ere n:-;>.'.:'.--.:ssary. 
p. 89. 
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The projections for growth in the Third Plan have been estimated in 
consideration of the effects of the new manpower p::>licy on the size of the 
labour force, as discussed in chapter 4. The growth rate for the non oil 
economy between 1980 and 1985 is expected to decrease from the Second 
Plan's average rate of 15 per cent to 6.2 per cent per year. Given the 
Kingdom's plans £or export diversification, it is therfore a little 
surprising to find the marked decrease in the relative contribution of the 
oil sector. As will be seen, although the exp::>rt of refined oil products 
increases, the export of crude oil decreases . On the other hand, the 
increase in the non oil sector is expected to be achieved by the doubling 
in the average gvowth rate of sectoral productivity as a result of lower 
unit costs or higher value products, or both. 3 
In Short, in the Third Plan increased emfhasis is placed on expanding 
the contributions made to national wealth by agriculture, minerals, 
hydorcarbons (particualrly natural gas) and the manufacturing industry. 
The primary objective for industrialisation is the eventual establish~~~t 
of a production base that will reduce the country's heavy dependence on oil 
as t..'he main source of incane. Looney makes two points on the arove 
strategy. Firstly, industrialisation does not inevitably lead to 
sustainable, long tem gvowth. In Iran the process was largely initiated 
by expatriate companies and individuals with no permanent commitment to ~~e 
v.relfare of the COlmtry. In::lustry is of no use if it fonns a sy:mbolically 
m::x:Jern sector of the e.....""''nO'flY without developing e-ver expanding linkages 
with the in:Jigenous ec'Jnouy aDd culture. Secondly, develop112nt econanists 
often prize industrialisation for its e11ployrnent-generating effects. This 
should not be a priority for Saudi .i\rabia, given its samll p:>pJlation. 
Non oil related jobs will Obviously be needed. In the short run though, 
there may be no point in creating jobs that can only be filled by 
f . 4 ore1gners. 
The Obvious reason for export diversification policies is to reduce 
the country's dependence on primary exports. The Government wishes to 
establish a complex of export-oriented heavy industries in collaboration 
with foreign and domestic enterprise, with a view to exploiting the 
country's potential CCIY1p3rati ve advantage \\here p:>ssible. At the same time 
it wishes to provide incentives and external economies to the private 
sector to establish a number of industries supplying the basic consumer and 
development needs of the econany, thus reducing the country' s dependence on 
imp:>rts. The general need to increase the econany' s capacity to 
competitively produce products for the domestic and export market is also 
recognised. The exploitation of the sUbstantial comparative advantages 
arising fran low-cost energy must be an aim. Objectives also include the 
desire to extend the Kingdom's access to modern technology, and develop a 
regionally balanced industrial sector with optionally sized plants in all 
sectors. Further, the government aims to promote interlinl<age arrnng 
industries 'While reducing dependency on expatriate skills by nntional skill 
creation. 
Given the long ·term exp::>rt diversification p.Jlicies, the f-uture for 
the private sector is bright. Ha-.vever, he suggests that certain obstacles 
to change exist. There is a need for reliable stati.sUcs a1 cucrent 
out.put, investment, Enploy.w=nt and industrial c-:::l:Bci ty. The ne ... ' census of 
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manufactures are kept confidential . Government rrachinery nee:ls to be 
strengthenErl. Rules governing incentives change too rapid! y for 
businessmen to exploit them. Further, adminsitrators are not familiar with 
the problems of industry and their planning activity is too centralised on 
Riyadh. Finally, the limite:] size of the market makes it difficult to 
foresee the successsful implementation of bnport substitution projects. 
Same, like construction projects are already in a supply-demand 
equilibrium. In 1982 same opportunities still exist in foodstuffs, 
plastics, Chemicals and metal working, However, increasing attention must 
be focussed on export opportunities fran the large petrochemical plants 
plaQ~ed £or Yeribo and Jubail. 5 It is in this field that the developed 
world market can be exploited and Where economic rationale suggest there is 
promise. 
The Heckscher-ohlin theory of international trade suggests a country 
tends to have lower canparati ve costs in the canmodi ty that uses the 
largest arrount of the relatively cheapest factor in its economy. Tne 
theory indicates that Saudi Arabia should establish and promote industries 
that are rrost likely to be efficient. Fbrtunately for the Saudis, these 
industries are not only energy j nt ensi ve but also capital intensive. Tll·~'Y 
utilise its abundant finanical surplus as well as gas and oil. The 
existence of under exploited gas reserves in the Kingdon presP_nts a strong 
argument £or developing gas ffised heCJ.vy j~1dustries. Gas, e-5p2cially Lhe 
dry gases like methane and ethane, is an expensive product to t.ra.nsport, 
It is t.herefore sensible to look £or m::>re proJuc~ci ve uses fcx its 
exploitation. Once gas has been use..-1 optio:1all y v..ri tl1 in t11e doK:>s tic 
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econany, there is a gocrl theoretical argument for developing gas intensive 
industries around it. 
Such industries can be chemical industries v.hich use the gas as a 
feedstock for conversion into higher value and more easily transportable 
chemical products. Alternatively, they can be energy intensive industries 
such as steel or aluminium production which can use the gas as a reasonably 
cheap source of energy. Of course, Saudi Arabia had virtually no heavy 
industry or industrial experience in the early 1970's. The Heckscher-ohlin 
pattern of trade had not been established, oil expJrts representing a "vent 
for a surplus." Also, the price systet1 had not fully developed and so was 
incapable of providing the planners with any correct signals about the best 
areas of investment. In any case, the country faced a nll!TIDer of other 
difficulties Which did not help in the process of identifying effective 
methods of allocating the country's resources. Physical bottlenecks, 
ma~power shortages and inflation impeded the absorptive capacity of the 
econany and prevented the successful implEmentation of diversification 
policies . 
• 'll,. !1urn':ler of p::>tentially profitable projects have been identified by 
the Government for ~ ts investment pr09ranme. Industries have be~n S£>lected 
that fit into the present structure of the econo-ny and o::mfonn to t_he 
Heckscher-Ghlin theory of trade by using relatively large amounts of e1e 
Kingdon's relatively abundant factors of prcduction6 - oil, natural gas and 
capi·tal. Tr1ey form t."he next logical p:,ase in develop:ne::1t by providing 
conp~titive exports v.d.th t.he aim of paying for future iln_tXJrts. 1i1e ci'ipital 
costs of these jndustries are irrrnense, so that tJ1e private st=:ct_or simply 
cannot attempt such investment. As a result, the Saudi Basic Indusries 
Corporation (SABIC) was founded by the Government to initiate developnent 
of the Kingdom's heavy industries in 1976. Table 5.2 outlines SABIC's 
basic projects currently, under implementation, as outlined in the SN-1A 
1981 Annual Report. 
SABIC had an initial capacity of SR 10 billion to establish these 
hydrocarbon-based industries and the govennnent designated two industrial 
sites at Jubail on the Arabian Gulf and at Yenbo on the Red Sea for these 
projects. The pro:Jramme includes four petrochemical cc:mplexes at Jubail 
and one complex at Yeribo, each oomplex producing 500,000 tons of ethylenP 
annually. Other planned projects are four fertilizer plants producing 
ammonia and urea, two methanol plants, an animal feed plant and a steel 
rolling mill at Jubail. There are four eL'lylene cc:mplexes at Jubail Which 
have been completed and are scheduled to start operations by the end of 
1984. Total investment in these four cc:mplexes is estimated to be $4, 600 
million. 
Studies are being prepared for ~1e establishment of two fertilizer 
plants, each having an annual capacity of 330, 000 tons of ammonia. Total 
cost of the two plan1:s is estci.rnated to be $600 million. Other projects 
include hJO methanol plants to be constructed by Sl\13IC. Each wi 11 have an 
annual capacity of 660,000 tons and will cost a total of $500 million. 'T':IJe 
steel plant at Juba.il is planned to have an iniUal annual capacity of 
800,000 tons, as table 5.2 shav,rs. Jubail is e.Jso to be t.he lor:crLion of a 
200,000 tons per year plant, at a cost of $1,100 rnilli0'1. 
Projects 
, Metallurgical 
!1 - Saudi Iron & Steel Co 
2 - Jiddah Steel Rolling Mill 
Fertilizer 
3 - Al-Jubayl Fertilizer Co 
Petrochemical 
4 - Saudi Methanol Co 
i 5 - Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical 
G - J\1-Jubayl Petrochernical, Co 
7 - Saudi PetrochEmical Co 
8 - National :\Iethanol Co 
9 - Arabia.n Petrocbanical Co 
10 - Eastern PetrochEmical Co 
SourcG: Si\BIC 
Table 5.2 
SABIC'S Basic Project Under Implementation 
IDcat ion and 
date of agreement 
Jubayl (March 1979) 
Jiddah (May 1979) 
Jubayl (Dec. 1979) 
Jubayl (Nov. 1979) 
Yanbu (April 1980) 
Jubayl (April 1980) 
Jubayl (Sept. 1980) 
Jubayl (Feb. 1981) 
Jubayl (May 1981) 
Jubayl (May 1981) 
Feedstock 
Iron Ore ~" Natural Gas 
Steel Billets 
Methane 
Methane 
Ethane 
Ethylene 
Ethane 
Methane 
Ethane 
Ethyl en 
Source: Sfi.\1A, Annual Report 1981, p. 77 
Annual Capacity Products 
(metric tons) 
800,000 Steel Rods & Bars 
140,000 Steel Rods & Bars 
500,000 
600,000 
450,000 
200,000 
200,000 
90,000 
260,000 
656,000 
456,000 
295,000 
281,000 
377 '000 
650,000 
500,000 
180,000 
130,000 
300,000 
Urea 
Methanol 
Ethylene 
Ethylene Glycol 
L.D. Polythylene 
H.D. Polythylene 
L.D. Polythylene 
Ethylene 
Ethylene Dycloride 
Styrene 
Ethanol 
Caustic Soda 
Methanol 
Ethyl en 
L. & H.D. PoJ.ythylene 
L.D. Polythylene 
Ethylene Glycol 
-' 
.., 
0 
The availability of gas is not the only reason for making investment 
in the petrochemical industry attractive. It is also both capital 
intensive and economies of scale are available. The industry has one of 
the highest capital and labour ratios in the world; investment per new job 
created is estimated at $20,000 to $100,0001 Also, large-scale capacity 
units cost proportionately less than small or medium-capacity units to 
build and manpower overheads appear to have proportionately lower 
expenditures with large plant size. In conclusion, Saudi Arabia's abundant 
endowments of both raw materials and capital make the petrochemical 
industry appear the rational choice as t..l-J.e starting p::>int on 'Which to build 
its industralization programme. Still, i·t must be remerrbered that there is 
no industrial option that gives similar returns to investment in the oil 
sector, including petrochemicals. Saudi Arabia must still ensure that oil 
is produced as efficiently as possible and that the best techniques are 
used in recovery and exploration. Secondly, the bulk transportation of 
crude cil will always remain cheaper than transporting oil prcrlucts. 
However, the comparatively greater cost of transporting oil products is 
still very small in comparison to the final market price of oil - so 
defending the Saudi decision to increase refining capacity. 7 
5. 2 SECIDRAL DIVISICN AND DIRECI'ION OF EXPORTS 
"AJ.though one of Ll-J.e major cbjecti ves of the Killgdan' s 
development policy is to diversify the sources of national incan9, 
oil revenue still rernains the p::.-edo:ninaJ1t contributor to b.Jth GDP 
and e.:·-.:p:)rt earnings ... B 
The p.Jblished figures of the Saudi Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy clearly show that oil is indeed still the major revenue producer, 
as table 5.3 shows. Although revenues fran oil have not increased 
Table 5.3 Government Revenue and Expenditure (SR million) 
Year Oil Other 
1974/75 94,190 5,913 
1975/76 93,481 9,903 
1976/77 121,191 14,766 
1977/78 ll4,042 16,617 
1978/79 ll5,518 17,353 
continually, as "other" revenues have, in 1978/79 they still remained 
almost 7 times higher. However, it is interesting to note hc.rw the value of 
exp:>rts mange and the extent to Which these changes are in line with 
changes in vohrrne, as table 5.4 sho'WS. Firstly, the overall value of 
exp:>rts has increased rrore than 26 times between 1970 and 1982, from 
approxii<B.tely SR 10 bilJ ion to SR 260 billion. Yet, the volume of exp:>rts 
has less than doubled, although the '.v-alue of exp:>rt' figures are ncrninal 
and not real. T'nere are many reasons for iliis. After 1970 the major oil 
cosn}_:x-mies effectively lost control of the oil j.r1dustry, as the oil 
prooucers nationalisErl the industry. The oil producin3 countries 
ths~elves asserted control CR'er the production and marketing strategies. 
Table 5.4 shov.'s that b2hveen 1973 and 1974 the value of E':ports increased 
rrore t..'ltan four tirr.es, as a result of s11arp increases i11 the vo] urne of oil 
exp:n-ts. In tJ1e fol1o,dng year, there was a 16.6 per cent decrease in the 
Table 5.4 
Petroleum Exports and Volmne of Exports 
EXPORTS (Dillions of Riyals) VOLUME OF EXPORTS (1980=100) 
Crude Refine Crude 
Ex-ports Petroleum Petroleum Petroleum Petroleum 
1970 !1.89 8.27 1. 61 38.8 34.8 
I 
1971 14.92 13.09 1.83 48.4 45.3 
1972 18.84 16.90 1. 94 61.7 58.9 I I 
I 1973 28.93 26.51 ! 2.42 77.9 75.8 
\ 1974 110 0 54 102.34 8.20 87.1 85.6 I 
I 
1975 101.54 97.26 7.28 72.6 71.3 
1976 136.91 127.73 9.18 88.3 87.0 
1977 154.98 146.00 8.99 93.5 93.0 
I 19?8 128.56 120.16 8.40 84.0 83.2 
I 
I 1979 197.12 186.03 11.09 95.4 95.3 
I 1980 339.37 320.45 18.92 100.0 100.0 
1981 383.00 359.57 23.44 98.0 97.5 
I 1982 259.93 2:15.16 24.77 63.4 61.0 ; i 
--------- ----- -·-
Source: IMF 9 International Financial Statistics 9 Yearbook 1983, pp. 438-439 
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Table 5.5 
Graphical representation of Exports 1972-1978 
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Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2 Saudi_Arabian ~vionetary Agency 2 Annual Report 
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volume of exp:>rts but the value of exrorts decreased less than 
proportionately by registering a 5.5 per cent decrease. The value of 
exports continued to increase until 1978. The volume of exports also 
decreased in this year, as the ·conservation measures taken by the 
industrialized nations and the persistent global recession decreased the 
aggregate foreign de-nand for Saudi oil. However, Saudi policy decisions 
and technical factors also played a part in decreasing exportso 9 Table 5.5 
shows the changes in the value of exports graphically o 
The figures after 1978 show the second major increase in oil prices in 
the 1970's. Between 1979/80 the value of exports increased moreL~~~ 70 
per cent, despite a mere 5 per cent increase in the actual volume of 
exports o Likewise, there was a 12 per cent increase in the value of 
exports in 1981, although the volume of exports decreased. There is a 
significant change in this trend in 1982 v.ihen 1:x:>th the volume and value of 
ex:ports decreased markedly. At this time Saudi Arabia's role as the 
'balancing producer' is evident. Oonsequently, Saudi Arabia decreased its 
production of oil as new supplies of oil became available When aggregate 
world de.tBnd was not increasing. Of course t..his seriously affected Saudi 
revenues and diversification plans and, budgets were updated. 
Table 5.4 also sho\VS how ex}Xlrts are di_vided between crude p2troleurn 
anr3 refined petroleum e.x}Xlrts, in tenns of boG'! the value and volume of 
e11.l_X)rts. The value and volume of cruae oil eAl_X)l-ts c..'tange ali'TDSt totally 
in line v.ri th total exports, as might b2 exp2cted. Crude oil <:::>=f-OL-ts form 
ab::>ut 90 per cent of exports and tJ1eir value has of course varied with the 
OPB2 price adjustment and glolBl recession. Consequently, there is a 
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decrease in 1975, 1978 and after 1980. Table 5.6 looks at crude oil 
prcrluction, as opposed to exports of crude oil (table 5.4). It is noteable 
that overall domestic production registered decreases in the same years, 
suggesting overall domestic production is closely-linked with crude oil 
exfOrts. This is tmlike the situation regarding refined oil. 
Receipts fran the export of refined oil are much less significant, for 
example, in 1970 they represented about 16 per cent of exports and in 1922 
they represented less than 10 per cent. The value of refined oil has 
fluctuated between 1970 and 1982 but nonetheless, there were substantial 
increases in 1974 and 1980 (but not in volume tems), in line with the 
increased price of oil • However, tmlike the receipts from crude oil 
exports, the value of refined oil continued to rise in 1982. The picture 
for the volume of refined oil exfOrts is a little erratic. In 1975 there 
was a significant decrease in volume, as the market responded to the abrupt 
increase in prices. It dropped from 116.3 in 1974 to 96.9 in 1975 (1980 = 
100). The high volume of exports of refined oil from 1970 to 1975 has not 
been reached since. Ho,..;ever, since 1978 there has been a.ll. increase in 
volume eaCh year. 
\>J'nen the volume of exfOrts of refined oil in table 5. 4, is oompared 
with the volt.nne of pro:luction in table 5 . 6, it becanes apparent that 
production of refined oil is less closely linkej to exports than is t.."'Je 
case for crude oil. In 1972/73 domestic production shows a sharp decrease, 
v,ihile the voluTJ2 e_xpol"t of refined oil sho.vs a slight increase. Li.""e·.,-ise, 
in 1976/77 and 1977/78 do-nsstic pro::1uct.ion increases, .... ~1ile exp::Kts sho,.,r a 
fall. The opJ:X>si te is true in 1980/81: dornestic prcx.luction decreases and 
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Table 5.6 
Crude Oil Production and Refinery Products in Saudi Arabia 
Crude Oil Refinery Products 
Year Production 1969=100 1969=100 
1969 100 100 
1970 118.1 132.9 
1971 148.3 p9.2 
1972 187.6 181.1 
I 1973 236.2 138.5 
1974 263.7 193.7 
1975 220.0 124.2 
1976 267.4 151.7 
1977 286.1 1 r:; '7 11 ..L.U t o":l: 
1978 258.1 167.5 
1979 '296. 4 178.0 
~· 
1980 317.1 178.1 
1981 305.1 177.3 
1982 201.5 183.1 
Som'ce: Central Department of Statistics, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
_The Statistical Indicat(_)r, 1982, Table 5 .1, 5 .4. 
I 
I 
I 
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exports increase. At first glance, these variations between the volume of 
exp:>rts and production do seem to suggest that domestic production is 
linked to danestic demand as well as the export market. However, it could 
be that these variations are the result of stock piling and expected 
demand, rather than actual demand. Of course actual demand has to 
esti.nBted. Sane economists suggest that exp:>rts of refined petroleum have 
slowed down to pre-1970 levels as a result of increased domestic 
consumption requirements. Also, that the Third Development Plan calls for 
the expansion of domestic and export refinery capacity for this reasan. 10 
It is also suggested that there was a fOurfold rise in domestic 
consumption/proouctian ratios of refined petroleum prooucts from 5.2 per 
cent in 1962 to 20.3 per cent in 1975. If this was the case, and it has 
continued, this increasing dcrnestic demand could undennine export 
diversification. Unless refinery capacity increased sufficiently, then the 
supply of refined prcrlucts would not cover export demands. Further, this 
contradicts the vi~w that a buoj~nt domestic de~d can cause econarJes of 
scale Which aid exports by lowering costs. 
Oianges in the arnow1ts of exp::Jrts roean "b'lat the direction of exp:>rts 
hc:.;.s varied. Table 5. 7 shows that Western EurQW historically has been t.h€ 
prirrary recipient of Saudi oil, receiving !lDre than 50 per cent of t.'le 
total value in the 1970's. Tnen, this droppej to 40 in 1977 al1d 37 per 
cent in 1978, as conservation efforts took ef feet. Factors like the o:mi_ng 
of North Sea oil are also of minor importance. H:rv.~ever, recent figures 
from the Saudi Arabi?Jl Monetary Agency suggest a revet-sal of this trs-:1d, 2s 
table 5.8 shov.>s. In 1979 Europe accow1ted for 40 p<~r cent of expxts and 
Table 5.7 
Direction of Exports 1970-78 (value SR millions) 
~- -------------
I Hcgion/Country 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
i Western Hemisphere,a of wh~ch: 591 1,707 2,523 4,678 17,155 14,810 21,275 28,291 29,636 I 
! United States 98 590 1,129 1,625 4,417 4,031 6,377 14,575 21,771 
Europeb 4,820 8,286 12,580 1'i' ,466 65,141 45,420 55,598 60,538 51,538 
Cam10n ~1a.rket ( EEC) of wl;lich: 3,333 7,437 10,422 14: '308 53,528 37,645 45,592 50,625 42,894 
Belgium 284 351 275 595 4,351 3,090 3,480 5,237 3,990 
France 692 1,662 2,111 ~: 9 061 14,570 11,290 15,582 14,704 14,776 
Germany 222 578 736 1 ,102 5,541 3,659 4,238 4,435 3,779 
Italy 1,179 1.767 2,547 3·' 322 11,050 7,894 8,587 11,182 9,360 
Netherlands 993 1,569 2,708 3 '111 3,259 5,291 6,951 8,123 6,018 
United Kingdom 828 1,510 1,846 2,651 11 '755 6,271 6,618 6,491 4,678 
Other European,c of which: 660 949 2,158 3' 158 11,614 7,708 9,930 9,912 8,641 
Spain 446 543 1,220 1,830 8,139 5,205 5,704 5,579 5,468 
Middle East, of which: 609 806 839 1,266 4,135 3,574 4,209 5,756 4,900 
I 
-~ Balrrain 512 646 616 770 2,804 2,249 2,548 3,370 4,900 --~ 
~ ,., 
Asia, of which: 3,339 4,414 5,532 8 ,291 31,973 31,135 41,074 47,162 46,947 
Japan 2,323 2,783 3,444 4, 94:0 20,135 20,483 27,097 29,080 27,881 
Africa 474 759 425 586 1,157 1,154 1,246 926 853 
Oceania 309 254 214 245 1,129 1,480 1,682 2,154 1,746 
Otbersd 765 977 650 848 5,533 6,389 10,170 8,383 2,662 
TOI'AL 10,907 17,303 22,761 
L 
33,308 126,223 104,412 135,154 153,209 138,242 
I NoLes: a. Including L::rtin America. b. Including exports to Eastern Europe. c. Other Western European. 
d. Mainly bunl<er fuel e:x1Jorts . 
Source: El Mallakh, R. Sau'di Arabja: Rush to Development, Croom Helm 1982, p. 347 
Table 5.8 
Changes in the Direction of Exports Between 1979 and 1980 (Millions of Riyals) 
EXIURrS 
1979 1980 
Region and Cmmtry ( 1 ) Value Percent Value Percent 
WFSrERN HEMISPHERE, OF' WHICH: 47 ,532 22.3 75,130 20.7 
U.S.A. 36,753 17.2 58,866 15.3 
Bahamas 295 0.1 533 0.1 
Brazil 6,048 2.8 9,479 2.6 
Trinidad 80 
Canada 4,001 1.9 7,183 1.9 
EUROPE 85,891 40.3 150,905 41.5 
E.E.C., OF' WHICH: 68,239 32.0 118,577 32.6 
Belgium 7 ,065 3.3 13,207 3.6 
France 17,856 8.4 33,525 9.2 
Gennany 6,022 2.8 11,029 3.0 
Italy 17,314 8.1 22,305 6.1 
Netherlands 11 '807 5.5 24,754 6.8 
U.K. 7,097 3.3 12,844 3.5 
arHER WESTERN EUROPE, OF WHICH: 17,652 8.3 32,147 8.8 
Greece 4,578 2.1 8,129 2.2 
Spain 8,624 3.9 10,569 2.9 
Switzerland 240 0.1 2,046 0.2 
Turkey 85 326 0.1 
EASTERN EUROPE 181 
MIDDLE EAST, OF WHICH: 7,599 3.6 11 '810 3.3 
Bahrain 4,511 2.1 7,150 1.9 
Jordan 829 0.4 1 '358 0.3 
KU\vait 122 0.1 176 
Lebanon 952 0.4 1,391 0.3 
Syria 126 0.1 38 
0rHER .ASIA, OF W1UCH: 64,205 30.1 111 ,200 30.7 
India 1,528 0.7 1,086 0.2 
Japan 36,983 17.3 63,274 17.4 
Korea, South 6,474 3.0 11 '784 3.2 
Pc:Jkist;:m 920 0.4 1,994 0.5 
Phillipines 1,492 0.7 2,812 0.7 
Singapore 8,394 3.9 14,1Q_9 "3.8 
'r::tiwan 3 ,2-8"7 1.5 5 ,961 1.6 
'fhailand 1,730 0.8 3,462 6.9 
AJ<'RICA, OF WHICH: 2,285 1.1 4,715 1.3 
Somalia 44 65 
OC£.4.. 1'\fl A 2,681 1.2 5,046 1.4 
OTIJERS (2) 2,991 1.4 4,080 1.1 
-- -~---- ----
GR._t.\I\1]) 'J'Or AL 213,183 100.0 3G2,88G 100.0 
(1) Countries listed accDunted individually for over 1% of either year totals 
(2) Mainly bw1ker fuel e->qxn'ts 
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the following year 42 per cent. One obvious factor involved was the second 
sharp increase in oil prices in 1979. Between 1979 and 1980 the overall 
nominal value of exports rose fran SR 210,000 million to 360,000. Asian 
states, including those in East and South East Asia increased considerably 
their purchase of Saudi exports in the 1970 ' so Although still ranking 
second to Westem Europe, they purchased 31 per cent in 1977 and 34 per 
cent in 1978. Again, as table 5.8 shows this trend appears to have been 
halted in 1979 When Asia acconnted for 30 per cent of ex_portso Japan 
appears to be responsible for this decrease o In 1970 Japan received 21 per 
cent of total ex_ports and in 1978 20 per cent, making this conntry the 
primary irnp:>rter of Saudi Arabia crude. Table 5.8 shows that in 1979 and 
1980, Japan acconnted for 17 per cent, a 3 per cent reduction in Saudi 
exp:>rts. This decrease along with the USA increase in exports, meant that 
Japan and the USA irn_ported similar values of Saudi exports in 1979o 
Up to 1976 the USA maintained a 3 to 5 per cent share of the Saudi 
ex_port market. Then, in 1977 it drainatically increased its market share to 
almost 10 per cent, in 1978 to 15 per cent and then, in 1979 ex_ports peaked 
at 17 . 2 . In this year, ex _ports to Japan were 17 . 3 per cent of the total o 
USA :LTtp::)l-ts f-rom Saudi A:cabia dropped to 15.3 per cent of the total in 
1980. The rna jor reason for this increa~~ Y?a~ t_1}e Sa1.1_di price level coupled 
with oil 8\"}X)rt cutbacks from Iran o The change in t..he distribution of OPEC 
oil has had considerable effects on t.he direction of Saudi imports. In 
1976 the USA ranked only as the tenth largest :iJnp:>rter of Saudi petroleum, 
having purchased less t11an 5 per cent of -the total ex_pJrt value in that 
year. The loss of Iranian oil supplies and o:Jtput cutbacks by s·2rveral 
OPEC:: nations had a substantial impact o Saudi Arabia is n:::>w the foremost 
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exp:>rter of petroleum to the USA. sane 16.4 per cent of the US toal 
petroleum requirements were recei ve:J fran Saudi Arabia in 1976 - and 18 per 
cent in 1977.11 This must indicate a certian amonnt of dependency on Saudi 
Arabia by the USA and therefore, trust. Given the continually unstable 
situation in the Middle East (in particular, the oil producers Iran and 
Iraq are still at war in March 1984) I this situation is likely to continue. 
Fran Saudi Arabia's JX)int of view, it may be beneficial for the USA to have 
this kind of stake in its future • 
It has been noted in chapter 4, that due to the fluctuating world 
demand for oil (and in particular 1 OPEC oil) , allocations in the Saudi 
budget for 1983 are 17 per cent lower than those of the previous year. 
This would imply that export diversification policies have yet to be 
imple.'Tlented. Despite such major re-allocations, a senior econanic analyst 
at a Riyadh bank is quoted as saying: 
"ressimism is not justified. The government has done a fine 
jdb in creating a solid infrastructure and developing the 
industrial base of the cntmtry. Oil revenue is beccming less 
import-ant. The Kingdon is already less depenc"lent on oil for 
uuc:Jget revenue and this trend will continue." 
Contrary to the belief of analysts in the '''estern countries, tJ1e fall in 
oil revenue will not seriously affect the Kingdom's econanic situation, 
a:r_-g·,J'O!S this analyst. 
"We believe that the degree of self sufficiency achieved over 
the past few years - especially in agriculture - will act as a 
buffer agianst loss of oil revenue. 12 
Having looked at the extent of export revenue from oil in this section, it 
is difficult to accept this view as anything other than too opibni.stic. 
5.3 JOIN!' VENTURES FOR EXPORT' DIVERSIFICATION 
As early as 1960, the Saudi Government began negotiating with foreign 
oil canpanies regarding the development of a petrochEmical industry. They 
realised t11at llie rountry v.es well-endo.ved with oil and natural gas, v.hich 
was then largely flared, but that resources are finite. Still, the oil 
companies showed little interest so that in 1962 the General Petroleum and 
Mineral Organization (Petranin) was established to undertake hydrocarbon 
projects v.hich did not detract private investors. State SUP1_X)rt increased 
for industrialisation with the ascesion of Fasial Ibn Ahl Al Saud in 1964. 
This desire to press forw-ard with llie petrochemical industry was t.mderlined 
by the creation of SABIC, the Saudi Arabian Basic Industry Corporation in 
1976. Again, as 5 .1 sho<..\'S, the Third Development Plan emphasised the need 
for a petrochemic~d indusLry, by calliDg for t11e pro:Juction of a variety of 
petrochemicals, as well as fertilizers by 1985. 
In the early 1970's Petromin saw Jubail as a possible grawth fJOle for 
petrochemical and other industries because of the proximity of t11e Berri 
crude oil and gas field and the decp~;ater channel v.hich makes it suitable 
for international shipping. In 197 3 t.he Bechtel Coq:x:>ration \'Bs as}<:eCl to 
call up a DB.ster plan for Jubail. When t_he master plan vJCS presented to 
the Saudi Government in 1975 it was decided to establish a Royal Ccrnmission 
for Jubail and Yenbu, the last town being added as a second developnent 
poll o The Canmission is resp:msible for p::>licy o Jubail 1 s industrial 
harbour is expected to be the largest in the world. By the year 2000 this 
Industrial City could have 300,000 inhabitants with petrochemical 
complexes, oil refineries, a steel mill and over a dozen other industries 
as well as a port area and an airport. The total investment could reach 
sane $40 billion. The industrialisation progTamme calls for large 
quanti ties of gas as fuel and feedstock. This has led to Petromin 1 s 
gigantic gas gathering, treatment and transmission project. A'l::rlulaziz A. 
Alzamil, the chief executive officer of SABIC has stated: " . . . the gas 
gathering we have will be much cheaper than anywere else, and that is the 
\\hole principle behind our industrialisation, we are using a resource we 
have." 
The industrialisation programme calls for the use of the most advanced 
techr.;.;lCY:f.f and the tecrmolcgical leadership of the US.Z\ is accepteJ as 
para1nunt. However, corporations v.hich have proprietary rights to 
teChnology are normally prepared to license their technology but at ~1e 
same time, anxious n:::>t to sell it. They look for ar1 ele11ent of rrnnage;nent 
participation to maximise their returns. Anyway, to bripg a new 
petroche~cal plant on stream d~nds highly specilaized skills, perfect 
ccr-ordinatio.'1 an::l fautless timing. These factors make a ratione~l case for 
Saudi Arabia 1 s decision to opt for joint ventures with some of the v..Drld 1 s 
leading corporatj 0!1S. 
1 c c _J_• 
Section 5.2 showed that Saudi Arabia has vastly increased its exports 
to the United States. Although u.s. demand for oil may decline by nearly 6 
per cent between 1979 and 1990, US i.rrq:orts of natural gas are expected to 
increase significantly. Saudi Arabia may find a market for its 
petrochemicals in the USA, despite the apparent over capacity in the world 
market. The revolution in materials in the 1960's and 1970's meant that 
the petrochemical industry became $150 billion industry v.orldwide. Growth 
in the 1980 ' s and 1990 ' s is expecte::l to be more ITlOderate, growing at ab::mt 
4 per cent per annum. If there is the expected over-capacity, will the 
rate of return be acceptable to these foreign corporations? Same suggest 
that the broader picture must be considered. That is, a foreign 
corporation could be canpensated by supplies of oil or other hydrocarbons 
at a specially attractive price, or supplies assured. This strategy of oil 
entitlements as an incentive to investment was underlined by Sheikn Ahmed 
Zaki Yamani in February 1980 When he stated that in future Saudi Arabia 
would only grant oil contracts to customers willing to help build up ~1e 
Saudi industrial base. 
After negotiations, 5 major US corp:xations showed interest - ~1obil 
Oil, Shell Oil, EY~":cn, Ilov.• C:'1cmicals, and Celanese/Texas Eastern. T:he 
projects a.YJd corp::>rations are listed in table 5. 9. ~egotiations are 
lengthy. The petrochemical prcducts am the volume of output must be 
agreed o Tne various processes have to be selected o Cont.ractors to 
construct the ccrnplex have to be cl1ose_'1. Bidding documents have to be 
issued ar1d the bids revie"'7ed. Finally, the contract l1as t.o be dra\•,11 up 
inclujin9 the financial arrange.11ents. Consequently, negotiations \,'ith the 
5 major corp:::>rations have been tiJne-co!lsuming. Below vJe l<x:>k at an 
Table 5.9 
Joint Ventures with U.S.A. CblJ?Orations 
(Metric tons per year) 
! ; 
I 
SABIC SABIC SABIC SABIC SABIC 
PRODUCT I MOBILE SHEll_, EXXON DOW CELANESE /TEXAS i 
I 
I I Ethylene I 450~000 656~000 -· 500?000 -I Low Density 
Polyethylene 200?000 - 240?000 68?000 -
I 
Hir~h Dnnsity ! Polyethylene 91~000 - -· 105,000 -
I Ethylene Glycol I 200?000 - -· 330,000 -
Ethylene Dichloride - 454,000 - -· -
Caustic Soda - 377,000 - - -
I Styrene 295,000 I - - - -
I 
I Ethanol 281,000 
I 
- - - -
Chlorine - 330,000 - - -
I Ethyl Benzene - 327,000 - - -I I I Methanol - - - - 730,000 
SouTce: Hambleton, 'Professor H.G., The Saudi Petrochemical Industry in the 1980's, p. 12 
-' 
L~ 
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outline of the negotiations with Mobil. The Mobil Oil Coq:cration has a 
long established relationship with Saudi Arabia: in 1946 Mobil came to the 
Kingdan to prcduce and distribute oil under the aegis of Ararnoo. Already 
in 1974, Mobil were examining the p:>ssiblity of establishing a 
petrochemical irrlustry in the Kingdan in conjunction with the Saudi 
authorities. In 1976 an interim agreement \>.las signed between Mobil and 
SABIC calling for a feasibility study, an economic assessment of the 
project and, negotiations £or the establish~ent of a joint venture company. 
Sin~ th_en, $31 milli_c;:>n has ~en spsmt on differ-ent __ re_lated studies_. 
Finally, on April 19, 1980 the final agreement was signed by the chairman 
of Mobil Saudi Arabia, the subsidiary of l'-1obil Oil Corp::>ration and SABIC. 
It is expected that the 725 mile East-West Natural Gas Liquid (NGL) 
pipeline, will carry 270,000 barrels per day. The liquids separate:] in 
Yanbu into ethane, butane, isopentane, propane and petrol. The ethane will 
then be sold to the SliBIC/Mobil canplex for feedstock and fuel at al:::out 
1/Srn of the \YOrld market price. This ethane will then be used to produce 
450,000 tons per year of ethylene using Mobil process and Bechtel 
~~gli1eering; 200,000 tons of low density polythylene using Union Carbide 
proc8ss; and 91,000 tons of high density polyethylene, once again using ~he 
1-bbil process. The capital cost-of this project--will be SR 700G- m. MOOil 
and Saudi Arabia would be partners, each holding 50 per cent of tJ1e equity. 
Each parnter is e).-pected to provide 15 per cent of ~"1-Je capital cost in 
cash. Tne re'llaining 60 per will caTI2 fom the Public Investment Fund of 
Saudi Arabia and (10 p2r cent) fron private b:mKs. Crude oil etlti tle.nent 
is also made available by Saudi Arabia to l\1obil as an adc3ed in:Juce.-nent. 
This plant is expected to <Xlllle on stream in 1985 • About 300 people 
will be needed to staff it. Initially~ 40 per cent of tile employees will 
be Saudis and 60 per cent expatriates. By 1990 it is hoped tilat these 
percentages will be revised. Products will be marketed in Europe, along 
tile east cnast of USA, in the Arab world, in Africa and in Saudi Arabia 
· itself. When the plant is at full capacity, it will mean that Mobil has 
increased its petroleum production by one third. 13 
5.4 MARKETit.x; PROBLEMS 
Saudi Arabia has a small danestic market. This means that any 
industries "Which are large scale (and therefore, make use of econanies of 
scale) must look for an ex_pJrt rrarket. In the case of Saudi Arabia, in 
order to exploit the comparative advantage, this means placing emfhasis on 
energy intensive, capital intensive li1dustries using resources Which are 
abundant in supply, oil and natural gas. Saudi plariners have had to 
curls.i.uer the fact that oil and gas are depletable resources and, that Saudi 
. . h . . . 1 'bl' 1 '1 14 Arabla as a certa1n 1nternat1ona respons1 1ty to supp y 01 . 
Consequently, the decision to develop a petrochemicals industry W3S taken 
with great caution and with t.he aii'11 of converting t_f)e country 1 s oil into 
higher value products . 15 It is unfortunate for Saudi Arabia that the 
global overSUPJ.::>ly of petrochemicals, is an issue -whic"l is achieving 
increasing attention in the 1980 1 s. ;r:,_ project nay m::J.ke economic sense in a 
tight market, yet be unjustifiable if its products are in global 
oversupply. Saudi Jlrabia 1 s case for pro::1ucing p2troc11emicals mtJst l:>e 
weakened by t.wo factors. Constructio:-1 costs rnay be at lenst 25 p2r cent 
nore than in the United States or Western Europe because the country 1 s 
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infrastructure does not permit the most efficient construction practices. 
Secondly, the cmmtry is a long wa.y from the richest world markets of North 
America, Japan arii Western Europe. Its export-orientated industries will 
thus have to be particularly competitive if they are to break into these 
establi~1ed markets. 
The alternative strategy is to aim fOr markets in Africa and Asia 
Where the Kingdan may be closer as a supplier than the advanced indust:r~ ·>l 
cormtries. At least .initially, these markets will be less lucrative. 
(Anyway, according to the Mobil Saudi Arabia case study, Saudi Arabia 
appears to be fOllowing both strategies) . In any case, it has been 
suggested that the Saudi Arabian output of petrochffilicals will play a minor 
role in global consmnpt.ion. The production of major petrochemicals in the 
free world is 86 million tons a year. It is said that the total value of 
the industry in the 1980's will be less than $3 billion each year, compared 
w;~h ~Gross Domestic product of $160 billion. 16 
·i""ne American Government is nonetheless particularly worried by the 
reduced decand for many petrochemcial products and excess production 
capacity. The Financial Times reported that Hr. Donald Regan, the u.s. 
Treaury S~cretary, iNarned that the Saudi Arabian petrOQb~ical projucts 
will not be al10\ved into the U.s. t.mless they· are sold at similar prices to 
US prcrlucts. P..fter the eighth annual meeting of the Saudi - U • S. Joint 
Canmission on Economic Co-cperation in Ri:y-adh in Oc-'cober 1983, Mr. Regan is 
rep.)_rted to have said: 
1 GO 
II we are for free trade • • . By fair trade, we mean no 
subsidies and no underselling of our producers by unfair 
means."
17 
The problem lies in that Saudi Arabia is expected to account for 5 per 
cent of world ethylene production capacity by the late 1980's. With the 
current access production and reduced demand, a nurriber of U o So chemical 
industry leaders, have been calling for futher capacity cuts in order to be 
better prepared for the arrival of new competitors - particularly Saudi 
Arabia. However, Mr o Regan confinned that the Kingdon would retain its 
'rrost-favoured' nation status in the US. Nonetheless, the current 4 per 
cent US tariff on petrochemical prcrlucts was supposed to drop down to 2 per 
cent in the next two years. 
The American Government has shown even less enthusiasm for sane of the 
Saudi efforts of import substitution. For example, fonn a oorgaining point 
of vie.;, pursuit of an imp::>rt substitution strategy 11Bkes a'1 exp::>rt 
p:Luflo::::..\:.ion policy less defensible. In fact, Saudi attenpts to lessen its 
dependence on food imports are simple attempts ~Bros self-sufficiency. 
They have raised son? interesting ~Jestions all the sx~e. TI~2 US Secretary 
of Agricul-ture, Mr. John Block stated during a recent visit to the Kingdcm 
th0~ it was 'crazy' for the Saudis to be spending billions of dollars to 
c1evelop agriculture in a difficult environment. He suggeste<j_ that the 
Saudis retreat fonn their "thrust to self-sufficiency at any cost"; "not to 
rc:.ise it if vie can gro-w it chci::tper" . TI1e Americc_ns have recently had to 
re::1uce t11e arrount of lam used for agricultural pro::Jucton. The Saudi 
r-1inister of AgricuJ ture and Water, Dr. al Shaikh retorted t,-,at if the USA 
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was spending billions of dollars on research to find an alternative to oil, 
Why Should the Kingdom hesitate over building a sector that would save it 
from asking for food from others. Both ministers are proving that politics 
must be considered by planners. Neither cotmtry is content in exploiting 
industries in which it has a simple, economic ccrriparative advantage. 
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CHAPTER 6 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
In this chapter the Saudi Arabian Balance of Payments p:>si tion is 
examined. Any policy for economic deversification must be expected to have 
an impa.ct on the balance of payme-nts. An import substitution p:>licy may 
for example actually increase the volume of imports in the short term, 
...mile export diversification may stabilise export proceeds. The balance of 
payments is examined in this chapter, not because of concern for the Saudi 
trade situtation Which remains basically healthy. Rather the concern is to 
ascertain trends with respect to particular i terns recorded on the balance 
of paym:"--nts, as this enables some assessment to be made of the impact of 
diversification. In an econany as open as that of Saudi Arabia, 
diversification must be expected to have a strong balance of payments 
iJnpact. Furthennore, as balance of pa:yments statistics are more accurate 
than rrost domestic econanic indicators, examination of t.hese accounts may 
be the most appropriate way of assessing the overall effects of econanic 
diversification. 
In this w-ay, the balance of trade is crucial, as one might expect form 
a developing econol!Y v.;ith a predoninant foreign trade sector. Tne current 
account ~Ahich includes all payrn2i1ts made for visible goods and services, 
hc:.s shoJm a suplus every ye:u b.e'c\,.:=211 1973 c:nd 1981, with the exce_!_::rtion of 
1978, as table 6.1 shows. Usually, even the nost enlightened government 
will regard a surplus as preferable to a deficit on its h1.lance of trade. 
A trade surplus means that £oreign exchange is accumulating Which could 
continue indefinitely without producing a crisis for that country. The 
1 
country is producing without consuming to the extent of its trade surplus. 
The difficulty in the case of Saudi Arabia is that the trade surplus is 
almost totally generated by its oil exports. These oil supplies are so 
vital to the world economy that small Changes in price or volume can have 
far-reaching effects. 
Chapter 6 attempts to provide same insight into table 6.1 Which shows 
the Balance of Payments Sumnary for Saudi-Arabia between 1973 and 1981. 
There are 2 major divisions: the CUrrent Account and, Capital Movements. 
As stated, the former includes all current purchases of goods and services, 
that is visibles a~d invisibles. The visibles refer to goods, Physical 
i tsns and the invisibles refer to services like shipping payments and 
insurance. Captial Movements, on the other hand, simply refer to all other 
transactions not recorded in the Current Account, suCh as capital transfers 
and foreign exchange. In this chapter, these divisions are accepted and 
followed. 
6.1 1'1ERCH!-\J\1])ISE TRADE 
Line la of table 6.1 shov:s that revenues form oil between 1973 and 
1974rrore than gua.druplej. 0;-lly the 1975 C:-Lr1d 1978 figures sho-w a decrease. 
The 1975 figure reflects the decreased deTand for oil in response to the 
abrupt ch:mge in tl1e oil price alld als0 as in.:Justrialised countries felt 
the effects of tl1e recession. This decrease in the voluiT>2 of ex1--orts of 
crude oil and refined oil pro:Juction is shv~m clearly in tab] e 6. 2. The 
Table 6.1 
Merchandise Trade 1973-1981 (Million Riyals) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979r 1980r 1981p 
1. Merchandise trade 
f.o.b. 14,813 103,293 74,889 89,122 90,430 57' 692 115 ,880 241,126 258,529 
a) Oil exports 21,583 115 '684 95,597 125,350 141,807 125,265 194,459 334;543 372,685 
b) Other exports 98 283 418 428 431 490 504 519 541 
c) Imports -6,868 -12,647 -21,116 -36,656 -51,808 -68,063 -79,083 -93,936 -114,697 
_, 
C:l 
n' 
r: Revised 
p: Provisional 
Source: SA.lV[A, Kingdom of Saudi Arabj_a Annual Rep)rt 1981 p. 158. 
Table 6.2 
Exports of Crude Oil and Refined Oil Production 1969-1982 
Years Index No. Eh~rts (1000 U.S. 
1969 = 100 Barrels) 
1969 100.0 1178260 
1970 117.3 1382056 
1971 146.2 1722145 
1972 186.8 2200635 
1973 235.4 2773346 
1974 263.3 3102244 
1975 219.4 2584651 
I I 
1976 266.9 3145401 I 
1977 282.7 3330437 
1978 253.9 2991051 
1979 289.3 3408068 
1980 301.8 3556128 
1981 295.9 3486825 
1982 191.3 2254477 
Source: Central DepaTtment of Statistjcs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The 
Statistical Indicator, 1982, Tab] e 5-8. 
figures for 1976 and 1977 show steady increases in oil revenues but the 
situation changes again in 1978. In 1978 there was a decrease in 
production, probably an attempt by the government to rraintain the real 
price of oil. The following year both oil revenues and production 
increased to meet the shortfall of Iranian proouction because of the 
revolution there. Table 6. 2 again shows this change in the proouction and 
volume of exports more clearly. 
At the end of 1979, revenues from oil exports also benefite..i from an 
approximate 33 per cent rise in oil prices. 2 Table 6.2 shows only small 
volume a."'l.anges in the exp:>rt of oil, yet table 6.1 shows an almost noubling 
of oil revenues WhiCh must be a result of the increase in the price of oil. 
In 1979 oil exp:>rts were SR 194,459 million and in 1980 SR 334,543. 
However, increases in revenue from oil exports are unlikely to continue. 
Table 6. 2 shov.rs a 30 per cent decrease in the vol urne of oil exp:>rts form 
1980 to 1982 (and table 5.4 in chapter 5 shov.'S more than just a decrease in 
oil exp::>rts in these years) . 
Line lb in table 6.1 looks at "ather exr:orts" showing a less dramatic 
picture. The econmry relies allrost totally on oil for its visible exp:)rt 
earnings. Ccmp3risons between revenues fran oil and non oil e>..'}X)rts show 
this. In 1973 "other exports" were 0.45 per cent of oil exp::>rts and by 
1981 the situation had deteriorated even f-u....rther Y.ihe'n they represented only 
0 .15 per cent of oil exports. OtJ1er ex}_X)rts incl ud.e dates, skins, wcod and 
fur. It. app2ars t.hat up to 1981 the o::mntry's exp:xt diversifjcation ai_ms 
achievej little success in conparison v.;ith oil exp:)l"'ts, Nonet.Jlel ess, 
between 1973 and 1981 o'-c.her exp:n"'ts have increased nore than five times. 
15S 
This will not surprise the Saudi Government. As outlined in chapter 
5, the goverrnnent only gave priority to its aim of exp:::>rt diversification 
in the Third Plan pericrl, 1980 to 1985. Only in this latest plan have 
specific policies been discussed £or achieving a successful export 
diversification policy. The 1981 SAMA Annual Report admits that in the 
meantime other exports constitute a negligible amount, particularly with 
3 the inclusion of natural gas liquid (NGL) in oil export. This situation 
is expected to change in the short tenn. By 1985 many of the Saudi 
petrochemical projects based at Yanbu and Jubail are expected to ccrne on 
stream. One of the reasons £or developing the petrochemicals industry is 
to achieve greater 'value added' fran oil relate::1 exports. With fuis in 
mind, increases in the figure £or other exports should be substantial . 
Gains fran refined prcrlucts are increasing, as table 6. 3 shov.>s. Of 
the total oil exports of SR 375.8 billion, refined products accounted for 
Table 6. 3: Oil ExP?rts in 1980 and 1981 
In millions 
1980 1981 % change 
§_ Rls §_ Rls 
Crude 96,325 340,444 104,099 352,375 10.0 
Refined, of 
W:1ich 5,096 16,953 6,933 23,468 38.4 
bunker fuel 858 2,854 933 3,158 10.7 
GPJ':JID TOTAL 101,421 337,397 111,032 375,843 11.4 
i?C 
about 5 per cent, bunker oil (described in 6.2 Services and transfers of this 
chapter) for about 1 per cent and crude oil for the mlance of about 94 per 
cent. However, in general the Third Plan accepts that crude oil exp:::>rts will 
maintain their central importance dcrnestically as well as internationally. 4 
Domestically, they will continue to provide financial cover for the Kingdom's 
expenditure budgeted from 1980-1985, the exchange needed to pay for imports 
and other current cpaital account p3yments abroad, including foreign aid and 
the continued strengthening of the Kingdom's international financial reserves. 
Internationally, crude oil and other hydrocarbon exports will maintain their 
stabilising role in the world economy and supply of energy. 
Imp:::>rts, lc of table 6.1, have a significant note to play in the 
Merchandise trade account. Figures for imports show a substantial increase 
between 1973 and 1981. However, the rate of increase has varied quite 
considerably. There were very substantial increases in imports 1973/74, 
1974/75 and 1975/76. Nevertheless 1976/77 and 1977/78 shows a slowing down L~ 
the increase in the denard for imp:>rts. After 1978 there was a m:rrked drop in 
i.rrtp'Jrts Which was only ternp:::>rary and in 1979/80 and 1980/81 there were 
increases in the rate of increase. Clearly, there is a high propensity to 
:Lmp:>rt ir1 Saudi Arabia but a number of factors have catibined to prcx:'luce such 
an unsteady increase in the rate of increase of ~~ports. (Determinants of 
imports were examined in chapter 2 using regression ar1alysis. The two factors 
Which were FOSi tively related to the level of iJ11p:>rts were private consw,ption 
and governrnent consumption.) 
Table 6.4 looks at the total value of exp.::>rts, i.iTtf:Ol-ts a.nd "L'le B-"->lai1Ce of 
Trade. It shaws a continuous run of figures f•.)r t11c~ years 1968 to 1982 but it 
must be noted that the figures are nominal , rather than real figures. 
Nonetheless, table 6.4 shows that Changes in imports were not sUbstantial 
up to 1972, after which the Changes in the price of oil took place. From 1972 
to 1976 there were large changes in imports showing a short lag effect before 
the demand for irniX>rts responded to the sUbstantial improvement :in the 
financial restrictions. During the mid 1970 ' s the Kingdan' s lirni ted port 
capacity constrained imiX>rts as well as the short run absorptive capacity of 
the econany, given the shortages of manrower and local skills. The decrease 
in the rate of increase between 1978/79 probably shows the government's 
attempt to control inflation. Finally, the increase in the rate of increase 
of :imiX>rts reflects the loosening fo financial restrictions resulting from the 
increase in oil revenues at the time. The conclusion must be that without the 
oil revenues, the demand for irniX>rts would not have increased in the 1970's so 
dramatically, but other factors played sc:rne part :in affecting the rate of 
increase. 
Table 6.5 gives some h"'1dication of v.hich sector has :increase3 its demand 
for ii11p0rts. It divides imports into 3 sectors, the oil sector, the pUblic 
sector and the private sector, and looks at the annual increase :in the gr~W, 
of irnp.:xts. Table 6. 5 gives figures c. i . f, that is, the-y include the cost of 
insurance and freight whereas table 6.1 gives figures f.o.b, that is, on a 
free on 1x:B.rd basis. Thus, the figures in table 6.5 are up.v-ard biased 
conr:ared to those in table 6 .1. 
Table 6. 5 shCM'S that denli:tnd fur imp:xts by the oil sector aJJt,::>st treble3 
bet\veen 1975 and 1981, althDDgh tJ1ese imp:)rts acCC>unt for only 2 or 3 per cent 
of the total . Since the oil sector is reliant on im_r:orts for its capital 
I 
Table 6.4 
Total Value of Exports, Imports and Balance of Trade 1968-1982 
(Million S R) 
Years Balance of Imports Exports 
Trade 
1968 + 6469.9 2803.9 9273.8 
1969 + 5641.6 3361.5 9003.1 
1970 + 7426.6 3197.0 10623.6 
1971 + 14886.6 3667.9 18554.5 
1972 + 18052.8 4708.3 22761.1 
1973 + 25998.8 7310.3 33309.1 
1974 +116073. 7 10149.2 126222.9 
1975 + 89588.6 14823.1 104411.7 
1976 +104462 .8 30690.7 135153.5 
1977 +101546.6 51662.0 153208.6 
1978 + 69062 .o 69180.0 138242.0 
1979 +130960.0 82223.0 213183.0 
1980 +262536.0 100350.0 362886.0 
1981 +286183.0 119298.0 405481.0 
1982 +131755.0 139335.0 271090.0 
&mrce: Central Department of Statistics~ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
TI1e Statistical Indicator 1982 Tab1e 6-1. 
I 
I 
I 
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Table 6.5 
lriliX>rtS ( CIF) by Sectors (Million Riyals) 
Oil Public Private Total % Growth 
Sector Sector Sector 
1976 1~093 11~823 31~072 43~988 81.1 
1977 1,380 13,161 47,627 62,168 41.3 
1978 4,481 14,039 61,115 79,635 28.1 
1979 2,927 11,000 78,599 92,526 16.2 
1980 2,808 10,596 97,442 110,846 19.8 
1981p 2,976 15,R6fi 116;500 135,342 22.1 
p Provisional 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. SAMA Annual Report 1981 p. 43. 
174 
equipment this is not surprising. However, the 1978 figure of SR 4, 481 
million is not easily explained. Tabel 6.2 shows an increase in oil 
production in 1976/77 of 266.9 to 282.7 but 1977/78 shows a decrease to 253.9 
( 1969 = 100). This clearly cannot account for the upserge in imr::orts demanded 
by the oil sector. According to the SAMA Annual Report for 1981, the SR 4. 5 
billion registered in 1978 was due to the gas gathering and processing project 
and the crude oil and NGL pipeline networks. 
The public sector increased its demand for imp:>rts from SR 11,823 million 
in 1976 to SR 15,866 million in 1981, as table 6.5 shows. Hovvever, there was 
not a steady increase in demand. In 1979 and in 1980 there were significant 
decreases in imports. This marks the Govermnent 1 s detennination to control 
"imj:orted inflation" by removing sane of the upward pressure on prices. More 
significant than pulbic sector imports, are private sector imp:>rts that is, 
those financed through the cx::mnercial banks. Private sector imp:>rts account 
for well over two thirds of total imports in each year between 1975 and 1981. 
Unlike oil sector and pUblic sector imports, private sector imports have 
increased every year. In fact, after 1976 private sector imp:>rts accol.Lnted 
for nnre than -Llrree quarters of total i;·nr:orts. This shovJS that the 
Government 1 s pJlicy of encouraging the private sector to take the lead, rat:her 
than be daninated by the public sector, has met with some success. 
Overall, the Merch2J1di se trade acaJUnt has increased IT\Ore than f i te3n 
times between 1973 and 1981, from SR 14,813 million to SR 258,529 millions. 
This visible trade surplus is a]JTost totally dependent on oil e:;:p::n-ts, t.hus, 
1975, 1978 and 1982 figures s1101.-.' su'ostantial decreases in tl1e surplus. 
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6 • 2 SERVICES AND TRANSFERS 
The Services and Transfers account, the invisible account is best divided 
into Receipts and Payments, as in table 6.6. Firstly, we look at Receipts 
Which are eli vided into three by Investment Income, Oil Sector (bunker oil) and 
"Other" positive receipts. Of these 3 factors, investment incane is clearly 
the most influential so that receipts are largely a function of investment 
inccme. Investment incane represents returns fran Saudi investments made 
abroad. It is the receipt of interest and dividends on loans and investments 
in foreign countries which provide foreign exchange. The figures for 
invesLment income in table 6.6 between 1973 and 1981 record a staggering 
increase, from SR 761 million to SR 35,614 million. Even between 1973 and 
1974 there was more than a five fold increase fonn SR 761 million to SR 4325 
million. The underlyin3 reason for this is oil revenues, once more. Thus, in 
1977/78 When oil revenues dropped, there was no increase in investments, so 
investment income was more or less constant. With the abrupt change in its 
financial rosition in the 1970's, one of the rrore obvious a..TJd straightforvrard 
options for U1e Saudi authorities was simply to invest their incomes in 
western financial markets. 
Oil sector receipts, 1 b of Services and traTJsfers in table 6.1, shows 
quite a steady increase between 1973 and 1981. However, like oil exports in 
the !''Jerchan::1ise trade account, it shov.'S "f:i..'O significant drops in receipts in 
1975 and 1978. As wiLh oil exp:xts, Lhis shows demnd responding to the price 
change. Table 6. 3, al-...ove shov:s bUt1dker :fuel ( o:i 1 sector) as p=rrt of t"'le 
overall ccrnposition of oil exports and it rn:1y be se011 t-...hat it represents less 
than 1 per cent. lc) of the Set-vices a11d transfers account in table 6 .1 shows 
Table 6.6 
Services and Transfers and the Current Account Balance (Million riyals) 
1973 1974 HJ75 1D76 1977 1978 1989r 198or 1981P 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
2. Services and Trlli!Sfers -5,479 -21,303 -24,553 -38:.708 -48,459 -65,200 -78,649 -103,380 -114,483 
1 - Receipts 2,873 9,238 11 ,259 16:,121 21,190 21,987 25,935 37 ,482 50,186 
a) Investment Income 761 4,325 6,539 10:,277 14,057 14,622 16,518 24,761 35,614 
b) Oil Sector 
(bwll~er oil) 793 2,616 1,755 2,047 2,168 1,843 2,561 2,854 3,158 
c) Other 1,319 2,297 2,965 3,797 4,965 5,522 6,856 9,867 11,414 
2 - Payments -8 ,352 -30,541 -3.5 ,812 -54,829 -69,649 -87,207 -104,584 -140,862 -164,669 
a) Freight & Insurance -687 -1,267 -3,167 -7,332 -10,360 -11 ,572 -13,443 -16,910 -20 ,64.'5 
b) Oil Sector Investment 
Income -1,267 -17,380 -5,676 -7,788 -8,621 -3,954 -6,943 -23,011 -23,065 
c) Otbor Private 
Servtccs -1,960 -2,591 -6,036 -9,659 -13,528 -24,338 -26,839 -22,095 -27,239 --' 
" 
d) Ol:hcr Government r:-> 
Services (1) -2,991 -7,468 -18,988 -26,556 -31,831 -37,671 -46,053 -65,326 -77,855 
e) Private Transfers -1,447 -1,835 -1,945 -3,494 -5,309 -9,672 -11,306 -13,520 -15,865 
3. Current Account 
Balance (1-2) 9,334 81,990 50 ,3~36 50,114 41 ,971 -7 ,528 +37,231 +137 ,746 +144,046 
(1): Including official transfers and contributions or capital subscription to international or regional development agencies. 
r : Revised 
[J : Provisional 
Source: SAI1A, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Annual Report 1981, p. 158. 
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other receipts. It tcx:> shows an annual increase between 1973 and 1981 but 
particularly large increases 1973/74 and 1979/80, showing its close connection 
with oil revenues. 
In short, Receipts of the Services and transfers account are largely a 
functico of investment incare. Investment incare in turn is largely governed 
by oil expJrts so that oil revenues are a major factor in this part of the 
invisibles account. Or rather, this has been the case so far. There are sane 
I 
signs that investment income may eventually move counter-cyclically to oil 
incane. When oil prices fall econanies of the west are more buoyant. For a 
given ~~unt of investment, there is a larger income. Specifically, if oil 
prices decline, there is more barik borrowing in the west as economies revive 
Which casues an upward movanent of interest rates, as more credit is demanded. 
'f!..s net. depositors, this beneifts the Saudis. Foreign investments can be seen 
as a £orm of diversification, with benefits accruing as oil revenues fall. 
The yuestion must be asked: Is this preferable to local diversification? 
Local diversification affects the Saudi populance directly, ~hereas foreign 
invesb~ents only earn revenue and &J has a less direct affect. 
The Paymo_nts T,Brt of the Services ar1d transfers accow1t is less simple. 
These are payments made by the Saudi Government and therefore, all shaw a 
negative sign. PayTI12nts are divided into five p:rrts: a) freight and ir1surance 
b) Oil sector invesbnent incam2, c) Other private services, d) other 
Government services, and e) Private transfers. Payments for freight and 
insurance incre.=:J.se:J fron SR 687 millio::1 in 1973 to SR 20 645 million. in 1981, 
a thirty fold increase (in current pric :os h.rt n:>t constant prices) . From 
table 6. 2, it may be seen that e..xj_X)rts of oil have risen fran 2.8 billion 
barrels (thousand million) to 3.5 billion barrels for the same years 
repsectively. Increased insurance payments must play a significant role in 
the increase of freight and insurance payments, as an increase in the volume 
of oil exports is an insufficient factor alone to account for the increase in 
freight and insurance p3.yments. This is shown in the figures for 1974/75. 
Although less oil is exported, payment for freight and insurance more than 
doubled. This must imply that Saudi imfOrters are paying freight and 
insurance costs, and nat just exporters. 
Payments for oil sector investments have increased (and decreased in 1975 
and 1978) largely in line with oil exports. Between 1973 and 1981 oil sector 
investemnt payments increased form SR 1, 267 to SR 23,065 million. However, 
between 1973 and 1974 oil sector investment payments increased more than 13 
times, largely reflecting compensation to the western oil companies When they 
were nationalised. TI1e following year therefore saw an immediate drop to SR 
5, 767 million. lliere was also a decline in investment incane :p3yrnents to SR 
3,954 million in 1978 probably because less money was available to invest. In 
1980 there was a dramatic increase i.11 these pay;nents to SR 23,011 million. .r..t 
this tit-ne the governemnt was making its petr(:)2hsnical irrlustry a priority and 
this increase ITay reflect these i.11vestments. 
Line 2c of the Services and transfers account in table 6. 6 shO\vs other 
private services. Like imp:Jrts of the l'1erchand ise trade Ciccount 1 other 
private services are not entirely dep2ndent on oil exports. TI1ese p3.yments 
are fur services like cx:msul tancy fees charged b-y e.."'!gineers 1 designers 1 
<:~rchi-tects and th2 like. Tnese private services did not decrease (in line 
with oil exp::n:ts) in 1975. In fact, the rate of increase 1-->et.ween 1974/75 is 
larger than 1973/74. Due to ambitious planning in the post 1974 perioo, 
payments to foriegn consultants increased remarkably. \Vhen oil revenues then 
fell, consultants still had to be paid. However, there is a decrease in 1980 
When oil exp::>rts are increasing. It may be that payment for private services, 
that is, payments by the non oil private sector are being diverted to oil 
sector investment payments, Vvhere there was rrore than a three fold increase at 
this tiem. In other words, private sector investors became more involved in 
the oil sector. 
other Government services includes official transfers and contributions 
or captial sUbscription to international or regional develop~ent agencies. 
With the exception of 1974, other Government services makes the largest 
contribution to the payments part of the Services and transfers account. In 
197 3 other Government services represented 35 per cent of total payments and 
by 1981 they represented 4 7 per cent of the total . This was mainly due to a 
substantial rise in foreign aid given by Saudi Arabia. 7 It is estimated that 
between September 1974 and June 1975 the Saudi Fund fur Development disbursed 
locns valued at SR 579 millions8 and this generous effort to help less 
developed countries has been continued. 
Private transfers also show an upward trend between 1973 and 1981, 
however, it accounted for 17 p=.._r cent of p3yments at the beginning of this 
p2riod and under 10 F-2r cet at the end. Tnis is mainly due to the h1creasing 
prop:::>rtion of p?.}'lnents accounted for by other Government services. The rna jor 
part of private transfers rep[esents n:::m S:o;udis V>Drking jn Saudi 1\rahia a"ld 
s2n:'ling a large part of ·that incore to their families in their hon2 cow1try. 
A£ter 1975, and the imple:11•~t.ation of t_he Second Developm::=nt Plan 1975 - 1980, 
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private transfers increased quite sharply. They were SR 3494 million in 1976 
COI11p3Ied with SR 1945 million in 1974. (Private transfers may well have 
increased even more, but because same of the transactions were handled by the 
money-changers, they were not all recorded) • This rise in transfer payments 
reflects the increase in numbers of expatriate workers to construct the 
infrasturctural projects, like roads and airports. Although there appears to 
be quite a steady increase upto 1981, this is expected to level off during the 
1980's as the Third Plan attempts to consolidate the numbers of non Saudis 
working in Saudi Arabia and use them only in selective industries. The 
reasons for the planners concern for the nunibers of expatriates w:::>rking in 
Saudi Arabia can be appreciated by comparing the figures for private 
transfers: between 1975 and 1980 private transferR increased al.'ITIOst 7 t.iJncs 
fonn SR 1, 945 to SR 13, 520 million. 
6 • 3 THE C"L.JRRENT BALANCE 
The current balance in table 6.6 is the l'1erchandise trade acount (table 
6.1) plus the Services and transfers account and therefore represents a 
summary of the two. By the early 1980's it was difficult to remeTPber how 
srnall the Saudi econany v.;oas little more than a decade earlier and 
additionally, how quickly it had ~n.9 The Current BalQnce reflects this 
and so varies largely in line with oil e>.l_X)rt.s o The C\.l.t"fent account surplus 
increased. fra-n SR 9, 334 to s~ 144,046 millim. Notably, t11e curr~'1t account 
surplus i.•1creased almost 9 times in 1973/74 v.~1ich v..as entirely attrib.Jta.~le to 
the increased. revenues resultin3 frcm higher oil prices o Imp::>rts o:1ly doubled 
during t-his time a11d \ .. it..hout t1:1e drarl3ticnlly incre.::>s2d p3.p~;·1ts for 
investments iJl the oil related sector, ·t_he suq"Jlus wo·uld have beeJ1 hig!1er o In 
Table 6. 7 
Capital Movements and Reserves 1973-1981 (Million Riyals) 
1973 1974 1975 1.976 19'77 1978 1979r 1980r 1981p 
1. Including inward direct investment, short-term private capital and net errors and omissions. 
2. Includes changes in total foreign assets of S/\J\1A, i.e. gold, foreign exchange (including currency cover) 
:mel investments (,inclucl:inr: loans to developing countli'ies and international financial institutions). 
r: Revised 
p: Provisional 
Source: SIIMA, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Annual Report 1981 p. 1S8 . 
1975 the surplus was lower reflecting the lower oil revenues and the expansion 
in :imports. Because the Saudi dcmestic econcrny was so small at this time, the 
loosening of financial restrictions inevitably led to an increase in imports. 
It was also in this year that Saudi Arabia cut the link between the riyal arrl 
the dollar because of the continued depreciation of the latter. The move was 
an attempt to maintain the real value of its oil receipts by stabilising the 
price of imported goo:1s fran the industrialised world. 10 
In 1976/77 the surplus on the current account was reduced to SR 41,971 
million. This is due largely to an increase in imports and also an increase 
in payments made for freight and insurance, and payment for private services. 
P.. deficit ·was reco.r::ued in 1978 in line with the reiluctian in oil exports and 
also as a result of an increase in peyments, and private services in 
particular. It see"'TlS that the private sector was becaning more active after 
1976 Which provided some encouragement for the Government's economic 
diversification policies. 
The current account Lmmediately returned to surplus in the following year 
but this surplus was only a quarter of that recorded in 1980 and 1981. In the 
latter year, merchandise exp:>rts reached SR 372,685 million as a result of 
both oil prices and prc:rluction being high. It is likely t..hat the 1982 cut ll1 
volume will loWer .lnco11e, as well as the current account surplus 
considerably. 11 The con-tinued gro-wth in payments for goo:Js 2nd s21-vices will 
make this even more 1ikely. 
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6 .4 CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND RESERVES 
The Capital Account has four major elements: capital transactions, other 
private capital, capital movements by cc::mnercial banks and, most importantly, 
official capital and reserves. (Table 6 o 7 shows these inflows and outflows on 
the capital accmmt). When the uses to Which foreign exchange is put and the 
sources to Which foreign exchange came are added up, the overall accounts of 
12 
all international payments must balance. In oilier words, the capital 
movements and reserves account acts to compensate a surplus or deficit on the 
current account. The official capital and reserves element of this account 
acts as the major compensating factor and so its movement in general oo-incide 
v.d. th oil eAPJrts o 
4a of table 6.7 sh~~ oil sector capital transactions and other capital 
am is the net situation, reflecting flo-ws in and out of the country. This 
section is mostly long term capital movements and represents the Saudi search 
for highest rates of return fran abroad. In the Saudi case it often means 
investment in western financial rrarkets Which has been an easier option than 
investing in local industries. T'nis account was only positive in 1975, 1977 
and 1978 ~1ich me~s that usually the Saudis invested more abroad Lhan they 
rerlcitriated back to Saudi Arabia. This is despite the increase in profits 
mad~ by the oil companies after 1973. In 1973/74 there was almost a 6 fold 
increase to SR l3 1 245 :rrii llion reflectin:3 U1e availability of m:::mey to invest o 
However 1 as oil revenues decreased in 1975 and in 1978 I and less 1n:x1ey vas 
available, the capital transactions account is p"Jsitiveo i·1ore c;:,pi.t.al j_s 
flovrlng into Saudi lrrabia t.,"f-)an is going out o .i\Hhcugh i21 J 981 t .. he outflow· 
rose to SR 11,428 million, it is expected to fall in 1982 reflectin:J decreased 
oil revenues, as well as increased investment in the domestic petrochemical 
industry. 
Other private capital includes inward direct investment, short term 
private capital and net errors and omissions (Whidh are more or less 
unavoidable) . Short term capital holdings arise in many ways. Traders' 
receipts and expenditures cannot be perfectly synchronised and hence they hold 
transactions and precautionary balances to FEY bills that are due. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, the imports bill is a high one so this factor is 
significant. Nonethelss, it is notably that other private capital is only 
positive in 1975 (SR 1013 million), reflecting oil revenues once again. Net 
private capital was SR 3,627 million in 1973 and SR 22,531 million in 1981, 
reaching SR 28,455 million in 1980. 4a) and 4b) represent inward and outward 
invest...'l1ent in Saudi Arabia, the latter being non oil investment e11tirely. If 
the Go·;c:::-nment is to achieve success with its export diversification polices, 
the private capital p3rt might be eA"})ected to becane p::>sitive, especially as 
increasing nunibers of foreign finns particip3te in ventures with the Saudi 
Government. It might be t...hat the 21 per cent decrease between 1980/81 
reflects a ne-.v trend of increased investment iil Saudi Arabia. However, t...he 
situation to date does not i11dicate that there has been a great dec.l of 
success in attracting external cpaital for domestic industry. 
4c of ·table 6. 7, CoTunerical bank trcnsfers inchx3e c11anges jn total 
foregn assets of SAH .. A., that is, gold, foreign exchange and investnents. 4c 
and 4d, official capital and reserves, are JTanip:..Ilated by ·L'-Je gO\?enllTlent to 
offset the current occount p:::>si tion. Ir:ti tially, rL:)St of t..he foreign .::.sse·L..s 
were held as short tenn financial assets, consisting of bills with a thirty 
day or ninety day maturity or, demand deposits with central banks and 
cammercial b:mks in the USA and Europe. This \.VaS the case tmtil the mid 
1970's because the Saudi technocrates handling the oil revenues had little 
knowledge of stock markets in the West. However, they did regard property 
. t 13 1nvestmen as secure. These deposits caused problems for the h:mks 
selected, as Arab depositors withdrew large anounts fran one bank, and placed 
it in another. The Saudis themselves lost v.hen the sterling was devalued in 
1967 arrl fran the depreciation of t.."he dollar in the 1970's. From 1975 to 1976 
outflows from the <XJI11ffiercial 'banks increased almost four items to SR 1, 789 
million, representing greater overseas asset holdings. 
It is inevitable that the increasingly larger balance of payment 
surpluses that have accrued to Saudi Arabia during the 1970's, have resulted 
in the steep growth of S.At-1A' s foreign assets and reserves. NCJV.T these assets 
l~~gely consist of foreign securities, Which is a major canponent of 
. . 1 14 1nh::Lnat1ona reserves. The growth of 4d roughly reflects oil revenues. 
Betwr:en 1973/74, 4d increased 18 times and betwee.11 1977/78, the situation 
changed from an outflow of SR 35,075 to an inflCJV.T SR 15,929 million. By 1981 
the outflow reache:J SR 122,040 million. Thus, in the 1970's and particulary 
after 1975, Saudi Arabia has been playing aJl increasingly imrx::>rtant role in 
international financial mrkets. In May 1980 the International Monetary Fund 
{IM!") made an agreement Whereby it could b:::>rrCJV.T upto SDR 8 billion over a 
period of 6 years for S.~-1!\. (In 1979 1 SDR -SR 4. 2825). The IMF o::msic'Jered 
the agree.11ent to be a substanatial contribution to the re-cycling process, 
stren~theninJ b:JL"h t_he Fund i·tself an:l the international moneL::uy system. At 
the s::hne time, Saudi l\_rabia' s Ir1F qL>Ota vJ3s doubled to SDR 2.1 billion and it 
. . board 15 was gl ven a permanent seat 0.'1 the IMF executl ve , . 
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Finally, table 6.8 looks at official reserves in Saudi Arabia between 
1973 and 1981, that is, the stock of reserves (not the flow). In 1973 
reserves wo._re SR 18, 040 m and by 1981 reserves reached SR 484, 170 million. 
Reserves increased more than three times between 1973 and 1974, and in 1975 
reserves doubled, reflecting the increase in oil revenues, as stated above. 
With the exception of 1978 When there was a relatively small decrease, 
reserves continue to rise throughout the period to 1981. When the data in 
table 6.8 is 
Table 6.8 Official Reserves (million riyals) 
1973 18,040 
1974 78,940 
1975 138,370 
1976 184,460 
1977 215,210 
1978 204,430 
1979 218,180 
1980 313,830 
1981 484,170 
Source: IMF, Intern3.~~<2r~a1 _L_inanc~~l-~~a~~st.ics Ye21r1xD'<: 1983 pp. 438-439 
looked at in relation to table 6. 7, a general pattern c-:-.erges, espe~cially 
after 1976. ii1her1 t!1e capital ac·count registers an outfJcr\v, tli'?re is a 
st.ock increase. 'Y..n_:is vr.::-ts t11e case ln 1979 v.'1en t.here v.'S.S a c.:1pi tal account 
outflov; of -SR 37, 231 a.'ld c:m increase in reserves t.o SR 218,180 million. 
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Conclusion 
Following the sUbstantial increase in oil revenues, the immediate aim 
of the Government was to utilise those revenues efficiently. The size of 
the revenues and of the Saudi Arabian p::>pulation encouraged the Government 
to adopt policies for economic diversification. Unlike Kuwait with a 
population of less than 1.5 million, Saudi Arabia was in a p::>sition to draw 
up both import substitution and export diversification plans. The 
Government began to implement these plans firstly by strengthening the 
country's infrastructure, as outline:'l in the Second Developnent plan period 
1975-80. 
Tne Government turned its attention directly to economic 
diversification in the Third Plan period 1980-85. The limited, existing 
domestic economy forced the Governm~~t to depend on imp::>rts to develop the 
econarry furtJ1er. Consequently, the de-nand for :i.rnports has been increasing 
rapidly since 1974. Linear regression analysis revealed that government 
consumpticn was the major determinant of imports and capital fixed 
formation v:as negatively related. Tnis was disapyointing because it 
suggested that the increase in imports are appare_I?tly n~ cont~ributing to 
f-uture develop:-nent. It also sh:Y..·JS tl1at the Government can control the 
de.ik''illd for irnp:>rts to so112 ex'cent, usef-ul when revenues decrease, as in 
1983. 
'rhe exccr,ination of industrial licenses discussed in c!1apter 3, 
suggested the Government h=:s c;chieve:J son2 success jn imple;11ent.ing its 
imp::>rt substitution fOlicies. This was the case ll1 construction-related 
industries in the First Plan perioo. After 1980, it appeared that imp::>rt 
substitution was taking place for durable goojs and transport goods, a good 
foundation for economic diversification. Given the limited domestic 
market, some r:osi ti ve steps have thus already been taken towards the 
implementation of import substitution policies. 
The need for foreign participation is an issue in Saudi Arabia's 
diversification plans. There has been a marked decrease in foreign 
participation after 1980 in import substitution plans, as the examination 
of industrial licenses showed. Although it means that Saudi Arabia is not 
attracting foreign investment, it may reflect the Government policy giving 
priority to Saudi Arabians in the awarding of contracts . The developnent 
of the lal::our force is no-Where near o.::Anpletion. S::rne o"bservers say that 
the Govern~ent should have started by developing the labour force; 
attitudes take decades to c..hange. In the meantime, despite arribi tious 
policies to limit the role of ex:patriates, they still ha.ve an essential 
role to play in the services sector, and in the Government policies for 
export diversification. 
It is rather too early to assess the success of e1e export 
divPrsification p:Jlicies. Against oil exr:orts, non oil exp:::n-ts have 
achieved little success. JIJ_though non oil exr:orts h3.ve increas2-d mxe than 
five times betwee."1 1973 - 1981. It is too early to judge because m:::ny of 
t..he large scale, c.:ipital intensive p2Lroch~11jcal plants axe o.1ly o:1:,i119 
ons-t:_rec.m tJlis Yeai 0 '.i"'llese plants are SCl unr:opJlar v.'i-i:h E:Xistin] \\'2Sb?l.-n 
SUFl_Jliers that success seeil1S likely. :!n ally case I the Govenr-,ent 1'-"1S 
founded its export diversification plans on well known economy theory by 
exploiting the available comparative advantage. 
Finally, Saudi Arabia is now facing muCh tighter financial constraints 
than it did in 1980. It is already causing sane difficulty, and is slowing 
down the implementation of econanic diversification plans . . This is not 
all tad. A case can be ma.de to suggest that the rationalisation of all 
Government plans is exactly What is needed, given the low financial 
constraints of the past decade. 
BIBLiffiRAPHY 
Books 
Birks, J .s. & Sinclair, C.A. The Domestic Political Econany in Saudi 
Arabia in Ed. Niblock, T. State, Society and 
Econcmy in Saudi Arabia. 
Bedore, J .M. & Turner, L.E. 
Caves, R.E. & Jones, R.W. 
Crane, R.D. 
El Mallakh, R. 
Emerson, E.C. 
IMF 
IMF 
J eddah Charrber of Cmmerce 
Lipsey, R.G. 
Looney, R.E. 
l•1oli ver, D .Jvl. & 
Abbondante, P.J. 
Shaw, J .A. & Long, D.E. 
Croom Helm, 1980 
Middle East Industrialization: A Study of 
Saudi and Iranian Downstream Investments. 
Saxon House 1980. 
World Trade Payments 
Little, Brawn & Canpany, 2nd ed. 1977, Ch. 7 
Planning the Future of Saudi Arabia • 
Praeger 1978 
Saudi Arabia: Rush to Develooment. 
Crocrn Helm 1982 
Prospects and Procedures for Establishing a 
Joint Venture in Saudi Arabia . 
CDMEI' 1981 
International Financial Statistics. 
Nove.llber 1979 
International Financial Statistics. 
Yearlx::Dk 1981 
International Financial Statistics. 
Yearl:xx>k 1983 
Annual Trade Directory 1980. 
Arebesk Ltd • 
An Introouction to Positive Economics. 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 4th ed. 1975 
Saudi Arabia's Deve1~ent Potential. 
Lexlilgton Books, 1982 
'I'h~ Econ~T!Y__<2_f Sa~C!_i __ t:rabia . 
Praeger 1980 
Saudi Arabia l•!o:'lerni:;:,atio:I: The Im-r:Bct of 
-=-----'-'--'= ------------- ---------------'- ----Chang~_C2_n_Stabili ty. 
Prae-ger 1982 
Trade and Investment in t_'r)e Middle F-2st. 
----------- --~--------------
f,lacmillan Press, 1977 
Wilson, R. 
United Nations 
Articles 
ABECOR 
The Econanics of the Middle East. 
Macmillan Press, 1979 
1980 Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics. Vol. 1 
(Association of European Banks) 
Saudi Arabia • 
Barclays. June, 1982 
Birks, J.S. & Sinclair, C.A. 
Braibanti, R. & Al Farsy, F. 
Christie, J. 
Eill 
Field, M. 
Hambleton, Prof. H.G. 
Renin, Dr. Claude 
H1F 
Loon<2y, R.E. 
National \'Jesbninst2r Brm..K: 
o,~'fl::illah 1 S • 
The International Migration Project. 
University of Durham, 1979 
Saudi Arabia: A Development Perspective 
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern 
Studies. 
Autumn, 1977 
Middle East Ncw~letters: Sauui Arabia. 
International Communications 16/26 May, 1983 
Quarterly Economic Review of Saudi Arabia. 
The Economist Intelligent Unit, 1983 
Regional Development in Saudi Arabia. 
a::>MRl'. May, 1983 
The Saudi Petrochemical Industry in the 
1980's. University of Laval. The First 
International _;rea Conference on Saudi 
Arabia: Energy, Development, Planning and 
Industrialization 
F.i.nancial Infrastructure of Saudi Arabia. 
University of Ottaw-a-~- fvlarch-l980 __ _ 
R~~nt on E>:chanERestrictioCLS. 
Washington, 1981 
S~~di ~ae~~~s Econanic Develop~ent 
Strategy: _Alternative Crude Q_~!:_ S~'=nar~os. 
i'-1orwegian Institute of Interna·tional 
Affairs. NoveJTib2r 1980 
Saudi Arabia: A..n Econonic Report. 1975________ --------- ------
RapajX)rt, c. 
Ritter, w. 
Turner, L. 
Turner, L. 
Wilson, R. 
Yates, J .Y. 
Goverr~~ent Publications 
Central Department of 
Statistics 
MinistlJ1 of Planning 
MinistlJ1 of Planning 
Ministry of In::'lustry and 
Electricity. Industrial 
Affairs "~gency. 
Indust_rial Statistics 
De:paxtrnent 
Researd1 and Statistjcs 
D2partment, Saudi _P.rabian 
!•ionetary Agency 
ResearCh ana Statistics 
D2partm211t 
The Financial Times . 
27 October, 1983 
Central Saudi Arabia. 
Dannstadt, 1975 
The Political and Economic rmpact of Saudi 
Arabia's Industrialization Policies. 
Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, 1980 
Saudi Arabia ' s Industrialization in a 
Regional Context. 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1980 
The Middle East and the EEC: An Analysis of 
Trade Flows . 
Intereconcmics. June, 1982 
Political and Economic Outlook for Saudi 
Arabia - sane j ssuPs for discussion. 
Norwegian Institute for International 
Affairs. June, 1980 
The Statistical Indicator. 
7th edition, 1982 
Third Develop~t Plan 1400- 1405. A.H. 
(1980-1985, A.D.) 
Census of Private Establishments in 1981 
Quarterley Lists _of Licer:sed Fa_~to!::.ies an~ 
Industrial Licenses issued by the Kil!_gdom 
of Saudi Arabia between 1975 and 1977 and 
1981 and 1982 
